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Ibis thesis concerns business advice to small and medium sized businesses 
(SNIEs). SNIEs account for the overwhelming number of businesses in OECD 
economies. Consequently, governments have come to see the SNIE sector as 
increasingly important to 'national competitiveness' and job creation, and 
therefore explored measures upport the sector. 
In the UK, government business support was channelled through the Business 
Links service, with a remit to support growth businesses. As part of Business 
Link a personal business advisor (PBA) service was developed to tailor SME 
assistance to the individual needs of small business, rather than offer a fixed set 
of programmes. 'Ibis has required PBAs to be able to identify the needs of 
individual businesses rather like a general practitioner before referring 'patients' 
to specialists. 'Mese complex assessments require advisors to make heuristic 
judgements and this research was interested in how they did that. 
The research used a qual-quant methodology. Research interviews with 
business advisors, where business advisors were deffied widely to include 
accountants and bank managers, elicited a set of heuristics developed into a 
theory of what advisors look for in a well-managed business. Ibis theory 
informed a survey of 175 PBAs in Business Links in England and Wales. 
The research suggests that SNIE performance is seen as non-sector specific. 
Good management is indicated by control, both financial and non-financial, 
with congruent objectives and strategy. 1hus PBAs are more concerned to 
identify and reinforce good management rather than promote a growth 
orientation. 
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PBA. Personal Business Advisors are employed as generalist advisors by 
Business Links. There is some debate about their role, whether they signpost 
small and medium sized companies to other advice or provide advice 
themselves. 
Business IinkIbesc are one-stop-shops to provide advice to companies with 
the number of employees betwecn 5 and 250, to facilitate their growth. 
SME Small and medium sized businesses: Ibc EU d6mition was based on the 
number of employees thus: 
1-9 employees describes a micro-enterprise 
1049 employees describes a small business, and 





This thesis concerns business advice to small and medium sized businesses (SNIEs). The 
contribution of the small and medium sized businesses to the economy has been enhanced in 
importance in the last twenty five years. Governments around the developed world have sought 
to improve the ability of these small companies to withstand the rigours of competition. Some 
have used soft loans. Many have come to the conclusion that the SME management is the key 
to develop the sector. Business advice is one area that has been used to improve the 
performance of SNIEs. 'Ibis thesis considers the methods by which business advisors assess 
businesses and decide which piece of advice to give. The task of business advisors might be seen 
as incredibly complex. Ibus, it is expected that advisors attempt to simplify the problem facing 
them. Advisors assess SNIEs using a limited set of heuristics to check the presence of good 
management. What they consider to be good management is the subject of this thesis. 
1.1 Background to the research 
The small and medium sized sector accounts for over 97% of all businesses. They do not 
account for 97% of the GDP of the economy but they do make significant differences to 
employment and importantly they can make a significant contribution to the development of 
new technologies (Kaplinsky, 1983; Oak-ey, 1984; Pavitt, 1984). The ability to generate new 
businesses in a region may have weighty consequences for the competitiveness of the region. 
New businesses, however, do not always last for a long time. Indeed, the survival rate is related 
to the birth rate of new businesses: the more births, the more deaths (Birley, 1986). The most 
successful new industries exhibit a great deal of 'churnine. Birch (1979) argued that the new jobs 
created in the US economy in the 1970's were overwhelmingly created in the SME sector. His 
research methodology has been questioned since, yet the results have been vindicated. In a 
separate but related theme Hannah (1996) reported research 'Are tall trees different? ' suggesting 
that large firms in the UK have outperformed both US and German large firms. But the UFCs 
economy as a whole underperformed, in particular, the German economy. One conclusion 
from this could be that the performance of SNIEs in a region and country determines the 
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prosperity of that region - the famed performance of the Afittelstand in the German economic 
miracle is an example. 
One of the central questions in SME research is to explain why it is that some new firms fail, 
others succeed, and very few succeed brilliantly. 1hus there are studies that aim to establish 
firms with high growth potential. Studies to explain the factors associated with the growth of 
businesses (Storey, 1994). Another strand has been to consider the environment within which 
firms are more successful (Kalleberg and Leicht, 1991). 
While these studies have been able to identify some of the factors associated with new firm 
success, they use a variety of definitions of the small firm, and at the heart of research into 
SNIEs there is a void where the central theory should be (Cooper, 1995). 
1.2 Research Question 
Given all the difficulties involved in predicting new firm performance, pity the poor bank 
manager. The Bank managers' and business advisors' task is to take a limited set of information 
and use it to make judgements about whether to support a business, or how to assist in 
improving its performance. The key word in the previous sentence is judgement. Advisors 'of all 
types are forced to make judgements about the performance of the SME. Economists suggest 
that you cannot pick winners, Milner (1988) puts it thus: Governments sbould be encouraged to irmed 
known sourres of '5warketfdlure", ratber than prr&ctfuturr events' (1988: 76). Advisors and investing 
community are required to do just that, however. It is an inexact science. 'Ibis research aims to 
uncover the processes and methods by which advisors go about their task. Making assessments 
about the performance, strengths and weaknesses of SMEs requires judgement. Casson (1992) 
defines judgement as decision-making in situations that are 'complex, novel and ambiguous'. 
These situations are uncertain rather than risky, risky decisions are those for which one can 
assign objective probabilities. Having assessed one's risk profile the economic actor can make a 
decision. However, when the situation is ambiguous the economic actor must assign their own 
subjective probabilities. Tversky and Kahnernan (1974) show that ýeople rely on a set of beurisfic 
prindýles wbicb reduce the coi*lex tasks of assessingprobabikfies and prr&cUng values to sitVlerjud gmentd 
o perafions'(reprinted in Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982) Advisors are likely to use heuristic 
processes. This research aims to uncover these heuristics. 
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1.3 My is this important? 
The first reason that this is important is that it will give many clues about the effect of business 
advice on the recipients. There seems to be an assumption that business advisors incorporate 
academic information and models about factors considered important for SME performance 
and then somehow deliver them to firms. They may not do this. In fact, it may be that the 
academic models are less important for advisors than business experience, or accountancy, or 
received wisdom. 
Many business advisors, if not the majority, have business experience. Storey suggested as such 
in his 1993 paper: 'Sbould we abandon support to business start-ups' in which he gave advice on 
recruitment for the nascent personal business advisors, (PBAs). With this business experience, 
advisors will bring views and thoughts about how business should be done and these might be 
extremely useful or they might not. Advisors can bring the knowledge of experience of running 
a successful business; perhaps they have experienced cash-flow difficulties or gone through a 
recession. These views, or rules-of thumb, that advisors may bring to their role are the subject 
of this thesis. 
Secondly, the methods by which advisors learn and utilise information about SME performance 
may be useful to enable academics to develop research for advisors in a form that is easily used - 
user friendly academic research. If academic models are not to be utilised, and are not useful 
then the 'language' might need to be changed to create effective communication. For example, 
we know that exporting SNIEs are among the more successful, this is fmc as far as academic 
research goes but for business advisors it lacks usefulness. Unless the performance of the 
enterprise is successfial they are unlikely to suggest exporting. 
7hirdly, the UK government has charged Business Links to be the delivery system for small 
business advice in the UK. Their remit is to help SMEs with the capacity to grow and realise 
that potential. However, there are different ways in which the Business Links have tried to 
accept this challenge. 'Ibis research is intended to contribute to that debate surrounding the 
promotion of SMEs. 
Fourth, the research attempts to build some theory about the model of good management 
within SMEs held by PBAs and business advisors. In uncovering this model the research will 
show how it is that PBAs attempt to improve the performance of SNIEs. This may provide a 
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model that, in future, can provide a set of hypotheses for evaluation research, to examine the 
effectiveness of this model and PBA advice. 
1.4 Methodology 
The methodology used in the research is a combination of both qualitative research methods 
and quantitative research methods. The thesis is not testing hypotheses derived from previous 
research. The literature review's role is to show how the existing literature shows the 
importance of the research question, and illustrates an approach based on decision-making 
under conditions of uncertainty and bounded rationality. Thus to derive a model of how 
business advisors assess the performance of SMEs, we need a theory-building section. 
Therefore a series of qualitative research interviews with business advisors made up the first 
element of the research. These semi-structured interviews were with accountants ' 
bank 
managers, Business Link personal business advisors (PBA) and other advisors. The definition of 
business advisor is discussed in a later section of this introduction. The thirty interviews, 
including a group interview with ten PBAs, were transcribed and coded. Each piece of 
information concerning how advisors looked at SMEs had its own code. After these codes were 
discovered the research then clustered these codes into the themes that emerged from the data. 
In turn a model of the internal performance of the SME is based on these themes. Having 
derived a model from the qualitative approach; the research considered methods to validate this 
model. The questionnaire developed the themes contained in the model to test its validity. Ibis 
self-administered questionnaire was sent to PBA managers for all the Business Links in England 
and Wales. Five of the Business Links refused to take part. PBAs returned 175 filled in 
questionnaires- a response rate of 25%. The response rate might have been a problem if there 
was a high degree of disagreement amongst the respondents. In the main, however, the 
responses agreed. 1bus the questionnaire responses could falsify our model of heuristics 
involved with SME performance. Ibis evidence is used to support the conclusion of the 
qualitative section of the study. 
1.5 Outhne 
The thesis is divided into six sections. In the first the introduction provides an overview of the 
thesis. The overview presents the subject and reports the research question, methods, 
definitions and scope. 
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The second section is the literature review. 'Ibis section considers the previous research 
concerning the performance of SNIEs. It divides into the three themes identified by Storey 
(1994), but also incorporates some elements of entrepreneurship research. The section sketches 
theories of the firm because these theories are the basis by which one can create a model of 
SME performance, particularly the growth theories of the firm. A fin-ther section of the 
literature review considers the decision-making under uncertainty. 'Ibis element is important for 
the discussion of assessments of SME performance. 
The third section, methodology, considers the various alternatives that could be used to 
illuminate the research question. This justifies the methods used, the data analysis and argues 
that the research is well-founded. 
The findings section is a large proportion of the thesis, which divides into two elements. Firstly, 
this considers the results from the research interviews. It therefore, presents the model that the 
following section validates. Secondly, the findings considers the responses to the serni- 
structured questions right through to the questionnaire responses. 
The final section is the conclusion to the research. In this section is the discussion of the 
findings. It presents conclusions about the research question and research problem. ̀ Ihe sixth 
section summarises and considers the thesis' contribution to knowledge. 
The structure of the thesis is quite traditional, although the research methodology might not be 
so traditional. 
1.6 Definitions 
There are a number of definitions that need to be made. Firstly the definition of small and 
medium sized enterprise is often dealt with in a different manner from research to research. 
Whilst conducting the research the European Union definitions have been used and cited when 
and if the respondents asked the researcher to define SNIE. lbus the definition concentrates on 
the number of full-time equivalent employees of the firm: 
* 1-9 employees describes a micro-enterprise 
9 10-49 employees describes a small business, and 
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0 100-249 employees describes a medium sized business. 
Having said that, the respondents usually replied with their definition and, given the research 
attempted to use their experience, their definition was the most important. In practice the 
research concentrated on the small businesses as defined by the EU definitions above, but for 
example the banks often used turnover definition and the PBAs used the definitions of their 
remit, that is 5-250 employees. There were occasions when it was pretty obvious that the 
participant's views described their experience with micro-enterprises. Indeed, qualitative 
research is predicated on the ontological argument that: 'rra§. ty is constructed by in&dduals involtied in
the rrsearrh situation. Thus, mu#le reakfies e)dst, such as the rra§fies of the rrsearrher, those qrtbe in&tidrials 
being invesýiated, and those of a reader or au&ence inteorrfing a studý' (Creswell, 1988: 76). Further, 
given that the interviews were engaging with the participarif s experience, if their experience was 
with micro-enterprises that was going to be the experience that one would tap. Interview 
participants did discuss their definitions of SNfEs and it is necessary to recognise differences in 
firm size of interviewees' experience. 
Besides the definition of SMEs, the defmition of what constitutes a business advisor is 
necessary. The starting point for this discussion is a piece of research for Shropshire TEC 
(Worrall, 1996). In this research the owners of small businesses were asked where they obtained 
their business advice. The top answer to this question was from their accountant-, this was 
followed by their bank manager. Ibis may have come as some surprise. The personal business 
advisors (PBAs) from Business Link were well down the fist. Therefore, the research defined 
business advisor in a wide manner. Hence the Est of research interviewees in section three varies 
from accountants, bank managers and PBAs to Princes Youth Business Trust co-ordinators and 
a venture capitalist from 3i. 
1he definition of entrepreneurship, which plagues this research area, has not been attempted, 
though literature from the research is used. There are other terms involved in the research such 
as strategy, leadership and control that are difficult to define. Some loose definitions are 
mentioned here. Leadership of the firm. concerns motivation, vision and the objectives for their 
businesses by the owner-mangers. Strategy puts the objectives into fruition and concerns the 
competitive environment surrounding the firm. Control is to do with the knowledge and 
management of resources, particularly cash. Culture is to do with the methods used by the firm 
and its ambience. However, it must be stressed that these definitions are loose. In conversation 
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with practitioners the experience has been that however you like to define a concept the 
interviewee carries on using their definition. For the most part this is not insurmountable but 
readers need to be aware of this. 
1.7 Scope of the Research 
The scope of the research is to consider the methods and processes by which those charged 
with providing business advice go about their task. The questionnaire provides evidence 
concerning the way in which Business Link personal business advisors advise small and medium 
sized companies. The research builds upon the assumption that to assess and advise an 
institution one needs a rudimentary, or sophisticated, model of how that institution works 
(Beer, 1979). Hence this research suggests a model used by the business advisors and validates 
this model on a population of PBAs; from Business Links. 1herefore, the model has not been 
validated across a wider group of business advisors. Although the initial group of advisors 
included a wider group. 
The research has not concerned itself with the owner-managers or managing directors of SNIEs. 
The question of whether the owner-manager recognise this model as (a) useful or (b) one used 
by the PBAs that they have come into contact with, is beyond the scope of the research. Also 
beyond the scope of the research is the matter of the efficacy of the model. The model 
describes the exemplar held by PBAs. The research does not examine whether the PBAs is a 
'correce view of good management within SMEs. That will have to wait for fin-ther research. 
1.8 Conclusion 
The thesis concludes with an explanation of the model of good management within SNIEs held 
by PBAs. The conclusion is that the PBAs are concerned with three areas of good management. 
leadership, strategy and control. The first thing that the PBAs like to establish, given that the 
firm is not teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, 'which is sometimes the case, is that there is 
adequate control exercised within the company. By control one means that the cash position is 
managed, that there is timely and useful management accounting available to the company, 
stocks are controlled and the shop floor is not a picture of chaos. Having established that 
company control is in place the PBAs then look towards the coherence between the vision and 
objectives that the owner-manager has for the company and the competitive approach. These 
issues are probed through a fairly unstructured conversational approach where the PBA. 
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attempts to establish rapport while encouraging the owner-manager to talk at length about his 
or her company. The conversations tend to elucidate error signals, both positive and negative, 
about the state of the management of the SNIE. Advisors expect that SME performance will 




In terms of sheer numbers, small firms dominate the market economy. Yet large firms dominate 
international trade; and hence, it might be thought, international competitiveness. However, the 
evidence shows that small firms make a valuable contribution to international competitiveness 
and, in particular, employment (Birch, 1979; Hannah, 1996). In support of employment 
creation, UK Govemnient intervention to support new business has been rationalised within 
Business Links where Personal Business Advisors (PBAs) assist companies with the potential for 
growth. 1his literature review reveals the thinking behind the shift of UK small business support 
policy enshrined in Business Link! s modus operandi, and considers the issues with which 
Business Links grapple, as they deliver the government's interventions that attempt to augment 
small firms' contribution to the economy. This section reviews the research base from which 
government interventions can draw. 
Historically the UFCs small firm sector has been less important than in other developed nations 
such as Germany and Japan (Deakins, 1996). The job creating potential of the sector has 
received more attention in the 1980's and 1990's. Yet most new firms will never employ more 
than twenty people, and researchers expect a small number of high growth new firms to provide 
the bulk of the employment growth in the sector. Moreover, the growth in new firm business 
start-ups and the importance of the SME sector has been accompanied by high death rates. 
Highly volatile small firms may benefit the pool of small firms and local competitiveness; but 
many fail and the social costs of failure may be high. In addition the quality of the jobs created 
in small firms can be variable, many are low-skilled, low-paid jobs (Deakins, 1996). Deakins 
argues, however, that the emphasis hould shift not from new firms to established firms; but to 
increased quality of small businesses (Deakins, 1996) 
The review divides into sections. The first looks at the small firm sector of the economy. What 
are the attributes of the small firm sector of the economy? It considers the definitions of SNIEs 
and the statistics about births, growth and employment creation. Second, from the discussion of 
the small firm sector, the review turns to the policy implications. Policy has shifted from blanket 
9 
support to new business start-ups and toward support for established SNIEs. Ihird, from that 
policy change it turns to measurements of success. Mat constitutes success for the small firm? 
And what constitutes success for those observing the small firm? Fourth, given that the dti 
charges advisors to help the small firmwith growth potential, what theory is available to guide 
practitioners? The review considers economic theories of the firm to guide those acting as 
advisors. There are also other themes in the literature including entrepreneurship, that 
concentrates more on the individual firm owner. These are considered also. Fifth, many 
empirical studies attempt to explain the success of the growing SNIE. Storey (1994) suggested 
that the SNIE's performance is dictated by a combination of manager, firm and strategy, this 
structure lends itself to a fin-ther presentation of literature. This section reports empirical studies 
from, mostly quantitative analyses, though some believe that this research is difficult to use in 
practice. Sixth, Given the complexity of small business management this section considers how 
decision-makers use heuristics. These short-cuts simplify complex tasks into 'bite sized' chunks 
of easily digestible data to make the problem of SME assessment tractable. Seven, finally the 
review considers research on heuristics used by bank managers and private small investors who 
are in a somewhat analogous position to that of business advisors in their diagnostic role. The 
review considers what constitutes SME success; what models of both firms and entrepreneurial 
behaviour are available and how decision-makers judge the success or potential of a small firm. 
2.1 The Small Firm Sector 
What is a small firm? The UK! s Bolton Report suggested that one definition of a small firm was 
inappropriate and those employee definitions, such as that of the European Union, should be 
augmented by a turnover definition, and a definition based upon characteristics. Turnover 
definitions are often used by banks as they reveal risk exposure, since banks are concerned 
directly with finance not jobs. The difficulty with the turnover definition is that, with time and 
inflation within an economy, turnovers expand and definitions date. Consequently, turnover 
definitions are seen less often in academic research, although they are used by banks. The 
characteristics definition argues that small firms: have a small share of the market, are managed 
by owners or part-owners in a personalised way and operate independently. Definitions of 
characteristics are not often used in research but are implicit in research samples, or are used to 
construct the rationale for the sample. 'Ibus for example, Kingston's study considered a small 
firm to be what a small firm owner would consider to be a small firm (Curran, Black-bum and 
Woods, 1992). Deakins (1996) argues that the EU definitions are too broad. 'Mey capture 99% 
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of all firms. Indeed firms with fewer than 20 employees account for 98% of all firms. In 
statistical research one or two medium sized companies can lead to distortion in the data and 
thus errorswithin the results of a study. Ibis is much more a problem for survey research into 
small firms than it is for qualitative research. Nonetheless, EU definitions, based on 
employment are widespread and often quoted. Ibey are: 
Aficro-enterprise 1- between 0-9 employees 
Small business = between 1049 employees; and 
Medium sized company = between 100-249 employees. 
These definitions are covered in the term small and medium sized enterprises (SNIEs). The use 
of employees as a definition of small business appears widespread. The ESRC fimding 
programme reported in Storey (1994) used employment as the main defining variable. Having 
defined small firms., largely in terms of employees; the next section concentrates on the 
characteristics of the small firm sector. 
It is important to note some of the characteristics of the small firm sector, notably its 
uncertainty and the precarious existence of many small firms. Table I considers the turnover 
levels for small firms in 1989. It shows that around one-in-three small firms have turnovers of 
less than Ll 5000 p. a. These firms are merely surviving. 
Table I Small Firm Tumover 1989 
Tumover_LOOOs No. Firms Percentage Cumulative percentage 
0-14 1046 35 35 
1549 939 31.4 66.4 
50-99 345 11.6 78 
100-249 339 11.3 89.3 
Source: Deakins (1996) 
The next tranche of turnover in the table is the under C49 000, and the cumulative column 
shows that almost two-in-three small firms were turning over under L50,000 p. a. And that is not 
all, the degree of churning is high for the small firm too. Table 2 reports firm births and deaths 
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for the period 1987-89, split into services and production and manufacturing. The high birth 
rates of small firms are associated with high death rates too. 
Table 2 Firm Births and Deaths for the Period 1987-89 
Employees 
Firm 
in the Services Production and Manufacturing 
Births (000s) Deaths (000s) Births (000s) Deaths (000s) 
1-4 240 166 82 62 
5-9 139 133 78 84 
10-19 76 101 65 95 
20-49 28 45 28 55 
Source; Deakins (1996) 
This table demonstrates the high death rates amongst the smallest businesses. Although the 
numbers of net firms employing between 1-4 people are increasing, there are many going out of 
business. The numbers of new firm births and deaths decrease rapidly with the increase in firm 
size; though note the negative net figures for the 20-49 employee size band. In her study of an 
American region Birley (1986) showed that the high rate of growth in transport and business 
services and net growth in these sectors was accompanied by high rates of firm deaths. High 
death rates are not necessarily bad as far as the economy is concerned; they are, however, 
miserable for the individual owners, many of whom invested their savings as equity in the 
business (Deakins, 1996). Small firms inhabit a turbulent environment. 
'1he start-up rates ignore the quality of businesses. The high start-up rates may not represent 
quality businesses. Deakins (1996) argues that policy makers are far too concerned with the 
numbers of start-ups and ignore the quality of businesses, though this may change as the 
emphasis changes towards fast growth firms. 
Westhead and Birley (1994) show that VAT de-registrations are higher in older industrial areas. 
Conurbation's lost jobs even throughout the 1987-90 boom period in the UK Keeble and 
XWker (1993) demonstrate significant regional variations in new business formation and growth 
of small businesses within the UK- New firm formation is higher in the south-east, south-west 
and East-Midlands than in the North, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Significant reasons for 
firm formation and growth are local population growth, capital availability (house prices) and 
professional and managerial expertise. They found the effect of enterprise agency support was 
to reduce the death rates of firms. The role of home ownership to finance firms is important. 
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Home ownership can reduce the liquidity constraints surrounding a firm and it influences the 
propensity to enter entrepreneurship (Evans and jovanovic, 1989; Batstone and Alansfield, 
1992) 
Evidence from the US suggests that firms that generate jobs improve their chances of survival, 
shown in table 3 
Table 3 Age of Business, jobs Created and Improved Chances of 
Survival 
Age of Business No jobs created Improved chances of survival by those 0- firms that create jobs relative to those 
........ - --------  -------------------- -  - 
that do not. 
up to 2 years 1 20 % 
41 40% 
4 years 24 80% 
6 with 10 or more 10+ near 100% chance to survive the next 
employees four vears 
Source: Philhps and Mrchoff (1988) 
Ibis table compares business age and jobs created with improved chances of survival from 
those firms that do not create jobs. Firms that create one or more job in their first years of 
tradin& therefore, have better chances of survival, and those that create the most jobs have the 
best chance to survive. Ibus employment growth and firm survival are correlated. The 
correlation might indicate that job generation causes urvival, it may, however, be that both job 
creation and survival are associated with other factors, such as management ability. Could, 
therefore policy support to three or four years old businesses concentrate resources on those 
more likely to survive and prosper?. This is the subject that has exercised policy makers and 
acaden-ýics from the late eighties to the early nineties. 
If the small firm sector is turbulent, it is making something of a comeback. Using employment 
as a defining variable SNIEs have become more important since the nineteen -seven ties. In the 
UK the key increase has been in the number of, and proportion of employment in, micro- 
enterpnses. 
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T2ble 4 Micro-enterprises: Firms, Share of Firms and share of 
Employment 1979-1989 
1979 1986 1989 
- ------ -----  ---------------- ------  ---------- ---------------------------- No. Firms 1597 2308 2802 
n-kro-enterprises as % total firms 91.6 93 93.8 
micro-entemrises % total emplownent 19.2 27.8 28.6 
Source: Deakins (1996) 
The perceived relative importance of small finns to the economy has changed over the post-war 
years. In 1971, the Bolton Committee investigated the declining number of small firms in the 
UK, as large firms crowded out small fmns and industrial concentration increased. Large firms 
in the UK out-completed small firms. As recently as 1981 Aaronovitch et al reported 'Betuven The 
tbinies and 1968 the bundreM largestfirms inmased tbdr sbarr of net ouiputfrvm 23 to 41 per cent, but the 
propo&on acrountedfor ýy the 100 laqestplants (I I percent) was s, 611 the same' (1981: 263). Yet by the 
late seventies, researchers reported that small firms were making a comeback. Research by Birch 
(1979) however, using Dun and Bradstreet data showed small firms created two-thirds of new 
jobs, across all sectors of the US economy, between 1969 and 1976. Birch's work influenced 
policy-makers just as incoming Conservative governments sympathetic to small firms came into 
power in the UK and US. 
Despite its influence, Birch's works attracted criticism on methodological grounds. First, his data 
was collected for the purposes of credit rating not research, and covered both firms and 
establishments. The existence of multi-plant large firms means that some jobs attributed to 
small firms were created in a small plant that was part of a large firm, precisely the point made 
by Aaronovitch. Criticisms also focus on Birch's dependent variable net job change. Net job 
change in manufacturing in the US between 1969 and 1976 was negative; as large firms shed 
labour. Critics argue that rather than measuring the success of small firms; Birch measured the 
fAure of large firms. However, Birch's research provoked subsequent work by the US Small 
Business Administration. It found firms with twenty workers or less comprised 19.4 per cent of 
US employment but created 37 per cent of new jobs (reported in Storey 1994). Although 
Birch's evidence may represent failure for large firms as much as success for small firms, might 
be historically specific to this period, and might be methodologically flawed; it showed 
nonetheless that in the 1970's small firms created more than their share of new jobs in the US 
economy. 
14 
Moreover, small firms might be important in international competition. Hannah (1996) studied 
large firms in the UK, US and Germany and found large firms in the UK outperformed their 
US and German counterparts; yet Britain's growth rate was worse. The Economist noted 2VIr 
Hannab aques Mat dfferences in the pqfomance of smaLl and mid-siZFdfirms my batie a bigger effect on 
, growtb. 
' (Tbe Economist 2/11/96 p122). SMEs play a pivotal role in economic development 
creating jobs and growth. 
1hough the studies by Birch suggested that small firms were job generators in the US, UK 
estimates for a slightly earlier period found that only 0.8% of the growth in manufacturing 
output was attributable to firms employing less than 25 people in the period 1968-1975 
(Fothergill and Gudgin, 1979). Ibis could be due to newer technologies t*ing hold later than 
the early seventies. A study in the late eighties found that small firms were as important as large 
firms (Daly et al., 1991). 71bese studies are based on VAT registration data. Daly's net fertility 
index does reveal the fertility of the 14 firm size in the period that his study covers, see table 5. 
Net fertility is defined as the share of net job gain/ share of overall employment. Again this is 
divided into production and service sectors. 
Table 5 Daly's Net Fertility Index (1987-89) 
Firm Size (employees) Service Sector Production 
1-4 2.7 6.3 
5-9 1.0 2.1 
10-19 0.4 1.0 
20-49 0.8 0.8 
50-99 0.9 1.1 
100499 0.9 0.8 
500-999 1.1 1.6 
10004999 0.8 0.2 
5000-9999 0.3 0.3 
10000+ 0.7 0.4 
Source: Employment Gazette (August, 1992) 
Although, Daly's fertility index shows small fmns that employ 1-4 people as the most fertile, 
longer research projects suggest the distribution is less equaL Storey et al (1987) report 
employment in ten years old surviving start-up firms in Northern England, shown in table 6. 
The firms started at anytime between 1965 and 1978. Table 6 shows 774 firms, over half 
employed less than ten employees. just I per cent employed over 100 workers and 6 per cent 
is 
of the start-ups, supported 33.8 per cent of the jobs (Storey et al, 1987 reported in Storey 1994). 
1hus one-in-a-hundred start-ups will become a medium sized firm ten years later. 
Table 6 Employment in surviving openings of wholly new manufacturing 
firms in northern England 1965-78 
Employment Number of Percentage of Total Arithmetic % Total 
size in 1978 Firms Survivors Employment mean Employment 
Employment in Size Group 
1-9 429 55.4 1862 4.3 15.7 
10-24 217 28.1 3297 15.2 27.8 
2549 81 10.5 2693 33.2 22.7 
50-99 39 5 2629 67.4 22.2 
100+ 8 1 1376 172 11.6 
Total 774 too 11587 14.9 too 
Source: Storey (1994) 
Other research concurs. Recent data from Northern Ireland manufacturing businesses showed 
9.5 per cent of firms created 43 per cent of the subsequent employment (NIERC, 1988). Storeys 
constructs a model of employment in small firms with similar distributions and mean 
employment as table 6 demonstrating the top four per cent produce half the jobs. However, he 
assumed a 40 per cent survival rate, which is sensitive. VAT registrations show the survival rate 
to be more like 30 per cent. (Ganguly, 1995) A firm start-up in 1989 has a one-in-three chance 
of still trading today. I re-calculated the table using a 33 per cent survival rate and found the 
result that the top 4 per cent of firms creates 37 per cent of the employment generated. 
Nonetheless, a few firms create most employment growth in the SME sector. 
In a similar vein, Smallbone, North and Leigh (1993) advocate government business support for 
mature SNIEs. 'I'hey examined the extent to which firms turned to outside help. 'Mey sample 
consisted of 306 ten year old manufacturing companies, in three locations, that employed less 
than 100 people. External assistance included both formal and informal contacts, although the 
paper reported only specific examples of help. They found that nearly half the firms used no 
outside assistance. The most common form of external assistance involved paid consultants, 
generally used by larger and better performing firms. Rural firms were most likely to use external 
assistance, two-thirds having done so, showing the success of the rural development 
commission. Business planning and design and product development were the most common 
types of consultancy demanded by the small firms, with design and product development 
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clustered in London based electronics and instrument firms. Design and product development, 
where a consultant addresses a specific issue, attracted a high level of satisfaction. Generally 
satisfaction with consultancy was high but the researchers found that business planning 
consultancy was more difficult to deliver to the client's satisfaction. Smallbone et al. found 37% 
of their panel more than doubled their turnover in the 10 years of their study. These firms 
created more than four in every five new jobs created by the firms in the panel. Again in mature 
SMEs the pattern of few firms creating most jobs is evident. Smallbone et al. say policy should 
target two types of mature SMEs. First, firms that want to grow but do not (27% of their 
sample) second, fast growing firms that need support because they have yet to achieve a size big 
enough to survive a recession (turnover = CO. 5m) or because growth has been at the expense of 
profitability. The government's Enterprise Initiative shifts support to established businesses 
(Stanworth and Gray, 1991). The scheme seems to have increased the use of consultants by 
SMEs although subsidised firms implemented fewer consultants' recommendations (Smallbone 
et al., 1993). Mature SMEs can, with government support, increase their growth and create 
many new jobs. 
One powerful argument against he idea of targeting, 'picking winners' is that the distribution of 
employment creation, though very uneven, may be random. The stochastic process, shown in 
figure 1, models this. In this figure all positions have a fifty-fifty chance of a 10 per cent increase 
or decrease 'in firm sales. Assume the process starts with all firms at the same point which for 
the sake of simplicity call 100. 
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After the sixth time the process occurs, six tterations, one firm has grown by over 60 per cent, 
four firms by over 30 per cent, and five firrns by 10 per cent, similar to the outcomes seen in 
the study of Northern English firms from 1965-78. But each firm at each point in the process 
has an even chance of growth or contraction. In this stochastic process you cannot pick which 
firm will 'win' and which will 'lose'. It is possible to identify firms that do very well, in hindsight, 
but that is not the same as being able to pick winners. Economists have shied away from 
picking winners, particularly by government departments. The consensus amongst economists 
at present is that specific intervention by government to support industries fails to realise net 
economic gains. 
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Caves (1998) reports empirical evidence regarding the growth of firms. He suggests that firms 
can have consistent growth. Geroski, Machin and XWalters (1997) in a study of large UK firms, 
estimated positive regression coefficients of one year's growth on the last three previous years 
growth rates, but observed a negative correlation with the previous year. Baldwin (1995) in a 
survey of Canadian manufacturing firms divided them into gainers and losers. The average 
continuing firm increased employment by 1.5% but the average gainer increased employment by 
7.8% and the average loser reduced employment by 6.3%. Caves (1998) notes: 
, gafiveyear-toyear utocoryrlafion 
appean in the týpicalfirm's et*loyment cbalEes amund Ne 
ge rates ofgrowtb forfims that e, %panded ag long term tirnd, shomm by coiVaring avera 
eVloyment in a given jear to annua§! Zedgrvutb rates for those that expanded cumulatimly, 
ovff logerperiods (Cams, 1998, p 1950). 
Growth then appears as a non-random event for a firm. 
However, a second critique of this policy shift uses models of natural selection. Hannan and 
Freeman (1989) found that population dynamics explain the births and deaths of firms better 
than studies of managerial strategies. They studied the births and deaths of unions over one 
hundred years, the size of organisations in the semiconductor industry from world war II to the 
late eighties, births and deaths of San Francisco newspapers over one hundred years and the 
changing pattern of specialist and generalist local restaurants in part of the US (quoted in Peters, 
1992). Hannan and Freeman say. 
Most of the vadabi§ty in coir stmaures Sr organisadon [fun&onal tvnur diisional venus 
, ganisadons and... 
the 
, gb the cmadon of new or matrixforms 




demise of older ones. Exisfing organisations, e  y the laqest and mostborqful rarr y 
,g and structure quickly enoýgb 
to keo in toucb nith .. uncerzýdn, cbanging cbange strate 
endmn, ments (1992., t6l6). 
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71h ey als ono te: most vrifiý(g and rrsearrb on organisafions concentrates on the largest and most successfuL This 
is almost alrays a mistake if one aunts to learn about the processes rbirb result in success andfailurr. (1992, 
618) 
Hannan and Freeman use natural selection models from ecological theory. The example of US 
retailers Wal-Mart and Sears illustrates their arguments. Wal-Mart formed in Arkansas in the 
mid-1960's. It follows a number of business practices (it spontaneously appears in the natural 
selection jargon), which have become the accepted 'way of doing things' within Nval-Niart. Ten 
years pass and then the environment changes. Wal-Mart starts to grow very quickly and Sears, 
the dominant player in the market, has problems. Wal-Mares strategy suddenly starts to work 
very well once the environment changed; Sears and older-type retailers may expire. 'Ibus 
companies have strategies and if the environment is favourable they grow. They may become 
major players, the environment changes again and another new upstart knocks them off their 
peg. Schumpeter's cycle of creative destruction is not dissimilar. 
'Me average start-up is likely to fA, but these start-ups maybe important because '. selecdon 
processes can only work on the atdlable dirryi_4'. The companies have to spontaneously appear to 
enter the selection process. Natural selection reinforces the more adapted fxms from the 
available diversity, but this is better, not perfectly, adapted. If diversity is small perhaps the 
'Australia solution' occurs where governments protect firms because they are uncompetitive 
internationally. Hannan and Freeman are part of a powerful counter-argument to the picking 
winners' hypothesis. Does a change in the environment ever induce a response? Do changes of 
the environment induce spontaneous appearances omehow? 
The properties of organisations reflect the conditions surrounding their foundation. British oil 
company BP has always been good at finding oil reserves. Shell's forte is marketing, still today 
the firm reflects its history and core properties. Xnere different organisational forms exist in an 
industry it is due to the companies being formed in different eras; thus IBNI, Apple, Microsoft 
and Netscape are all in computing but formed in different periods. 
Hannan and Freemen saT. we reject the view that the diversity of organisational structures at any 
time reflects only recent adaptations of organisations, in favour of the view that diversity reflects 
a long history of foundings and displacements of organisations with fairly unchanging structures. 
(1992,620). Indeed, firstly organisations do not change easily because they institutionalise 
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themselves and their procedures and secondly, they ought not to change easily since selection 
favours organisations have a very distinctive competence. The firm has to execute its strategy 
and hope to be selected: We argue that organisational selection processes favour organisations 
with relatively inertial structures, that cannot change strategy and structure so quickly as their 
environment can change. ' (1992,621) 
Ibus a corporate culture, widely shared values and a firm x way of doing things are necessary for 
success but once successful inertia sets in. There is little to do say Hannan and Freeman 
Hi tb , gb 
levels of inenia may pmduce serious mismatches between oýganisafional outcomes and e 
intenfions of members [i. e. ýefforts to ebang strategv] in a changing entironment, On the other 
, ganisalions 
that tg to [ft band or xgproduce veg Attle , gbt 
back and] ir-oganisefirquentyl 
and hatr s§: gbt chances of sunivaL The wont of allpossible worlds is to chan , ge structure 
confinua, ýi only tofind each fime u pon rr-oganisadon that the entironment has aIrra, # sbi)Ted 
to some new conft , gurafion 
that demandsjet a dfferrnt structure. (1992,62 1) 
There are two different biological strategies, the r and the K, to carry on the ecological 
metaphor. Given that natural selection explains the processes it is reasonable to suppose the 
biological methods to ensure survival of the species are gen-nane to the survival of the firm. The 
r strategy releases large numbers of offspring each with a low level of energy and with a poor 
survival record. Under the right conditions the numbers of these offspring can grow rapidly 
(Like flies, mosquitoes). Hannan and Freeman say this strategy maximises t. the speed ofgmuth in 
q 'pen entimnments. 
'(1992,623) 
The K strategy, followed by humans and whales, has a small number of offspring with a great 
deal of energy going into each. The single offspring has a good chance of survival, unlike in the r 
strategy, and the population expands even under competitive conditions. The K strategy is able 
to withstand rivals but is slow to change. Slow environmental change, for example during the 
1950s, favours K strategies. Fast environmental change favours r strategies. 'Ilie r strategy firms 
are not more adaptable, the strategy works because there are enough new firms to offset the 
failure rate. According to Hannan and Freeman: 'ourpm . 
posifion that eag-to-build organisafions 
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, 
prokferate in modern sodey [is] an argument that the cbaracter of [modern sodqys] entirvnmental 
variadons .. fatioun the 
[rstrateg]'(1992,621). 
In an especially volatile environment the flexible firm, if that is not a contradiction, which is a 
collection of small firms will have an advantage over the K strategy firm (Boeing or IBNý. 
However, the ability to respond quickly may be in competition with the ability to perform 
reliably as in the K strategy. Technology may be important. 
One might note the parallel between the discussion of strategy and the proposals to target 
resources at growth firms, which suggests aK strategy and those who believe in policies to 
increase the total number of new firm formation r strategy. Thus one might conjecture that the 
support for a small number of g rowing businesses would be more successful in a slow changing 
environment whilst the new firm support would help in fast changing environments. Given new 
innovative areas are usually fast changin& a discussion of biological strategies and small firm 
support might be fruitful for government agencies. 
Peters (1992) thinks the r strategy favours flatter, more organismic organisations, using networks 
rather than hierarchies, following on from Burns. The similarity to Schumpeter's creative 
destruction begs the question of whether the environment will continue to favour the r strategy 
or; provide a framework to benefit the K strategy with a stable international system based on 
the Euro, Yen and US Dollar. 
For Hannan and Freeman then the key for developing the SME sector in a turbulent 
environment, is to develop new firms and lots of them. In contrast to the ideas of Storey and 
Smallbone who would favour aK strategy. In a sense the arguments over UK SME support is 
to switch strategies from r to K The problem is one of (a) identifying the Ks and (b) nurturing 
them rather than killing them with kindness. Again we return to the issue of how to help fast 
growing small firms. 
There is no agreement about how to measure a fast growth firm -through employment, 
turnover or the like, though it can be noted that turnover and employment are positively 
associated theoretically (Allen, 1967). The inherent difficulty is that conditions are unstable, 
tirning may be important. Despite these difficulties researchers have sought to identify fast 
growth firms, rather than act on the constraints that hold firms back from growth. 'Ibus instead 
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of looking at the major constraint on growth in SNIEs of available finance and looking at ways 
round this; research has focused on identifying firms with the potential to grow quickly. Deakins 
notes that there is a difference between those that achieve growth and those that wish to grow. 
His research with Afro-Caribbean businesses suggests that half 'Wished to grow but faced 
constraints of a niche market and the socio-economic status of the area. Indeed Reid et al 
(1993) suggest that the typical micro-enterprise experiences growth at some time or other, in the 
first three years. 
There are a number of suggested reasons for the increase in the number and importance of 
small firms in this period. Small firms, it is said, can respond more quickly to the pace of 
technological change. The structure of the economy has changed to favour the small firm. 
Deakins (1996) posits eight reasons for the increase in small firms: 
1. the growth of the service sector where minimum efficient scales are much lower, 
2. technical changes favouring small-scale production; 
3. the ability of the small firm to react to market opportunities; 
changes to government policy - the enterprise culture; 
5. macro-economic policy - changes to corporation tax, income tax and so on; 
enterprise agencies; 
7. local authori6es; 
8. high unemployment and high levels of redundancy. 
All these changes may have boosted the small firm. The key changes it would seem to me are 
those involving technological change. Freeman and Perezs (1988) work suggests that 
technological change can lead to a period of great uncertainty in the economy where the pace of 
change increases. It would appear that this change to the environment favours small firms in 
newer industries at the expense of large firms in older sectors of the economy like steel, coal, 
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manufacturing and even banking and finance (ONS, 1998). The small firm sector has become 
increasingly important for the UK economy. Yet the sector is not uniformly thriving. 
The quality of start-ups brings us onto the role of start-ups. Deakins studied start-ups from an 
Enterprise Agency. They surveyed 117 firms all under three years old. The found that their 
constraints for growth were: 
1. Financial resources 
2. Competition from other businesses 
3. Human resources 
4. Physical resources 
5. Administrative resources 
Given the key constraint were financial resources the researchers examined sources of finance 
for start-up businesses shown in table 7. The table below shows the mean score for the sources 
of finance with a score ranging from 0 (no importance) to 5 (very important). 
Table 7 Sources of Finance for Start-ups 
Source Alean score (0-5) 
Personal savings 3.0 
Family and friends 1.43 
Bank overdraft 1.31 
Personal assets 0.75 
Bank loan (secured) 0.62 
Bank loan (unsecured) 0.49 
Other loan 0.43 
Re-mortgage 0.31 
Insurance policy 0.25 
Local authority 0.13 
PYBT 0.11 
Source: reported in Deakins (1996) p58 
Ibus finance comes most often from personal savings followed by money from family and 
friends. To increase the numbers entering entrepreneurship then policies to increase the savings 
rate in the economy or locality, like support for credit unions, might be more important than 
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training. But if finance is available the individual has got to want to own their business. Motives 
for new business owners are presented in table 8. Note that there is a very low priority given to 
the wish to lead others. 
Table 8 Motivation for Self-employment 




Picking people you work with 3.4 
Building an enterprise that can survive 3.0 
Status 2.5 
Leadine others 2.1 
Source: Deakins (1996) 
Founders of companies believed that their most important skills were planning and controlling, 
followed by negotiation skills, and those associated with acting as a figurehead Peakins, 1996). 
There were four key factors that prevented potential start-ups from going ahead: availability of 
sufficient finance, confidence, lack of knowledge and lack of support. 
Deakins also asked about the personal difficulties that lead to the decision not to go ahead with 
self-employment Ibus financial. commitments and insufficient finance were the key areas that 
stopped potential self-employment both personal, within the farrdly and for the business. Ibis 
might reflect a poor quality business proposal. 71hus a business that attempted to undercut a 
highly competitive market, like car valeting for instance. might suffer from anticipated cash flow 
problems. Their cost of premise may be higher than the business could support. Yet insufficient 
start-up fmance could suggest hat there is a lack of equity available to would be entrepreneurs. 
Deakins reports more tentative findings related to business fAure, again in rank order 
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Table 9 Factors preventing business start-ups and causing business 
failure 
Factors preventing start-up Personal factors preventing Factors leading to business 
start-up failure 
-------------  -- ------  ------------- ------------------- - -------------------------------------- ------ ---- ------------------ --------------  -------- - -------------- insufficient start-up finance financial commitments lack of knowledge of 
marketing 
anticipated cash flow family commitments competing family/domestic 
problems task demands 
change in home circumstances 
cost of business premises 
unacceptable risk 







anticipated problems of 
outlets 
fear of failure (especially single 
women) 
lack of general self-confidence 
problems of outlets 
lack of market awareness of 
their product/service 




adequate job satisfaction 
inadequate support from 
partner/spouse 
lacking skills for the tasks that 
they will meet 
unacceptable risk 
change in home circumstances 
inappropriate sizes of outlets inappropriate size of business 
premises 
Source: adapted from Deakins (1996) 
One of the interesting things to note is the differences between the market failure, although the 
sample size makes these findings tentative. 1here are many studies about business failure (e. g. 
Hall, 1995). Interesting to note is the increased influence of marketing amongst business 
failures., something that does not figure in the reasons for not starting up businesses. 
Insufficient finance has transmuted into insufficient mark-up. Thus instead of the finance being 
unavailable, business failures could not sustain sufficient profit margins for investment or, 
presumably, to cover financial commitments. In a study of Canadian small firms Baldwin et al 
(1997) note that: 
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gement skiUs and ebaracterisfics ... firmsfdI because tbg sitIly do not 
have the basic mana 
necessag for success. Firms that sunive the fint jean of Afe sucressfiulýly detelop core 
coiVetendes - management a dfinandal expertise - ar well as market specific apabiAfies 
rrgar&ng what to produce, how it is to be produced, and bow it mill be marketed (Successful 
Entrants). BankVt firms, on the other hand, siij# do not devekp their core 
capabikfier ... Alanagement's lack of abiky plays less of a role 
in fdlurr than lack of 
pondents to have been a gement is stated by 45% of rrs y mana knon-lecge ... Lack of control b 
m, ýor contributor to banknptg. This is a result of management inexperience. Control is 
"ported as a causalfactor behind bankruptg in about two-thirds of these [more than ten 
ei*Ioyeesjfirms. (1997.24,25) 
Daly's data does suggest that the employment effects attributable to small firms are more diffuse 
than is suggested by Storey (1994). He suggests that half the net job generation came from firms 
that move from the 14 class to the 5-9 group. However, Dalf s data is seen as exceptional and 
it covers only two years. 
2.2 Policy Implications of the Small Firm Sector 
The small firm sector is turbulent. Small firrnýs profits and sales fluctuate more widely than 
larger firms because they are more likely to depend on single products or customers (Storey et 
al., 1987; Cambridge Small Business Research Centre, 1992). VAT deregistration rates for UK 
firms demonstrate that ceasing to trade is more prevalent for younger firms than older. Almost 
one-third of VAT registered businesses cease to trade in the first three years; it takes a further 
seven years for the next third to cease trading (DoE, 1992). The VAT deregistration rates for 
UK firms reveals that those with turnovers less than L14000 in 1980 were six times as likely to 
deregister than those with a turnover of k2m (Ganguly, 1985). Storey (1994) suggests that half 
the jobs created by new firms are created in just 4% of firms. Other studies confirm the uneven 
impact of new firms on job creation (Gallagher and Miller, 1991; Smallbone et al., 1992). 'Mus, 
small firms fit three categories: short-life firms that trade for less than three years Cturnover 
firmsý; firms which survive without significant growth Ctrundlersý; and the under 20% of firms 
that create a significant number of jobs Cgazelles) (Storey, 1993). Switching public support 
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resources from increasing the formation rate of new firms to supporting growing businesses can 
provide more jobs for any given level of support (Storey, 1993). 
Audretsch (1995) argues that most small firms fail because firms must achieve the minimum 
efficient scale within a few years of start-up. A few firms grow to challenge the established 
firms in an industry and economy. The basis of start-ups for Audretsch is knowledge and 
innovation. The reason that the number of firms has increased is because the existing 
tendencies towards routinization (accepted production practices) and industrial concentration 
have encountered new knowledge and a host of innovative opportunities for new firms. The 
idea of routinization seems to ignore the wide productivity differences between firms in the 
same industry, even in the same industry and area (Coase, 1988). Ibus; the particular times 
provide the impetus for a shift towards more small firms. Audretsch's examines innovation, he 
is less concerned with small firms per se. Consequently, he may dismiss Storey's trundler firms 
as little consequence, little consequence for innovation that is. Audretsch's view supports the 
Smallbone and Storey thesis but adds a twist. 
Moving on from this, Storey (1994) classifies small firms into 'flyers', 'trundlers' and 'failures'. 
Flyers are fast growth firms, failures are those that go bankrupt and trundlers are surviving firms 
that grow only slowly, they trundle along. When money for business support is scarce it is 
tempting to target that money using their resources in the most effective manner. Yet it begs 
the question of whether one can identify fast growth firms, flyers, reliably. It is tempting to see 
the existence of a few employment generator firms as proof of the targeting approach. It is not. 
In support of his view to concentrate resources on established firms, Storey argued that the 
UK! s high rate of new firm formation led to increased churning rather than employment gains. 
ahatever the UK econopy needs, it does not trquirrfurtber incendivs to sfimulate newfirm 
jormafion, for two trasons. The fint is because our rates arr bi , gber than almost aL, of our 
co, Vefiton, and the second is because the impact wbicb incenfives bam u pon eiVloyment 
arafion is ne y lead to ̀ cburning(; otr bi bs and mo d , g&gible, since tbyprimaril, m rt, ir eatbs) ratber 
than to net eVloymentgains. '(1993. - 22,23). 
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71bere were other alternative policies, however. In continental Europe alternative models exist 
for the provision of business support. In Germany, for example, the local chambers of 
commerce (II-1K) play a central role. The IHK can provide support and training for high 
technology firms, for example. German chambers, like trade associations are better funded than 
their British counterparts (Deakins, 1996). Moreover, their political system differs. Their states 
Oander) within a federal system have more power to implement programmes, whereas in the 
UK SME support is a matter for national government (de Koning and Snijder, 1992). In the 
1980's the UK lacked any devolved regional government although regional government offices 
existed. The UK policy could have taken a turn towards the strong Chambers of Commerce 
model that exists in Germany and France. 'Mat it did not might be due to the costs of that 
system, as well as political considerations. Patrick Walker as Secretary of State for Wales during 
the 1980's appeared to develop a more dirigiste approach but this was seen as an exception. 
Ibus policy should target growth businesses. Such a growth business policy requires procedures 
to implement it. First, a commercial database can identify autonomous firms in all sectors who 
satisfy two criteria; they should be between three and five years old and have at least 20 
employees - playing the percentages. The TEC should contact firms to ascertain their future 
plans and whether they wished to discuss them with the TEC. Many SME managers choose not 
to belong to the fast growth group. Hakurn (1989) found 55 per cent of just under % million of 
firms had no plans for growth and only 15 per cent were 'actively looking for expansion'. 
Differences in the growth intent of owner/managers are reflected in the subsequent firm 
performance (Orser, Hogarth Scott and Wright, 1997) Ihe Cambridge Small Firm Research 
Centre (1992) found 22.5 per cent of firms wished to grow substantially. Researchers 
consistently mention four major constraints on growing small firms: finance, premises, labour, 
owners and management teams (Cambridge Small Business Centre, 1992; Atkinson and Meager, 
1992). The policy recognises that constraints for the individual firm differ markedly. Support 
aims to overcome constraints (Storey, 1993). 
Ibc temptation for government agencies, particularly in areas of high unemployment, is to 
target help at these flyers and better still firms with potential to fly, if you will, 'fledglings'. 
'Fledoings', firms that aim to grow but fail to achieve it, accounted for 24% of 140 South 
London manufacturing firms in a survey conducted by Smallbone et al. (1993). He suggests this 
is an important target group for Business Link. For government agencies uccess is synonymous 
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with fast growth, for SME managers it is not. Different agents in the economy define success 
differently; acaden-ks, PBAs, business people and central government all have different 
standpoints. Support for targeting growth firms promoted a research agenda to find, ex ante, 
entrepreneurial firms. 
Deakins (1996) argues that support agencies are part of a desire to create an 'enterprise culture'. 
He suggests that research into the role of enterprise agencies is limited. Enterprise agencies 
provide a range of business support ranging from business clubs, financial support, clerical 
services, databases, and additional business services. They were first established in St. Helens in 
1978, since when they have grown to number over 300. Yet their growth has been ad-hoc and 
they have been criticised for their lack of strategic viewpoints and their low profile in the small 
business community. There are uneven patterns of business support. Above this patchy 
network, in 1989-91 the government established training and enterprise councils (TECs) and in 
Scotland LECs. Yet these vary, even though they are supposed to be based on local labour 
markets with populations of 250 000. 
The Enterprise Culture was part of the free market ideology emphasised by the then 
Conservative British Government. At the same time as the government emphasised the value of 
small businesses it introduced labour market reforms that effectively undermined trade union 
power. A de-unionised, de-rigidified labour market developed (Goss, 1991). Wage determination 
became localised (Dickens, 1988). Burrows (1991) argues that Britain restructured through a 
complex set of economic, social and political changes, changes that government represented 
within a new cultural framework - enterprise culture (Flarvey, 1989; Ibrift, 1989). Enterprise 
culture emphasised individualism, independence, flexibility, and self-help. Enterprise culture 
masked a more laissez-faire attitude to industrial policy, and at the same time pointed the way to 
policy responses towards the restructuring of the British economy. 
Given Deakin's view that enterprise agencies are evangelists for enterprise culture. It begs the 
question, what enterprise culture? John Ritchie (1991) describes a taxonomy of different 
'enterprise cultures'. These cultures represent the standpoint of different groups in society 
towards enterprise culture. Enterprise culture is a political expression of the trend towards 
smaller firms. Mrs 'Ibatch&s Conservative government in the UK lauded enterprise culture, 
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associating with it de-regulation and reducing the influence of corporatist institutions such as the 
CBI and TUC. 
Ritchie uses two parameters to classify sub-cultures of the enterprise culture, the degree of 
involvement with enterprises and the enthusiasm for enterprise culture. The vertical axis 
describes the degree of involvement. 1hus degree of involvement ranges from those running 
small businesses; to those not directly involved like academics. 
31 
Figure 2 Ritchie's Taxonomy of Enterprise Cultures 
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Ritchie's horizontal axis describes the degree of enthusiasm one has for the idea of enterprise 
culture, from sceptics to believers. The taxonomy throws up a number of different views of 
enterprise culture. 
Ritchie maps the involvement with enterprise and groups' positions in society, from the ruling 
government and party to marginalised social groups. The relevance to this section on success is 
that SME managers may feel that success is surviving whereas for government agencies' success 
is growth. Ibis has a large impact on the implementation of policy at a local level. 
How effective enterprise agencies are is questionable. The role lies in unlocking latent 
entrepreneurial talent (Deakins, 1996); yet their low profile leaves this perhaps unfulfilled. 
Casson (1990) believes that interventions to promote business start-ups will not stimulate 
entrepreneurship. A report for the BITC suggests enterprise agency support creates sustainable 
business but that the actual difference is difficult to assess. Moore (1988) says that the effect of 
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enterprise agencies varies from marginal to significant and the Centre for Employment 
Initiatives (1985) find their effects to be weak. Keeble and XWalker (1993) in a study of regional 
variations in small firm births and deaths found that the existence of enterprise agencies reduced 
death rates for small firms, and thus contributed to net job growth through saving existing 
businesses that would otherwise have ceased trading. Deakins (1996) believes that the 
effectiveness of support is determined by the degree of selectivity, co-ordination and inter- 
agency collaboration. Yet selective targeting is weak, and inter-agency co-ordination is 
undeveloped. 
North, Blackburn and Curran (1997) suggest government policy to aid small firms has largely 
fOed but that industry training organisations and trade associations could provide a vehicle to 
deliver business support. Trade associations are a common link between small firms and support 
providers (NfacMillan, Curran and Downin& 1990; Berry-Lound, 1994; Curran and Blackburn, 
1994). Trade associations can build up significant areas of expertise, particularly in sector specific 
information (Boleat, 1996). The UK Government recognised their potential role in its 
competitiveness agenda (May, McHugh and Taylor, 1995). Besides, owner-managers may prefer 
to identify themselves with their sector or their m6tier, that is printers or restauranteurs rather 
than small business owners (Rainnie 1991). 
Trade associations vary in their desire to recruit small firms, however. Although they emphasise 
technical advice to members, trade associations and federations (like the Engineering Employers 
Federation) have the largest proportion of large companies, with many having less than 100 
members and a low specific service orientation. Their primary role is to represent their industry. 
Besides trade associations many individual SNIE owners belong to professional associations. 
Professional associations have a stronger focus to include all businesses and emphasise services. 
They maybe involved in training provision. Professional associations are more helpful to owner- 
managers but SNIEs are most closely served by associations of owner-managers (Bennett, 1998). 
Nevertheless, those small firms who are trade association members were very satisfiedwith their 
service. Three-quarters believed that the service was good; fifty-five per cent believed that their 
membership improved their business performance (North, Blackburn and Curran, 1997). But 
most small businesses are not members of trade associations (Curran and Blackburn, 1994). 
Non-members see trade associations as costly, time consuming and irrelevant Their services are 
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very sector specific and are not aimed at the lack of general management skills perceived as the 
key weakness in small firms (North, Blackburn and Curran, 1997). 
The way associations interact with the state, their form and orientation influences their capacity 
to affect individual SMEs and economic development (Sadowski and Jacobi, 1991; Crouch and 
Traxler, 1995; Unger and van Waarden, 1995). Ibus, effective associational development 
depends on the degree of state organisation and regulation (Streeck, 1991). British business 
associations have fewer resources and government support than their German counterparts 
(Lane, 1997; Bennett, 1997). Business associations in the UK are voluntary. Their limited 
subscription income restricts their staff Bennett (1998) suggests: 
luntag associado si aZ ys be prrtious tbeorrfical nd eVirical kteraturr suggests that po n all Va 
subject tofragmentafion, smaLlness and inadequate or 'subopfimal'Pmtision- SMES are the 
sector that is pmbably, sijidn yfmm these axitafions because of tbeirgeneral ,g most adirnel -# 
kss sadifadog reprrsentafion vitbin assodadons. lVitbin SAIEr, inStiduals appear to be the 
best senied, ahile micmbusinesses qf 2-10 eVloyees appear to be the wont sened (Bennett, 
1998. - 258). 
Trade associations have the potential to provide a medium for business support, but have their 
drawbacks. Many target large firms. Although their services may be excellent, the relations 
between state and association within Britain reflect the voluntary ethos prevalent within British 
society, and a more laissez-faire political climate prevailing throughout the period. Besides, many 
SNfEs do not belong to trade associations. 
Into this business support melee, Business Links were charged to rationalise small business 
support into a one-stop-shop: Ymm cot*&ýdo to sitV§dy' (Bryson Churchward and Daniels, 
1997) or Yram clutter to collaboration' (Hutchinson, Foley and Oztel , 1996). They act as a gateway 
for existing firms to: support in marketing, business survival, staff and management training, 
quality management, corporate and business planning, and European issues and information 
(Cutler, 1994). 
The creation of Business Links would seem to offer an opportunity both to rationalise support 
in the UK (by reducing duplication) and to develop some specialisation by different enterprise 
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agencies. However, we found that, in the case of Birmingham, there was little attempt to do 
either. Some provision for targeted support for ethnic minority clients was provided, as might 
be expected, but there was no attempt to encourage specialisation beyond that which currently 
existed (1996: 141). The need for rationalisation was accepted by the President of the Board of 
Trade in a foreword to the prospectus to develop one-stop-shops (DTI, 1994). Desides aUtbing 
ahicb rr&ices the confusion caused ly 125 su port agendes in one county (Ritcbie et aZ, 1984) must bam some 
merit' (Hutchinson, Foley and Oztel, 1996: 521). 
Business Link's aims, though these are confused and subject to policy dissonance, are to target 
growth fmns, Though the way in which this is put into practice is not clear. In the case of 
Business Unk Birmingham(BLB) 'altbou 
, gb 
BLB bas a clearpogg qfpmti&ng suPPort tbmugb PRAs to 
odifin gfirms the aiteriafor supporting gmutbfirms vere admitted to be unknomm' (Deakins, 1996: 145). Yet 
the other part of the argument advanced by Storey, to switch resources away from start-up 
support was adhered to, Deakins comments: 
At the same fime, the Business Start-up Scbeme bas been pbased out witb an accoiVanied 
irduefion in scbemes of blanket support. Altbougb their is a poxetful agumentfor suitcbing 
rrsourres away fmm start-tp support, the criteria for selecfing groxtb firms bave not been 
dembped 'Picking vinnen' bar been advocatedjet we arr sfill no nearrr demloping criteria 
that uill idenfi ., 
ý so-called Yast-track'firms. As anotber oficer bas admitted- 'we don't know 
what the answer is (to pickiq winnerT) ... at the end of the daj it comes down to seý'-selecfion. 
Groxtb firms mill bopefu4 pbone in BLB for addce and su gort sitb their business 
detr1opment. (1996.145) 
The issues surrounding policy making and the implementation of policy are complex. Rather 
than seen as a 'top-down' policy that fails through haphazard implementation without control, 
policy has to be seen in a %ottom-up' or action-centred manner (Hill, 1997). Hill suggests the 
reality of lcbanging and cbalgeablepokg, a cvV&x ihtera&on structure, an outsid? mor& wbicb must inteýeirr 
aitb iVlementafion becausegotemment a&on itViqes u pon it, and it*lemenfing actors wbo are inberent4 
. 
ýJ, icult to contmL 11997: 139). 
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2.3 Implementation. 
Although a new policy may attract support, to fully implement the policy requires expertise. 
Many studies have made much of the difficulties met by policy-makers implementing new 
policies. The following section discusses theories concerned with the policy process. Although 
the policy process literature is located within political science, it has implications for 
management areas too. In seeking explanations of why policy fails, the literature is close to that 
of strategic management within the subject matter taught by business schools. 
Political science's implementation analysis describes what happened to policies after legislation. 
Pressman and XVildavsky (1973) suggest sequences occur within policy implementation because 
government agencies that implement policy have to make joint decisions. For example, the 
Housing Corporation, Government Offices of the Regions, local authority housing 
departments, housing associations, housing offices and housing officers all realise the 
Governmenes housing policies. Each of these levels has some limited degree of discretion, 
which will subtly alter policies as they filter down the hierarchies, and leave grains of the policy 
behind (Lipsky, 1971). The more decision-points arise; the less chance that the policy will be 
carried out as intended. Pressman and Wildavsky's probabilistic decision-making theory held 
that at each stage in the sequence, say, a one-in-ten chance that the policy failed. New decision 
points and more complex decision-making undermine effective policy. 
John (1998) suggests that complex, fragmented UK urban policy of is a classic example. Local 
authorities have partnerships, development departments and companies to promote local 
economic development. Chambers of Commerce and the regional Confederation of British 
Industry play a role in the private sector. And a whole host of government quangos all add to a 
myriad of business support. John argues that the Business Link failed to rationalise this support, 
just added another agency. Urban policy negotiates a tangle of departments, regional bodies, 
quangos and local authority bodies. 
But government's do implement policies. Tests of Pressman and WildavsWs model find that 
the government can re-introduce policies and increase their chances to successfully implement 
policy (Niazmanian and Sabatier, 1981). Moreover, successfully implementing policy at the start 
creates a %andwagon' effect increasing the chances of later success. Government policy is more 
successful than Pressman and XVildavsky's model predicts (Bowen, 1982) In addition, the 
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approach assumes that policy is a top-down process, where the higher level makes policy; the 
lower level implements policy. The reality is more complex. As John (1998) suggests: 
... this presupposes that bý, gber-ktielp0§9-maken ever tbougbt of the po§g cleady, in tbefint 
place and that tbg uisb to bam sucb detzziled contrvI over dedsion-makiq. Po§fidans and 
senior bureaucrats are often bappj to tract to events, create UmboUc poUdes and kave the 
barder and more contrwr3ial dedsions to lower-level ogani. Zations and local autborifies wbicb 
can take the blame if apo§gfiih. (1998: 29) 
Lower levels of government have a more pro-active role than the Pressman and Xvildavsky's 
model implies, however. Policy is made up and down the hierarchy. Top-level decisions can 
legitimize policy choices, already made lower down the hierarchy and all agencies learn from 
each other Uohn, 1998). The top-down explanation of policy fails. Sabatiees criticisms of 
implementation studies conclude that researchers cannot divide making policy from 
implementing policy. After rejecting the top-down approach, after rejecting the implementation 
approach, the researcher must engage with the gamut of policy-making Uohn, 1998). Again the 
rational, top-down approach is criticised. Rather than taking the top-down rational approach to 
policy, following Lindbloom (1960) many political scientists see the process as incremental. 
Policy-makers muddle through. Policy is a process where groups, agencies and experts adapt and 
reformulate policy and learn from their mistakes (Sabatier, 1986). Much public policy analysis 
uses the group or network approach,, where close networks make policy (Heclo and Wildavsky, 
1974; Rhodes, 1988; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). Heclo and XVildavsky's (1974) study of British 
economic policy suggested that the values of close network of Treasury civil servants and allies 
across Whitehall explained policy better than the democratic structure. 
The policy studies literature signals several messages about UK business support policy. First, 
that the policy operates within a fragmented, complex area with many groups and actors 
involved in the policy process. Although this does not automatically lead to policy failure, the 
fragmented nature of the agencies involved in UK business support would lead to a loose 
network of policy actors: civil servants, academics, practitioners and so on, a situation wholly 
unlike that operating within agriculture, for example. 'Mis loose network might enable policy- 
makers to consider a wider set of ideas but it may also describe a fragmented, shifting set of 
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alliances. Indeed Sabatier (1986) suggests that a policy advocacy coalition (PAC) best describes 
policy-making. The framework combines networks with ideas to suggest hat policy coalitions 
compete to dominate a sub-sector of political decision-making. Other approaches emphasise 
policy streams where policy is formed at the confluence of three streams: problems, policies and 
politics, where policy entrepreneurs propose solutions and where election results and shifts in 
public opinion determine how the media and opinion-formers; perceive problems (Kingdon, 
1984). Moreover, policy approaches can discuss the conditions where policy making is stable 
and when the equilibrium is punctuated, and as period of 'policy activism' takes hold 
(Baurrigartner and Jones, 1993). 
In the case of Business Links, there is some confusion regarding the targeted business support. 
Thus, the policy seems to lack clarity in its purpose, at least by the time it reaches the people 
responsible for implementing the policy. As Hutchinson, Foley and Oztel, (1996) put it: 
Fintly, as noted abotie, Business Unks are jun&d by gommment and otber partner 
organitadons to assist local businessgMxtb and iVrvtv coiVefifiveness. Unfoirunate#few of 
these oganiZadons batie stated ahetber tbese small business support senices sbould be offered to 
eiieq, one or afen, selected businesses. The DTTpmjPeCtus (D77,1994, P7) states Business 
, Unks 'a ill need to xork proarfitrly, to detelop a long term rrIa, 6onsbo uitb a portfo§o f local 
businesses' This si(gests be0jor afew rutber than all businesses, tbougb the latter opfion is 
not excluded Afore recent DT7 inidafities bam stressed selec6ti_4 and the need to 1aqetgmiPtb 
coVanies ... Afore income can begenerated tbrvu , gb sele&te assistance to afew 
busuiensses zVbo 
may be able to pay (now or in thefuture) for sen ices. But a moral &lemma may eýdst about 
`subsi&, -r*ng-' these businesses (tia adifional beo or cbeaperfees) and exclu&n en OU g otb or 
cbaging them more, Sixiladj, tagetfing certxn businesses my mn counter to a pubhc seruce 
etbos of assisfing evegone on equal terms wbo requests adtice (Hutcbinson, Foley and OZte4 
1996.520). 
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jDrawing on the experience of Business Link Binningham, Deakins (1996) found that eight areas 
of business support were developed: 
, gal and , gement andfinance, 
le pment, mana aportsi iaks and marketrSi quahty, team detelo 
.y 
formafion and adzice is rrguLvion, pmpen and tabnologv. He45 is on tbrre kvels. Fint, in 
attilabk ly pbone. The second larl uses the penonal business adtison to cany out a 
'dagnosfic'on The business, to assess the 'rralmeedr oftbe business'(1996. J40). 
The third level is where the client is referred to an agency that will carry out the PBA! s 
recommendations. The PBA then, changes roles to act like an account manager, keeping tabs on 
progress and developing a longer-term relationship. Regarding targeting of Business Link 
services to growth-orientated firms Deakins notes: 
AUbougb in Ibeog, Business Links am meant to twget e-Nisfing SMES that evloy between 
20 and 200 eVAgees, xv found in BIJ3s case That This tnet bad alrraqý been rrtised 
perafion to includefirms that elvloyedfive or more. In don-naunds afler sLv months of o 
adifion the idea that Business Links could taqet minnen , (i. e. the small number offast 
,g sucbfirms 
bgond a behytbat tbg gma fbfirms), n -as not barked ýy ag aiteriajor taqe, 6n 
y x vuld be se#-*seIe&ng. In BIJ3s case it v -as Weved that sucbfirms would sekd tbemselms b 
Comilarfom-ardfor assistance (1996.140). 
Deakins found little evidence that enterprise agencies targeted support, although larger agencies 
were more likely to do so. Relatively fmv attempts to provide specific assistance to specific 
groups were made. A minority of enterprise agencies ran Vomen into Business' seminars. 
Deakins culogises the opportunity offered by Business Links. 
Business Links provide, or signpost, small businesses with consultancy to help them to realise 
more of their potential. Business Links employed personal business advisors (PBAs). PBAs 
were: 'to uvrk pmx6vebt o deirlop a Ion nsbo mitb a porVo&o f local businesses, focused ,g 
term rrkdo 
par6ailaý. ý on small compaides vitbgmz-tb potenfial' (Bushell, 1995,166). Smallbone and Storey's 
views have shaped Business Link policy. Bushell's view of the PBAs role is echoed by Agar 
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(1994) PBAs 'this penon needr to be able to searrb out, idenfij and home in on "estabksbed businesses sitb 
, gmxtbpoIenfiaf" 
(1994: 1). Although the Business Link could target and leave the PBA free to 
signpost relevant help. At the time Agar wrote this note PBAs thought the policy asked them to 
'walk on water'. 
Agar (1994) believes that: (1) PBAs must operate as true business generalists and that 
recruitment and training should aim toward that end; (2) the PBA! s ability to maintain 
productive relationships is as important as the need for generalism; (3) the Business Link must 
find criteria to effectively segment the customer base on the basis of their development stage to 
focus individual PBAs on a target group; hence (4) Business Links should recruit PBAs with 
experience at different stages of development of a growing business; and (5) although the PBA 
must undertake the diagnosis of their businesses, PBAs should facilitate other specialist help 
even if the particular PBA has those skills. 
That PBAs need business experience (in lieu of theory) is a truism. Agar suggest that not only 
should the experience be in small businesses but also PBAs need to understand underlying 
principles to be able to apply them to all new situations and different business sectors. Like 
good chess players PBAs must recognise different board situations positions as well as play a full 
game. he says: 
PBAs must have a cleargraip Sf the kgjpdnqýles, issues andprac, 6ces in each of the mdn 
businessfunaions so that tbg can be app§ed imspec6tv of sector, size or an y otberfactor that 
dfennfiates business. As genera§sts, PBAs must be able to see bow the wbole ticturr fits 
togetber and u-bat arr the ii*&afions of nider demlopments in the business's total 
endronment. (1994: 5). 
1hus the PBA plays simultaneous games and by analyses board positions picks the right move. 
1hough business experience can be invaluable it is 'ndtber sufident nor absolutel 9 y necessag to be a ood 
PBA' (1994: 5). Instead says Agar, we should focus on the ability to create empathy. Business 
counsellors visiting Durham University Business School (DUBS), from endsting networks most 
often display a strong preference for judgmental behaviour compared with population norms, 
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they are likely to reach conclusions quickly without sufficient information (see Kruglanski, 1992 
for the effect of this). 
Agar rejects market segmentation by sector because the sectoral experience of the PBA is 
unlikely to be specific enough, and the approach might re-cycle standard industry solutions. The 
latter argument is a plea for PBAs to diffuse their business experience across sectors, yet the real 
problem it seems to me is financial - too many sectors; not enough PBAs. And because of the 
cost of PBAs there never will be enough. In addition, problems are multi-faceted and the 
functional specialist probably does not have the functional sub-specialism required. 
Audretsch (1995) argues that not only are a small number of small firms responsible for the 
economic effect of the small firm sector but also that those small number -are clustered in industries 
with new knowledge and innovation. Today's routinized industries will not produce tomorrow's 
Aficrosofts. Ibus, Business Linles or local economic development agencies might focus fiuiffully on 
knowledge industries. Smallbone (1997) disagrees, he argues that although commercial databases can 
identify fast growing sectors, this often misses the individual fast growing firn-Ls. Many firms in many 
sectors increase employment because firrn Ibebatiour twies ajdeý vithin secton, both in so-azUed ')astSmutb" 
sea= and in otbm' (1997: 132). Local data is unreliable as a basis to ta: rget local growth sectors. 
Smallbone agrees with Curran and Blackburn (1994), however, that SAIE owners demand sector- 
specific advice, which Business Links should endeavour to supply. 
Agar suggests Business Links should divide their market into three distinct types of business: 
owner-managed growing businesses with 10-30 employees, businesses in transition where the 
owner must develop a management eam, with 30-60 employees, and team managed growing 
businesses where the established team wants to grow. Each stage requires the PBA to play a 
subtly distinct role: "helper", "facilitator", and "consultant" respectively. However, evidence 
from Smallbone, North and Leigh (1993) suggests that firms in the latter group, established 
management team businesses with over 50 employees actually use the private sector. In this last 
group there is a potential for the public provision to crowd out the private sector with 
unnecessary duplication and unnecessary subsidy. 
Agar notes a perception amongst a substantial minority of PBAs that they should work with all 
businesses regardless of their potential to grow. Agar argues that whilst Business Links are 
charged with the responsibility to meet needs from all business, PBAs -a scarce valuable 
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resource - should be targeted to maximise their productivity. But does targeting make the most 
use of their resources? 
How many clients? Agar argues that 40 simultaneous games are sufficient for any grandmaster, 
more games (higher portfolios) undermine the programme. In short the PBA must: 
9 establish and manage relationships 
9 undertake a holistic analysis, diagnosis and provision of small business needs 
9 develop appropriate solutions with the business 
* know when to introduce a third party 
* help the business to select, use and manage third parties. 
'Me PBA! s role is like an account executive in advertising agency, he or she looks after their 
client, is their client's interests but provides no service, while the advertising 'creatives' provide 
the copy. Unlike the account executive, however, the PBA has to determine the solution. 
Whereas in advertising the solution is clear - more advertising. In the SME the solution is often 
opaque. And if that were not enough the institutional position of Business Links differs 
throughout the country. 
The relationship between the Business Links and TECs is close - TECs were invited to set up 
Business Links PTI, 1994). Hutchinson, Foley and Oztel (1996) suggest that there are three 
typologies of Business Links: TEC as owners, TECs as key partners and TECs as contract 
holders. As you move from owner to contract holders, there is more freedom of movement for 
the Business Link. Business Link Birmingham as an example of the contract holder model, three 
partners the TEC, City Council and Chamber of Commerce are the shareholders in the 
Business Link, that is led by its chief executive. Bryson Churchward and Daniels (1997) take 
issue with this categorisation, believing that a plethora of organisational structures describe 
Business links and their partners. They do concede that the third typology, practised by 
Business Link Birmingham may be most successful. 
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The Business Links can pursue added value through partnerships. However, the collaborative 
arrangements for partnership between existing competitors can be painstaking. Members of 
Chamber of Commerce, for example might be private sector business advisors and consultants. 
'inStidualpartner organisadons notonI ba tbdr oaw interests to consider but that these bam to be balanced y Pe 
against those of the consfituendes of i! pport enjUed ýy otberpartnen' (1996: 519) Not only will different 
interests affect the structure of the partnership but also the mode of delivery. Business Links 
can adopt preferred supplier contracts for service delivery. They can segment their marketswith 
each sector being served by a different partner. They can offer services using their own staff. 
The integration of services can work well and this adds value to local support (Hutchinson, 
Foley and Oztel, 1996). 71hough the contribution of Business Links will be realised in the 
improvement of local SNIEs (Keeble et al, 1991; Bryson Churchward and Daniels 1997). 
Bryson, Churchward. and Daniels (1997) suggest hat PBAs are We kg to the success of eacb Business 
ljnký it is tbg rbo form dira long tem rrlafionsbos mitb local SAIEr. ' (1997: 72 1) PBAs usually have 
direct experience in running small businesses (Bryson Churchward and Daniels , 1996; DTI, 
1996). Yet the PBA model is expensive (Bennett, 1995) and one method to recoup fiinds is to 
aim the service at growth companies (Bryson Churchward and Daniels, 1997). They say that 
there: 
are. prublems aitb sucb tageting as it assumes that nx delhýg q gomus and accurate 0 tecbni ues 
can be developed to identz re Is danger that . 
§,, grouing venus dec§ning coVanies. The is ao the 
senices aid be su 
.p re M OV . 
p§ed to covanies that do not quire the , or to c anies that in au 
event zould have ezýplojed aprivale sector consultantuithout subsid y. (1997.721) 
This confusion over which is the client group also extends to the SNIEs too (Summon, 1998). 
The current role of PBAs is that of gatekeeper to business advice (Hutchinson, Foley and Oztel, 
1997). The core areas of a PBAs role are to: manage relationships, analyse needs and to manage 
change, manage a portfolio of clients and manage third parties (Agar and Moran, 1995). 
Moreover, PBAs, are generalists, usually facilitate advice, they are not usually the direct key to 
business success even if their advice could be seen to be a key success factor (Hutchinson, Foley 
and Oztel, 1997). As part of the Business Link the operations constrain PBAs. ý.. the rvIe of the 
PRA is etohing as tbepo§g maturrs' (1997: 725). 
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Agar and Witzel (1994) noted the confusion surrounding whether PBAs should work only with 
those businesses that have a potential to grow. PBAs have been provided with professional 
development and continued professional development from a minimum 60 hours per year 
(Bushell, 1995). 'Meir development has highlighted the importance of experience and peer 
group learning- 'a sinificant amount of learning takesplace betLveenparfidýants as tbg excbaqe xperiences 
pedfic tecbniques (e. g. jor ana4sis)'(Agar and Moran, 1995,5). botb on the PBA mle and on s 
Lean, Down and Sadler-Sn-ýith (1999) reported a national survey of PBAs. They suggest that 
PBAs mainly advised growth firms, although 'a si gar , gntjzicant minorio of 
PBAs re ded the prvdsion of 
senices to `stea, #-sIdte' businesses (defined as firms aitboutgrvatb potenfial andlorgrvxtb ambifions) and 
businesses in need of turning amunds as substandal aspects qf their ivork' (1999: 84). The survey's found 
that PBAs identified firms with growth potential from informal assessments through the owner- 
manager's motivation. These firms might be the most useful for PBAs to advise but they seem a 
long way from Storey's 'flyers'. Lean, Down and Sadler-Smith noted that the targets set for the 
PBA service to become self-financing shifted the focus of PBAs towards firms who could pay 
for services. 
There is a geographical tension within the Business Link network between local specialisms and 
collective action like exchanges of best practice, joint EU funding, joint accreditation of 
consultancy (Bryson, Churchward. and Daniels, 1997). The Business Link policy is: 
'a coV&xpaýg wbicb was desiý, a gned to encounge the customiýZedprodsion of SAIE adtice 
,g as a senices at a 
local ktd... a local monopoly qf SAIE addoe xiy be equa, ýi damagin 
confusiq Velter of adtice and informafion' (D77,1993). The etidence to date suggests that 
the Business Link inifiadve is not kting up to expectafions. A sung undertaken ýy the 
Fomm of Pdtate Businesses in 1995 nvealed that on# 9.7% of SMEs bad ufiýVd a 
Business link coVaq as a sourre of odemal business adtice. The ky quesfion ivbicb our 
rrsearrb is toing to address is that of the value ýf Wemal adtice to the SME' (Bgson, 
Churrbward and Daniels, 1997-722). 
A second issue surrounding the Business Links is the requirement to fulfil quantitative targets. 
Ibis requirement means the Business Links have to meet targets for number of business visits, 
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and quantity tends to drive out quality. In the German and French systems, support tends 
towards existing business, Deakins quotes an officer of the Comite d'Expansion Econornique 
talking about his customers: 'One third arepeo le b pwo want to start a new business; one-third are ckent; 
aho uant to detelo p an eýdsfijg business and one-third aerepeo ple rbo verefadng . 
if, imWes. ' Cin Deakins 
1996: 145). The indicators used by government constrain agencies. Task orientated help may 
benefit start-ups but continued support for management skills is what is required. 
Funding is an issue (Cutler, 1994) Business Links were intended to become self-fimding though 
more recently the government has said it will 'confinue to fund the Penonal Business Addsor smice 
after the put*ýpriming petiod and that jun&ng for senices rould be tbrou , gb a roNng 
Mire jear programme' 
(DTI, 1995: 5). Business Link Birmingham is the only Business Link to become self-fimding 
through an appropriately entrepreneurial approach (Hutchinson, Foley and Oztel, 1996). 
Summon (1998) reports a respondent to an IoD survey on Business Link- 
Business links um ca pable of bein se -funded in 3 je , then so ee te sing ,g 
ý' an mn rPri 
entVrrneur would have estab§sbed them aIrrai#. The on# xqy in wbicb the Business Link 
scbeme can ever be sehfhandng is if itprotides a senice and qua#ty aell exree&ng anytbing 
atuilable in the private sector cumntly- or in tbefuturr. This is maybe a uvndeiful ambifionjor 
a government inifiatim but it is totagv unsu exp i , ppoired 
by tbepmtrn etidence, the er ence of 
bistog and basic kic. (1998.53) 
Whilst funding of the Business Link is one issue. The way that the Business Links themselves 
organise their PBA team might be expected to influence the way in which it responds. Ilie 
consequences of the salaried PBA versus the self-employed PBA are played out in table 10. 
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Table 10 Imp2ct of PBA contr2ct on Business Link Policy 
PBA Contract Incentives Companies targeted Consequences 
PBA self-employed Incentive to 'Ihose with Probable displacement of 
target wealthiest deepest pockets, private consultants 
firm which maybe 
growth firms 
PBA salaried with Incentive to Growth firms Probable focus on a 
performance indicators target enough unless there is a broadening target 
firms to justify shortfall 
their salary - 
keeping busX 
Table 10 suggests that the self-employed PBA act, in effect, analogously to a private consultant. 
They have incentives to target those with the deepest pockets and may displace private 
consultants, with associated displacement costs of the policy. Where PBAs are salaried, however, 
different consequences might be discerned. They face slightly different incentives. They need to 
fulfil their performance indicators and therefore must 'keep busy'. This pressure is more likely to 
result in the PBAs targeting non-growth firms, if they are not reaching their targets. Thus, 
performance indicators soften the targeting policy. 
In addition to the variety in PBA contracts, Business Links varied in their requirements for 
PBAs. Some Business Links adopted a deliberately proscriptive approach. They developed a 
checklist of factors for the PBA to tick. Some even went as far as using a computer model called 
RiSK Analyser. Others adopted an emphasis on judgement. One Link, for example suggested 
that its questions were really aide-memoire for PBAs. They required a written assessment of the 
firm, over twelve pages. 
In an assessment of TECs Bennett et al (1994) suggested that their power was too limited: The 
, gb poxer 
hasjet beengimn out to redress a ky iVe&ments to business development in the UK is that not enou 
,g 
imbalance that basfmstrated Britdn's economicgmxtb' (I 994: vii) centug loý 
But Emmerich and Peck suggest that TECs focus on low level skills and that large firm 
representatives dominate boards. Moreover, the local needs do not match the emphasis in TEC 
budgets (Topharn et al., 1994). And again the local business community is unaware of the TECs 
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role (Curran, 1993). However, the higher support in Northern Ireland for SNfEs has increased 
their growth rates (Flart et al, 1993). 
UK government policy toward small firms has been switched toward support for growth and 
existing business and away from start-up support. The nature of such changes in policy, 
however, is confusing. The role of PBAs is crucial to implement this policy but their role 
changes as the policy 'beds-down'. The evidence of agency support effectiveness finds that they 
reduce death rates, rather than promote growth, though this research pre-dates the policy 
change. But if the policy is to succeed there needs to be a definition of small firms success. 
Moreover, for this research the definition of success is important. 
2.4 Small Firm Success 
What is success for the small firm? Neo-classical economics defines success in terms of profit. 
The behavioural assumption is that the firm is a profit-maximiser. Accounting textbooks mirror 
this approach seeing the joint-stock cornpanýs goal to generate returns for its shareholders. 
The idea of the infra-marginal firm is that the firm making the most profits is the most 
successful, in an industry. The idea of the infra-marginal firm depends upon relaxing the 
assumption within perfect competition that all firms face the same costs. 
Figure 2 shows a simple demand and supply diagram for an industry. Supply is the horizontally 
aggregated costs of all the firms in the industry. The supply curve is upward sloping because 
increasing output leads to increases in costs, due to inefficiencies once you push output beyond 
a certain level, called diseconotnies of scale. 
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On the demand side as the price falls, holding everything else equal, consumers demand more of 
the good or service. So, for example, increased taxes on cigarettes drive up the price and reduce 
demand. The demand curve slopes down from the top left-hand corner. 
The market clears where the demand and supply curve meet, determining the industry price and 
output in a competitive equilibrium, in this example the price is P with output Q. 
Suppose the price falls to P'. The industry supplies Q. Ibis n-dght be some combination of all 
firms reducing supply or some firms leaving the industry. The firms left can still break-even or 
cover their variable costs at this lower price P'. Those firms still left have cost leadership. In a 
competitive market structure where firms face the same set of prices the firm that makes the 
most profit is most successful. The UK electricity industry provides an everyday concrete 
example of the infra-marginal firm. When demand is low the pool price of electricity is low and 
only the generators with the lowest marginal cost provide electricity. As the price increases 
during the morning less efficient generators come on line, as the pool price increases. This 
success is demonstrated by profitability. 
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In practice, using profit as a measure of performance is less attractive then at first sight. Firstly, 
firms' objectives may not be to simply maximise profits. Researchers have questioned whether 
profit is a constraint upon other objectives, such as sales maximisation or asset maximisation 
(Baumol, 1959; Marris 1964; XWilliamson 1964. ) More complex still is if it is considered that that 
firms operate under bounded rationality, pursue multiple targets and do not necessarily 
maximise anything (Simon, 1959; Cyert and March, 1963) 
Secondly, high profits may not measure performance success but measure market structure. 
Monopoly power in a market, whether a global market or niche market confers monopoly 
profits. The firm can restrict output to increase prices. This is not necessarily due to the firm 
performing better. 
Ibird definitions of profit are not straightforward. Ilie definition of profit from an accounting 
point of view differs from an economists definition. Profit for the accountant is an assessment 
of the trading status of the firm (Smith, 1992). As a measure it is subject to different accounting 
standards, depending upon, how the accountant calculates capital depreciation, whether s/he 
includes managerial costs, and the importance of loan capital to a company, for example. All 
these and other differences affect the profit figure and this figure is a commercially sensitive 
one. For example, the method used to value stocks can have a large impact on the profit 
measure. 
For these reasons' profits may not be a good measure of performance. Measuring performance 
depends upon the objectives of the business. Firm behaviour and performance do not just 
affect shareholders and firms; they have much wider ramifications. Different groups may look at 
success from their own perspectives. 
Profit motive. The behavioural assumption of neo-classical is that the goal of the firm is profit 
ma3dmisation. Partly, again this reflects the use of calculus in thatwith a fimction to maxirnise the 
theory is predictive. Take away the profit-maximising assumption and the theory lacks predictive 
power. The profit maximising assumption is deeply embedded in our society gaining support from 
accounting theory and stock market analysts through to Alandsts surplus theory (Aaronovitch et A 
1981; Glautier and Underdown, 1986). 
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To use the profit motive to define price and quantity the model needs to consider costs. As output 
expands firms take advantage of some economics of scale and unit costs fall. However, they do not 
continue falling and at some point the accent switches to diseconornies of scale. Average costs and 
marginal costs are represented as U-shaped. 
'Ihis predictive power comes by introducing revenue to costs. As the marginalist revolution suggests 
it is by equating marginal costs and marginal revenues that the profit maximising point is reached. 
Ibis is where the profit (mathernaticaD function is maxitnised. The theory often goes under the name 
compambvc statics. 
In a competitive market, the marginal revenue curve is flat, and price will equal marginal cost. 
Under this condition the firm is a price-taker. When the firm has the ability to influence price by 
changing quantity the firm is seen to have some degree of monopoly power in monopolistic 
competition. These distinctions reflect different markets. The extensions of the model show 
monopolistic competition whereby firms have introduced some element of product 
differentiation. 1bus, despite its level of abstraction the model has something for practitioners, 
and indeed, Porter's (1980) generic strategies can be seen as derivation for this model. However, 
the model is a poor description of what firms actually do. Evidence suggests firms have little 
idea of their own price demand curve. Hall and Hitch (1939) found that firms do not attempt to 
maximise profits. They set prices rather than act as price-takers. Price setting was on an average- 
cost principle 
P= AVC + AFC + Profit margin. 
Firms then sell as many products at the prevailing average cost price. Further, Gordon (1948) 
argued that the presence of uncertainty precludes use of the marginal cost pricing. Managers 
pursue a multitude of goals and concentrate on solving 'local' problems, without recourse to 
marginal pricing. Firms do not act to maximýise profits in the way neo-classical theory predicts. 
Oligopolistic behaviour was widespread, firms are conscious of the reactions of competitors. 
Nfachlup (1967) believes Hall and Hitch's evidence is inconclusive because accountants and 
economists definitions of profit are different. Moreover, the job of the marginal theory of the 
firm is to predict changes in markets due to changes in tax, demand or costs. Ibis it does well. 
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Friedman's methodological defence is that because the traditional theory of the firm yields good 
predictions it should be accepted. The realism of the assumptions are not the key criteria. 
Koutsoyiannis (1979) argues that average cost pricing implicitly reflects the elasticity of demand, 
though the firm might not recognise it as such. Consequently, the controversy surrounding the 
theory of the firm is far from over. It does however, yield some interesting results and 
implications, particularly for corporate strategy. Porter's (1980) generic strategy typology can be 
seen as based on the way to gain economic rent, by either differentiating products or niche 
marketing. Thus corporate strategists and economists approach rent-seeking behaviour from 
two different standpoints, good strategy is what economists call anti-competitive behaviour. 
The firm's objective may be sales growth, from Baumol's model, and from Ritchie growth is the 
government agency's objective. STNIEs interest government institutions because they contribute 
to growth, as well as employment. The difference between Storey's flyers and trundlers is in the 
pace of growth in the firm, but researchers measure growth using different variables. Many 
researchers in the ESRC programme used employment growth as the dependent variable. There 
may be difficulties using this variable. 
First, the EU defines SAIEs by numbers employed. Should the first order of this variable, the 
first derivative, growth of employment-, be the dependent variable? The links between the two 
variables seem unsatisfactory. 
Secondly, there is a category of firms exist that innovate, grow quickly but which do not take on 
more employees. If employment change defines growth then innovative small firms that 
generate wealth and indirect employment will be defined as unsuccessful. 
Ibird, change in employment is a 'lumpy' variable. This makes the timing of the research a 
factor. Studies have shown growth to be unrelated to the previous year when employment was 
the dependent variable. Ibis may reflect the lumpiness of the variable although it may be that 
growth is not cumulative, which would be a significant result. Employment growth is 
discontinuous. It is more cost effective to hire ten staff all at once rather than one a week for 
ten weeks. 
So if employment growth is inappropriate, although it has been used extensively, what variable 
could describe growth? Following Baumol sales growth appears as a reasonable variable to 
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capture growth. The West Afidlands Business Survey (1996) reports growth of sales as the 
largest contribution to increased profits by West Afidlands firms because if you hold the profit 
margin constant then profit equals the margin multiplied by the number of sales and growth in 
sales can feed directly through to sales. Sales growth may be highly correlated with profit growth 
in any event. Steady-state economic models take asset profit and sales growth to be growing at 
the same rate. 
Sales growth may capture the success of the innovative firm as its turnover increases and reflects 
the objectives of govemment institutions. Economic growth has been a government objective 
since the Second World War. 
Sales growth is continuous, related to the objectives pursued by firms and reflects the objectives 
of quasi-autonomous governmental institutions. So if a measure of success and performance is 
sales growth what does prior research indicate are the independent variables? 
2.5 Firm Growth lbeory 
Given that the government has decided that the key for employment is to generate growth in the 
SME sector then we need some way to theorise about growth. We need an idea of what it is that 
causes growth so that policy choices will, in fact, increase growth within the SME sector, or individual 
SAIEs. In short, we need theory. 
Advisors need some model of the high performing firm to use as a yardstick. XNhat models are 
available? Economists have an established theory of the firm, the neo-classical model. 
Neo-classical models derive from the marginalist revolution in the 187Ys. Writers such as Leon 
Walras introduced calculus into economic models. Neo-classical models explain how individual utility 
maxinising behaviour can lead to socially optimal outcomes, and equilibrium (Aaronovitch et A 
1981). Today every economics student learns about perfect competition, monopoly and points in 
between. Yet the neo-classical theory of the firm is really a theory about markets rather than firms. It 
explains the price setting and output producing behaviour of fim-Ls under different market conditions, 
however, it does yield some interesting results and implications for business strategy. 
Because the neo-classical model is a poor description of firms authors have come up with 
alternatives, in the first instance questioning the behavioural assumption. Managerial theories of the 
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firm regard the firm as a coalition. Members of the coalition have different interests. The divorce 
between ownership and control in large firms gives managers ome discretion over policies pursued 
by the firm. These theories often introduce the idea of managerial utility, where managers have 
different motives other than madmising the profits of the joint-stock fin-n. There are three such 
managerial theories presented here. 
The first suggests firms maximise sales subject to a profit constraint (Baumol, 1967). Baumol 
suggested that in his consultancy dealings writh executives, they concentrated on increasing sales, and 
managers incomes were correlated with sales. McGuire, Chiu and Elbing (1962) correlated executive 
saLuies and sales revenue for 45 of the top 100 industrial companies in the US, over the period 1953- 
59. They found salaries are more strongly correlated with sales revenue than with profits. 'Ibis might 
not mean managers target sales. Alarby and Siders (1966) found correlations between turnover and 
profits, interpreted as contradictory to Baumors model. Sales maxknisation is not incompatible with 
long-term profit maximisation (Peston, 1959). Steady state models suggest that in the long-run profit, 
sales and assets grow at similar rates (Allen, 1967). The evidence for Baumors model is inconclusive 
and may point to a rule-of-thumb used to promote long-term profits. Firms may be increasing sales 
with a cost plus price in order to maximise long-run profits. 
A second variation on the theme is to maxin-dsc the balanced rate of growth (NIarris, 1963). The 
balanced rate of growth is the growth of demand for the firm's services and the growth of the 
firm's capital supply. Managers' utility increases through optimising the rate of growth of 
demand and capital. Ibis model suggests that the firm faces two constraints: the capability and 
extent of the existing managerial team, and a financial constraint. Adopted from Penrose, Marris 
argues that the capacity of the managerial team acts as a constraint on the growth of the firm. 
Hiring new managers can increase capacity but there is a limit to which managers can be hired 
and integrated into the firm. The managerial constraint increases but can only increase so far. 
Similarly, R+D acts as a new product development constraint. Only so many new products can 
be developed at a time. The financial constraint operates because managers risk profile is 
rcflcctcd in the prudent financial policy. Ibis policy decides the debt ratio, liquidity ratio and 
retention ratio. 71hus Marris has incorporated financial policy into a model of the firm. 'Ibis at 
least starts to open up the 'black box'. The emphasis on constraints is a second element that is 
helpful to take from the model. Marris understands that the steady state growth rate of demand, 
profits and capital are 'reasonably equivalent! over the long run. Hence, although managers and 
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owners might have different goals, maximising the rate of growth is compatible with both 
groups' interests. Ibis model is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it argues that growth 
within the individual firm is constrained by factors. Thus an approach as an advisor could be to 
identify the factors and then to relieve these constraints. Secondly, the factors Alarris argued 
were important are finance and managerial capability. Ibus as a model it might be useful for a 
small businessperson or advisor to use in a practical way. 
Another model of the growth of the firm is Penrose's, on whom Alarris's model relies. Penrose 
(1959) modelled the growth of the firm. She deliberately drew her focus on the internal 
processes of corporate growth. The firm is assumed to maximise long-term profits. 'Ibis means 
that the firm will want to pursue any investments that yield a positive return, regardless of the 
overall rate of return. The theory's core is the set of 'productive opportunity'. These are the 
opportunities that the firm is aware of, and can make a profit supplying. 'Ibis puts the 
managerial team at the centre of events. Each firm has a particular history within which 
managers have acquired skills and experience. Each firm, therefore, is unique. Given no external 
constraints, the firm cannot grow faster than the existing management can plan for. The firm 
can acquire management talent but then needs time to integrate the new managers. The rate of 
efficient managerial expansion is limited, but growing. It is limited by the existing management 
team but is growing through the added experience of the team and any additions to that team. If 
the existing markets are growing at a slower rate than the managerial constraint then the firm 
will start to look for additional markets through diversification. The diversification will tend to 
build on the existing resources. It will be close to the existing markets, the type of service these 
resources offer, and the unused capability. We would not expect retail bankers to move into oil 
exploration but they might try insurance, for example. Downie (1958) looking at the competitive 
process, suggested that the relationship between profit and growth was reflexive. Those with 
higher profits could support faster growth. Further, the more efficient firms, with higher profits, 
could grow faster by taking customers from the less efficient firms. The managerial and demand 
from the firms' industry constraints, constraints that can be overcome in the medium-term, 
impede firm growth in these models. Though the behaviour of profit maximising is assumed, it 
is long run. Further, these models are more explanatory of the internal processes of the firm 
and are not comparative statics but dynamic models. The further extension toward explanation 
occurs if one abandons profit maximisation as in bounded rationality models. 
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Bounded rationality models. A firther alternative is that firms do not maxitnise anything. The 
behavioural theory of the firm derived from bounded rationality Simon (1955). Cyert and March's 
(1963) theory derived from four case studies two laboratory studies. The firm is seen as a coalition of 
groups with conflicting interests. It particularly applies to large multi-product firms and as such leaves 
little for small business advisors to draw upon. 
Industrial economics demonstrates the key variable of managerial capability and the availability of 
financial resources. 7he neo-classical theory of the firm leaves us with the strategic choices about 
competition and differentiation. Further the, industrial economics models show the importance of 
financial and managerial consh-aints to the growth of the firm. 1hus as an advisor one can consider 
methods to hurdle constraints. 
1here is also another literature concerned with entrepreneurship. In small firms the divorce 
between ownership and control is largely absent, the owner is often the manager. Miis accords 
with the aton-ýistic ompetitive firm of economic theory and the Austrian school of economists. 
In Austrian economics the entrepreneur plays an important role in a capitalist economy, and 
entrepreneurship is central to the allocation of resources. 
Entrepreneurs take risks, innovate, arbitrage and make markets. Economic agents take on and 
re-allocate risks when they hold contracts. According to Casson (1992) 1be French economist 
Castillon suggested this in 1755. The role of risks and contracts is still important today. An 
entrepreneur buys a product, or contracts to sell it in the future, as futures markets are not 
present for all goods and times; they take on the risk of holding stocks. In this sense the 
entrepreneur is acting in a role not dissimilar to the futures markets themselves, and Austrians 
believe they are crucial to the functioning of the capitalist system. 
The entrepreneur as arbitrageur quotes prices that act as information to other economic agents 
in the economy. In return the arbitrageur receives a return. Ibis return may be greater than 
normal profits because the population is not equally alert to opportunities (Casson, 1992). 
Fntrepreneurs receive economic returns from being more optimistic because pessimists fA to 
compete in the market. If entrepreneurs help general equilibrium they are also innovators in 
particular for Schumpeter. 
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Schumpeterýs model of the role of the entrepreneur is 'a romanfic tiew of buman mofivadon aitb 
tecbnoiogical opfimism and an unconmnfional tiex of monetay economics' (1992: 187). A vision drives 
Schumpete? s entrepreneur that she persuades financial institutions to back. The vision is 
innovative: a new technology or product, entry into a new export market, changing the supply 
chain or a new organisation. Schumpter's entrepreneur ealises the commercial potential of an 
invention. 
In Adair (1990) Sir Clive Sinclair who arguably started the personal computer revolution 
discusses precisely this issue. 
Sinckirfirml, n y bekeves that in order to be successful the inventor bas to turn bimseff into a 
innovator Tougo out their andjou start a coVany and-youget-your invenfion off the 
, gmund, 
' be sgs. 'You bave to be a small business manager, because there are buckets Sf ideas 
around and thgrr not almys veygood ones. We don't need any inventors =4. ý most of them 
arejust a nuisance most of the fime (1990.4) 
Entrepreneurs are also decision-makers. Knight (1921) argues entrepreneurs take decisions 
under uncertainty. He distinguished between risk and uncertainty, though this distinction is not 
always clear cut. A risky situation is an event with known probabilities. Repeatable events are 
amenable to statistical analysis. Decision analysis can reveal the risk-reward trade-off and how to 
insure risks. This is the role of insurance actuaries. A Midland Bank speaker at the 1995 ADC 
Economic Development Conference argued that banks should not take on business risk. 
Uncertainty describes more ambiguous or novel situations where probabilities are not available. 
The decision of whether to sell a new type of vehicle is uncertain. There are techniques for 
decision-making under uncertainty often concerned with the attitude of the decision-maker. 
'Ibis requires judgement, described by Casson as decision-making in situations that are complex, 
novel and ambiguous. These decisions are ones that all firms take and the decisions go to the 
top of the hierarchy in large firms. In many ways the judgement of the entrepreneur is 
analogous to the strategic management choices faced by larger firms, what business or market to 
be in, how to structure the organisation and what strategy to use to create competitive 
advantage are typical judgements necessary in all fmns. Moreover, the entrepreneur and CEO of 
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the firm lead the organisation. Casson (1992) believes economic rent accrues to the small firm 
where the manager exercises leadership 
Ihe research connecting entrepreneurship and new firm performance has various approaches. There 
is not a generally accepted theory. Cooper (1995) describes the approaches as a set of variables 
measurable at the start-up phase, shown in the diagram below. 
Figure 4 Approaches to Entrepreneurship 
Tp#epieneurs, ýý 
- 1, ---, ýT" ,ý-,,, -I `64idceteri§ticý 
I :- ý- I 
Source: Cooper (199ý 
ly E 1.1', ýý, 
1 74.14, Envirdnmeht 
Orocesses-: - Ch4kiepstiO 
Te I if 
The research relates these different characteristics and the interrelationship between these 
variables must be 
'being innovaton and idoyncratic, entroreneurs tend to dej agregation. Tby tend to reside 
at the tails ofpo pulafion &stiibutions, and tboqb thy mV be e%pected to dfferfmm the 
mean, the nature of these &fferrnces are notpreSdable .. any alte&ot to pmfile the -Dpical 
entreprrneur is inberrntlý, fufile' (dted in Cooper 1995. )
Notwithstanding these criticisms, four attributes appear associated with entrepreneurship: need 
for achievement, internal locus of control, high risk-taking propensity, and a tolerance for 
ambiguity; though Amit suggests the trait approach yields more questions than answers (Amit, 
1995). Further, methodological criticisms of the trait approach doubt the permanence of 
personality traits (Hampson, 1988), although one response is to consider entrepreneurial 
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behaviours, which appears much more defensible (Chell, 1997). 'Ibus despite methodological 
limitations the trait approach has yielded some useful results. One does not have to accept the 
trait approach to note that younger entrepreneurs are more likely to lead growth companies 
(Barkharn et al., 1994). 
The founding processes involved in the new start: business plannin& risk management, use of 
information sources, team development and finance, and their subsequent effect on new firm 
performance represents a further method (Feeser and Willard, 1988). Thus the effects on new 
firm performance of the four ingredients have been well researched. Yet the development of 
theory has gone on largely in parallel rather than converging on a single model. 
Summing up Coopers article Amit (1995) suggests there are six concernswith the present research to 
predict new firm perfommce. 
I identýibing &cadons of entrepreneurial abiko 
2 dvenity of entreprrneurialfirms 
3 aide vadafion qfpqformance m asures 
4 uncontrvZýable emironmentalsbocks 
5 mixed mofivafions and incenfives to start, manage and grow a business venture in 
inde 
. 
pendent and in cqorate selfings and 
6 unmeasurrdfacton in sung reseamb that are iVoifant contributory to success (e. g. the 
cballen rela, 6onsbos). ge of measuring the 'rigbt tbings'sucb as leadenbo and 
The cballenge for tbeog is to pmtide an explanation of entrepreneunbo, pre&cfions of 
entre 
. 
prrneurial aaWty andpe! formance (con&fions for new profit opportunifies or new firm 
fomafion) orprodde normafitieguidance. (Amit, 1995., 12415) 
Research in the field of entrepreneurship encompasses more than the normative guidance that 
is investigated here. The stimulation of new business ventures through an environment 
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favourable to new firm formation, and the distribution of entrepreneurial talent are two facets 
of the entrepreneurship aradigm. Entrepreneurship research considers the process by which an 
entrepreneur identifies an opportunity through to the founding of the business, and the 
development of a growing business. It is a rich source of recommendations to develop existing 
firms. 
Notwithstanding the richness of the existing research, there are sets of unmeasured factors that 
practitioners are using to aid their task to develop businesses. Cooper suggests: 'e. %ploratog 
irsearrb and a twiety of researrb metbodology mey be needed as we seek to undentandfirocesses wbicb batv not 
been stu&ed nucb to date' (Cooper, 1995: 121). Ibis call for more qualitative methods is echoed in 
the methodology employed in this research. 
All these capability factors are important to create a fast-growing SNIE. Clearly, it is not a simple 
matter and the owner must lead the organisation therefore the next section looks to 
organisation theory for some insights about high performance and growth. 
2.6 Managerial skills 
Founding teams are more likely to be associated with fast growing firms not only will they have 
access to capital but their skills may complement each other. Deakins saw the inability of 
managers of Birmingham firms to delegate as a key constraint for growth. In addition Deakins 
believes human resource management skills are important. Owner/managers of growing firms 
need to be able to motivate, delegate and stimulate their staff to achieve high performance. 
Some training might potentially help here. Barclay's research suggests: '.. tbe researrb retrals that 
, 
ppq priate ,ga some of the 
kg buees togrortbJor small businesses could be otarome (at leastpartl, ý) ýy takin 
,g and acfiq upon addce' 
(1994.23). trw ni 
As to the issue of industrial relations in small firms, the Bolton Report (1971) suggested that 
industrial relations in small firms were good. Rainnie (1989) suggests there are some exploitative 
firms. Ram (1993) argues that within small firms is a 'negotiated paternalism'. Factors that 
promote growth in the clothing industry are a complicated combination of family relationships, 
ability to maintain a skilled workforce, and negotiation skills. 'Mese are subjective and difficult to 
measure quantitatively. The ability to survive in intensely competitive markets requires as much 
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ability as growdi in a different sector (Ratn, 1993). Deakins believes that ýbe iVortance of human 
e ijycult to identýiý rrsoun-e mana '(1996: 192) , gement skhYs 
has been undolayed, sincthy arr & 
The 'neýV flatter structures put increased responsibility on the manag&s ability to motivate 
employees in a more ambivalent setting. Organisational theorists have a great deal to say about 
this area, theorists such as Likert (1961), Herzberg (1966) and AfacGregor (1960). 
Ibis returns to leadership issues. Likert looked at successful managers in the US and concluded 
that their methods were new. He states: 
, gen 
in American i dustg andgoternment who are achieting the ... the supenison and mana 
gbestprvduc6ti-y, lowest costs, least turnow and absences, and the highest lemZr of eiVloyees hi 
mofitudon and safisfaefion &splay, on the average, a &fferrntpattern of leadenbofmm those 
managerTaho re aebieting less itVirssive results. (11kerf, 196 1, cited in Pugh, 1971: 279) 
High-producing managers develop their organisations into highly co-ordinated, motivated, and 
co-operative social systems under their leadership. The manager uses participation to develop a 
team with high expectations and undertakes a coaching role. Likert called his new management 
style the Trinciple of Supportive Relationships'. A recent article in the 'Financial Times' quotes 
Jack Denfield Wood, professor of organisational behaviour at INID who argues that leadership 
has both a masculine side (getting the job done) and a feminine side (maintaining relationships). 
Likeres new managers use the erstwhile neglected feminine side of leadership. 
NfacGregoes (1960) theory Y builds upon Likert and sees motivation as the key. The 
organisation needs to integrate the goals of the individual with the group and it is up to 
management to discover how to realise the potential of the human beings working in your 
organisation. Theory Y submits that humans work best when committed to objectives, 
rewarded with responsibility and allowed creative expression. 
Herzberg (1966) distinguished between motivators and hygiene factors. Motivators motivate, 
they relate to how well you enjoy the job, hygiene factors relate to dissatisfaction with the job. 
The contents of the job, achievement, the recognition of achievement, responsibility and 
advancement are all motivators. Hygiene factors are: the context within which you do your job; 
job conditions, salary, inter-personal relationships, company policy and administration, and 
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supervision. Good hygiene factors, high pay and good conditions reduce job dissatisfaction but 
to motivate employees requires such things as achievement and responsibility. The motivating 
employer needs to provide motivators. 
The observations of Likert, MacGregor and Herzberg tell of superior perfortnancc in 
organisations due to leadership, supportive relationships, with employees given responsibility 
and allowed to be creative and grow. 
SME managers require leadership skills to motivate their employees within organismic network 
structures, with vague job descriptions. Chell et al. (1991) found entrepreneurs in growing firms 
paid attention to personnel matters. 
2.7 Leadership 
Casson (1992) models the effect of leadership on employee effort. Leadership influences 
employees through personal example, moral rhetoric and emphasis on the importance of the 
job. Employees feel guilty when they slack. It is an emotional way to influence employees. 
Casson assumes that only a few people are capable of leadership, and that if you have the ability 
it is a costless activity. He assumes leadership is more effective in small groups because it 
requires face-to-face contact, you must see personal example, and leaders can adjust 'moral 
rhetoric' to take account of employees values and attitudes. This may involve some cost in time 
but nowhere near the same as full-time supervision. 
Figure 5 illustrates competitive equilibrium under the two conditions, supervision and 
leadership. The vertical axis measures the real wage. The horizontal axis measures employment. 
The demand for labour is infinitely elastic at the level OX. 
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The horizontal line PP' shows the expected value of the product. Two factors adjust the 
expected value downwards. Firstly, although they take on risk we assume employers are risk 
averse; that is they demand a return for taking on risk. The risk-adjusted expected value is NNW. 
This return reduces the real vrage paid to employees, assumed to be the value of the marginal 
product. Then there is the cost of slacking; this again increases costs for the employer, reflected 
in the realwage. The horizontal line MV shows demand for labour. At the real vrage OX the 
demand for labour is infinitely elastic. 
The line AIA2 denotes the supply of labour. 71his denotes employment in both the old industry 
and the new. Employees take a risk by moving into the new industry. To induce them to do so 
the new industry offers a higher real wage. The higher the real wage the more employees move 
into the new industry, hence the positive slope of the line AIA2. 
I). 
At the wage rate OX (W2e) the total . number of employees in the new industry is On3e where 
the supply of labour AIA2 intersects the demand for labour )OC 
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Ube new industry has two types of firm, the leadership firm and the supervisory firm. 
Supervision costs the supervisory firm the difference between WXV and )W. The leadership 
avoids these costs but if the leader's team increases, then the leaders ability to influence, based 
upon face-to-face contact, will diminish and the incidence of slacking increases. The downward 
sloping schedule WL displays the leader's demand for labour. It is downward sloping to 
represent increases in both marginal and average costs with team size. 
Under leadership the number of workers is given by the intersection of the leadership demand 
XVL with the wage rate NX and D, with* employment of OM. Leadership avoids the cost of 
supervision but not the costs of slacking. The area V= shows the economic rent for the 
leadership firm whilst the area WCD shows the slacking by the employees in the leader's firm. 
Leadership is a superior method to supervision for an entrepreneurial firm. A study by Michael 
Unseem, professor of management at Wharton school in the US, found that leadership skills 
matter even in the largest firms. A new CEO can raise or lower performance by 10 per cent in 
Fortune 500 companies. Further, organisational leadership is most important during times of 
uncertainty and change. 
2.8 Identifying Growth Finns 
Managerial skills are crucial for fast growth in small firms (ACOST, 1990). But these skills differ 
from those required in large firms. They need to have: 
,* strong negotiating and selling skills; 
o the ability to sell their business idea to potential funders; 
* the abflity to deal with buyers, manage the accounts of the firm, deal with tax forms, VAT 
and so on. 
Along with these skills the company needs the right product at the right time, in the right area. 
It is little wonder, therefore, that only 3-40/6 of firms are high growth firms (Deakins, 1996). 
Deakins joins Storey's, criticisms of the univariate nature of much of the quantitative research. 
Deakins reported ten areas. 
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Finance is one of the most important barriers to SNIE growth (ACARD, 1986; Metcalf and 
Porteous, 1989; ACOST, 1990). High technology entrepreneurs have high sunk costs in R+D. 
I'lley may face high barriers to growth. Despite this, empirical research suggests that high 
technology entrepreneurs display higher rates of growth (Acs et al, 1987; Rothwell, 1994). 
Ability to network. Ibis has been suggested in the case of small high tech firms (Segal, Quince 
and partners, 1985) but for service sector firms it appears unimportant (Curran and Blackburn, 
1994) 
Economic environment. The general state of the economy affects deaths, rather than births 
(Cambridge Small Business Research Centre, 1992). Moreover there are regional differences. 
Keeble (1994) argues that there is a north-south divide within high-tech firms. The growth of 
the market is a strong influence on growth (Barkham et al., 1994) 
Legal and Regulatory environment. Low taxes are claimed to affect the number of business 
people, as Deakins reports: There is adua4 no eddence to support the tiew that &xafion leivIs bave a 
, gness to enter entrepreneursho orser-eVloyment'(1996: 
197). Ibeoretically the 
. 
Yea on effort or itOn drect e 
effects depend on income and substitution effects, which are indeterminate, a priori. 
2.9 The Resource-based approach to the theory of the firm 
The theoretical insights of Edith Penrose (1959) have become the basis for a new economic 
paradigm, the resource-based approach (Peteraf, 1993; Teece and Pisano, 1994; Fransman, 1994). 
Gamsey (1996) argues that Penrose! s work provides the only theory to explain and interpret the 
mperience of individual firms. There is no recent, tbeoredcaZý Smunded badsfor interprefing the expedence of 
, gle 
Ixii indiddudfirms or the aggmgate d& used to desoibe smaLlfim gmutb. ljknaýurr retiews return to a jin c 
Penmse's Tbecýy ýf the Grvatb of the Firm wb&b firit appeared in 1959' (Gamsey, 1996: 1). Moreover, 
Gamsey suggests that the central interest for Penrose, the internal processes in a growing firm, he 
unexplored. Gamsey proposes a model of the stages of the growing firm that which emphasises 
internal processes. 
The resource-based view of the firm argues that firms create distinctive internal processes because 
members work together, and, over time, combine resources in distinct ways to build novel 
competencies. For example, car-makers' different ways to co-ordinate routines, which persist over 
time, impact significantly on development costs, development lead times and quality (Clark and 
64 
Fuju-noto, 1991) Competence, embedded in characteristic ways firn-is co-ordinate and combine 
routines, coheres (Teece and Pisano, 1994). Productive systems are highly interdependent therefore 
changes to one element can affect A others. Innovations that change systems often devastate 
incumbents in an industry because firms have to create whole new routines. Partial replication can 
have zero benefits (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Teece and Pisano, 1994). 
lbese processes ensure that the firms organize activity without recourse to the market (Teecc and 
Pisano, 1994). Tbus, a nexus of contracts cannot model the finn. Despite some arguments that firms 
ought to operate quasi-markets (Arrow, 1969; Fama, 1980), the rcsourcc-based approach suggests 
that capabilities, which involve teamwork, cannot be assembled through markets (Teece, 1982,1986; 
Kogut and Zander 1992, Teece and Pisano, 1994). Indeed, Coase (1937) pointed out that the firm 
replaces market arrangements. The resources created must create advantage in markets, however 
(Porter, 1991). Critics, like Porter, argue that the introspective resource-based view ignores the 
extrinsic market. Finns create resources; markets value them. But resource-based researchers 
exan-tined the relationship between the firm's internal skills and its varying circumstances. Firm gain a 
competitive edge when they exploit internal and external capabilities and develop new ones (Teece 
and Pisano, 1994). Gamsey adds a systems perspective to the resource-based view to depict a firm as 
a ceaseless flow, where the firtn! s activity is 'ar a rrsu& of npaiy to mobiSse, conu7t and excbange rrsourres' 
1996: 2). Activity in the form of an input-output system interacts with customers, distributors, 
suppliers, founders and competitors; adds to the firm! s assets. Assets signal a firm! s growth (Barney, 
1991). The finn! s growth prospects depend on its advantageous place within the connections 
surrounding the firm and its customers (Gamsey, 1996). 1bus, the resource-based view has become 
more extrovert 
Nonetheless, models of the firm concentrate on the firrn's capabilities or competencies. Small firms' 
underperformance r flects poor managerial competence Gennings and Beaver, 1997). Firrns acquire 
competence through solving problems. Once the firm solves one set of problems, a new set of 
problems emerges, partly a result of the ability to solve the first set of problems. Periodic crises 
require new skills and competence to solve (Greiner, 1974). As the firm navigates this sea of troubles, 
the firm grows. Gamsey characterises her growth phases by the main problem firm must solve. Thus, 
the first start-up problem is the firrTýs access to resources. Although the model does show a steady 
upward path, Gamsey admits that phases overlap and problems repeat, consistent vigorous growth is 
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rare. Gamsey depicts growth processes reflected in possible growth paths: steady growth, early 
failure, stability with oscillation and a phase of growth reversal. Each phase has a central challenge. 
The first stage is to access resources. Garnsey says 'to embark on a new commerrial venturr is to undertake 
ajourng a itbout map orfixed desfinafion. The pre paratog pbase of sueb a project int vltrs determining &rraion 
and the means to traveL Wby the tratr&ff are embarkiý g' (1996: 5). Key g on sucb a traurr prrcedes our sto 
relationships in this phase are among founders, with previous associates, and potenfial sponsors. 
Gamsey argues that the entrepreneurs' personality, acumen and creativity, and his or her contacts 
dominate the initial conditions. Contacts and knowledgeable people explain the clusters of start-ups 
in certain sectors. Knowledgeable people act as an agoomeration location advantage to firms, as do 
multiple founders (Feeser and Willard, 1990; Oak-ey, 1995). 11igh barriers to entry and specialised 
resource needs make this initial stage more challenging. At this stage time is well spent in identifying 
customers and how the enterprise will meet their needs (Feeser and NNillard, 1990) because after the 
start-up founders have discussed alternatives and decided their products or services they build up 
sector-specific and project specific knowledge- they are locked in (Gamsey, 1996). Gamsey notes the 
challenge facing the innovative new firm: 
Enteorise often intulves rrctgnising the value qrrrsourres that cannot be accessed tbrougb the 
market. For exaVle, pub& domain knoxIedge my be used as a resource, or talent nurfurrd, 
ahilejami# andfriendsprviide uncosted contributfons. The freognifion ofo . 
pporfunifies requires 
au, arrness of unused resources, somefimes tbmu(gb approacbesfrom usen (von Hope4 1988). 
Potenfial usen xy need to be encouraged to rraiYse that their needs could be met in new ways. 
Wbilefims arrjounded on the basis Sf botb marketpuLl and tecbnieaIpusb, the atuilabi§ty of 
a marketposifion tofillpmtides the more secure basefor a newfirm' (1996.6). 
Innovative firms can lock the innovation within the firm and the firm and innovation, for a time, 
share the same fate (Rosenberg, 1994). Gamsey suggests that from being aware of profitable 
opportunities from research to their eventual exploitation may take twenty years. During the pre-start 
phase search processes dominate. It is pre start-up stage, 'before taking the plunge! upon which many 
small business courses eem to concentrate (Woodcock, 1988; Barrow, 1995; Stokes, 1995; NNilliams, 
1996) presumably because the firm once up and running is lock-ed-in to firm-specific and sector- 
specific knowledge. The resource-based theory pioneered the argument hat firms compete through 
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exploiting and developing internal and external firm-specific capabilities (Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982; 
NVernerfelt, 1984, Teece and Pisano, 1994). The discussion here tends toward the innovative new firm 
but all firrns become locked-in to their sector and capabilities and indeed their history (Teece and 
Pisano, 1994). 71he resource-based view seems to fit the more practical advice given to entrepreneurs. 
Ibus, the potential entrepreneur is advised to search carefiXy to pre-empt lock-in 'because early 
choices shape future options' (Gamsey, 1996: 5). Arguably the key resource at this stage is finance 
(Gamsey, 1996) 
Fmancial institutions are central to the processes of firm start-up. Institutional and local arrangements 
for new venture support influence Aggregate funding (Gamsey, 1995) and as financial institutions 
select ventures to back they enable the successful firnis to achieve growth (Schumpeter, 1928; Nelson 
and Winter, 1982). At this stag successful refers to the ability to raise finance. 
The ability to raise finance depends upon perceptions both of the firrn! s founders and outsiders. 
Penrose (1959) argues that the entrepreneur or owner-managers perceptions of its environment are 
the opportunity set for the firm. 'Ibus, strategists have long debated questions of appertaining to 
what business a firm is within, for example railroad or transportation. As important is the perception 
of the business by outsiders, particularly by bankers. Start-ups have a particular difficulty to raise bank 
finance because they lack a track record. The business plan is in some sense an attempt to establish 
credibility with lenders (Woodcock, 1988; Barrow, 1995; Stokes, 1995; NNilliams, 1996), although 
lenders may look for other factors that they associate with a remunerative firm. Section 2.7 reports 
research into factors that bankers use to determine lending decision. VMatever impression is given to 
the outside world internally the firm has to originate means and routines to run the firm, particularly 
to deal with the 'resource conversion process' as Gamsey (1996) calls it. She explains the problems 
associated with this stagm as follows: 
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... the resource ontriiion process bas to be set up anew uitbout Precedents or accepted ways of 
Proceeding. As tbegroup learns to save fixe and avoid early mistakes, mutines andprveedures 
g form tbrvqgb trial and ermr and a ditision of labour ititb speda, ýst mles emerges. CaNlafin 
g ttqg nivIve u-bat resources arerequires mitbout incurring excessive owheads or crý5p§n sbo es is 
steerin erafio ,ga naryvw coune. 
The inifial mobi§safion pbase leading up to resource g n n 
usually demands m, #or efort, and succeeds only ipberr tberr is mutual commitment. The effort 
,g against the odds to make apmjea succeed, exerted ýv memben ofclose 
knitgrvips, stmg§n 
is legendag (Kidder, 1982). The veg sbortage of rrsourres in these circumstances mayprvtide 
focus and dirrdion a here Mere is a sbarrd sense ofpurpose' (Garnsy, 1996.8). 
Indeed, one might note that new products in establish firms need new resource conversion process. 
Indeed Teece and Pisano (1994) argue that dynamic capabilities are a higher level set of managerial 
competences; that enables firms to create new products and processes, and respond to changes in the 
demand for their products. Organizational structures and managerial processes, rather than balance 
sheets, determine firm capabilities (Teece and Pisano, 1994). In if the firds capabilities are hard to 
replicate then the firm has strategic advantage. In this respect the theory is similar to Kays (1993) 
identification of architecture as a source of competitive advantage. '1hus, Kay saw the architecture of 
the methods used by Uverpool football club in the 1970-80's as a specific source of competitive 
advantage. The architecture, however, may be better described as firm-specific capability developed 
from the processes developed under the leadership of its famous managers Bill Shankly and Bob 
Paisley, since slowly dissipated. 
Wien the management has refined these processes the firm has a platform for fin-ther growth 
(Penrose, 195 59). Ihe management effort expended in the developing efficient ways of doing things is 
free to concentrate on other factors. Presumably the more efficient processes release free cash-flow 
to support ffirther growth in addition. This might infer that one method to improve growth in the 
firm is to help establish more productive routines. Should PBAs look to free resources for growth 
by improving firm-specific capabilities? Gamsey (1996) suggests that at this stage the firm, having 
built up tacit skills establish key relations with suppliers and customers. At this stage the firm can 
lurch from underproduction to overproduction as their members miscalculate resource needs in 
relation to customer and supplier behaviour' (Gamsey, 1996: 9). With inadequate feedback systems 
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d)mamics suggest he instabity, verified by empirical data (Storey et al., 1987; Cambridge SmaH 
Business Research Centre, 1992) Growth amplifies internal pressures for further growth as positive 
feedback in dynamic systems (Arthur, 1990). 
Because sources of instability differ in each sector, firms require sector-specific solutions, which 
constrain growth. Sector-specific knowledge and firm-specific routines constrain the growth of the 
firm because the growing firm has to assimilate outsiders. Besides the costs of recruitment people 
recruited to satisfy the firm's growing demands need to learn to work within the firtes routines. The 
existing firm members must teach the newcomers those routines, which distracts firm members 
from production. Fmally recruits have to learn to work together. Staffs with experience of working 
with one another are rarely obtainable on the local labour market, though London's merchant banks 
went through a spate of poaching teams of dealers in the 1990s. Consequently teamwork demands 
constrain the pace of growth (Penrose, 1959; Gamsey, 1996) The management capability to integrate 
newcomers also constrains growth. 
If the pace of growth is constrained, the size the company grows to is what industrial economics call 
the minimum efficient scale (Devine et al., 1985). Industrial economics suggests that production 
technologies exhibit scale econornies, particularly mass manufacturing technologies. Increased 
production reduces average costs. Technology can alter the minimum efficient scale (MES). In the 
last decade, fle3dble production methods have reduced the MES with the arrival of mini-mills, micro- 
computers, telephone banking, for example. Small firmýs niche marketing strategies are another 
attempt to deal with the minimum efficient scale problem. In a niche market or focused on a 
particular set of customers (Porter, 1980) small companies can avoid growing to the minimum 
efficient scale and compete on the basis of distinctiveness, and survive with higher costs than a mass 
producer but charge higher prices and accept lower profits. Firms within a niche market may find 
their scale limited by the market. 
The resource-based theory posits a second type of economy - growth economies. As the firm- 
specific routines improve so does firm productivity and costs fall. Besides, the now larger firnýs 
ability to reduce average costs by spreading fixed costs over a latgff output; the improvement in 
routines reduces costs. For example, Peters and Waterman (1982) sight the examples of Dana 
Corporation where Rene McPherson took over destroyed the policy manuals and let his employees 
improve the firnýs routines. Over time routine improvements increase capability and efficiency. 
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At this point the firm is viable. Fn-ms can inhabit a 'comfort zone', and become a lifestyle' firm. Risks 
involved in mobilising for growth increase the likelihood that the firm remains in the 'comfort zone'. 
Wben the environment changes, this comfort zone can be anything but. Ihe growth plateau can 
precede growth, merger, dechne or faflure (Gamsey, 1996). 
The firms that grow rapidly, although unusual (Storey, 1994), find limited appeal in a low growth 
'comfort zone', and/or win a major contract or exploit favourable market opportunities (Gamsey 
1996). The sustained growth firm needs a strategy. lGoodjortune rrqidres an qPPVriate rrsPonse ffýmllfb 
genvzdon is tofolkw. Insofar as tbm is consisteng andpoose in sucb reiponses, sftuV is emeigng thougb it my 
notfolk, wpredetanined tracks' (Gamsey, 1996: 11). Moreover, staff taken on to ease shortages may find 
themselves under-employed as routines improve and companies reap economies of growth (Penrose, 
1959). 
In addition, key relationships established in earlier phases promote growth and influence the firm 
(Porter, 1980; Gamsey, 1996) Funders may realise their investments. Customers may demand more 
products or demand new products. Distributors may threaten to stock alternative products. Wy 
rrhzUons of thterdePendence, vd, 6aZý, a soun-e ofsipport, my narmw opons, pmven&ng the punidt Sr a strateV of 
sk4pacedgrvuib con&idtr to resoum yncbmdsa2ion'(Gamsg, 1996.12). 'Ibus, the firm can grow despite 
the orientations of the owner-manager (Hughes, 1998). 
And the growing firm must delegate. The fAure of the management to delegate is a key defect within 
a small firm (Argenti, 1976). The pressures for firther growth combinedwith the existing production 
require managers to spend increasing time on networks of alliances. Alliances can help organizations 
access complementary assets and reach new n=kets. These local networks confer agoomeration 
economies on firms (Camagniý 1991,1995). Alliances cost management time, however. The growing 
firm! s management eeds to attend to the interdependent relationship within its markets and delegate 
other activities. 
Paradoidcally, within a dynamic system, rapid growth can tigger growth-restraining elements. 
Employee motivation at the growth plateau can decline as individuals do not see their influence on 
outcomes or staff may suffer %um-ouf (Kotter and Sathe, 1978). NNith the increased size of the firm 
comes in increase in compleýdty. 
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Complodty's effect on management played a central constraining role in Penrose's theory. With a 
larger size firm, the rate at which managers can assimilate information constrains decision-making. 
The management's must build their experience and authority and create the firm-specific 
competence. The use of consultants can help but not replace the management team's ability to make 
decisions. Indeed this transition seems hows similarity to the idea that firms need to consolidate, to 
become more bureaucratic after they employ a certain number, often fifty, of people (Churchill and 
Lewis, 1983; Agar, 1994). Abnaging a complex organisation slows decision-making. Penrose (1959) 
believed that the key growth constraint is the managers' difficulty in managing a complex 
organization. 
Rapid growth constraints can build steadily as a niche market is saturated and the growth in orders 
slows down. Unsettled climates value the ability to reconfigure the firm internally and externally 
(Amit and Schoemaker, 1992; Lang1ois, 1994). Uncertainty favours firnis that enthusiastically adopt 
best practice and surveille markets and technologies (Teece and Pisano, 1994). Firms can bench-mark 
to recognise best practice (Camp, 1989). 
On other occasions the reversals can occur suddenly. Gamsey (1996) characterises growth reversals 
as fluctuations, bottlenecks and shortages. Warnes (1984) characterises rapidly growing firms going 
through the Death Valley curve' where cash haemorrhages from the company. The resource 
requirements for growth, in particular cashflow and capital are acute. All the firms that experience the 
growth phase need to consider the effects on cashflow and profit. Warnes (19&4) suggests that 
managers must attend to profits and cashflow, or risk liquidation. Perren, Berry and Partridge 
(1999) suggest that firm that grow to over ten employees establish systems of control 
concentrated on cash but they calculated break-even also for their businesses. Control became 
formal as the owner-mangers developed the business. All aspects of the growing firm are 
interconnected and discontinuities within complex systems create growth crises (Gamsey, 1996). 
Growth crises occur within the firm's dynan-ýc system. Shortfalls and shortages within complex 
systems can switch to excess stockpiles. Unaddressed problems build up precipitating crises. 
Breakdown in relations with funders and suppliers because the pattern of suppliers, customers, 
distributors and competitors all change from that at start-up. Again the firm must address the 
problems and build their competence. Crises highlight new skills. (Gamsey, 1996) 
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In addition, a growth reversal phase places eKtra demands on management The growth reversal crisis 
requires managers to respond to immediate problems. In addition, the business requires future 
planning to recover from the problems. Nfanagers often find the balance of immediate and fiiture 
problems difficult. Managers can often find themselves dealing with immediate problem - fighting 
fires. Indeed, fighting fires can be exhilarating. 71he most difficult crises are those where the firm's 
basic assumptions are questioned, often resulting in key figures leaving the firm (Argyris and Schon, 
1978) 
XyMen key people leave the firm they take tacit knowledge with them. The typical response is to 
introduce job descriptions and roles but fim-is that inaugurate more routines into the company can 
reduce motivation. Growth reversal strains the company. Fkm members leaving the company can 
produce spin-offs, which is often the case in innovative locations (Oakey, 1984). In the growth 
reversal phase, competition can increase. Industry concentration matures, which erodes the firm's 
profit margins (Peteraf, 1993). 
Acquisitions are quite likely at this stage. F=ns have a track record of early growth. Owners are aware 
of small business' oscillating fates. Successful founders may be tempted to sell, then found a fresh 
undatak-mg. 
For a firm to sustain growth the firm needs to expand market share, or supply a growing market 
(Gamsey, 1996). In addition, sustained growing firms provide opportunities for their staff and 
broaden their product and customer base (Hughes, 1998). Highly specialized firms must develop 
complementary assets (Teece, 1986). 
The relatively few firms that overcome growth reversal processes or Warnes' (1984) Veath Valley 
curve' can build reserves. Reserves might come to the firm through take-overs where the ex- 
independent firm accesses the resources of a parent Although Teece and Pisano (1994) stress that 
conoomerates offer few efficiencies because the routines developed by the firm, its competences and 
unique organizational skills remain the same. Indeed core competences can become core rigidities 
g"nard-Barton, 1992). 
Beyond the phases of accessing resources, mobilising resources, generating resources, reinforcing 
growth, reversing rowth and accumulating lies the maturing firm. At this point the firm follows no 
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pattern argues Gamsey (1996). Growth and declines may continue, past solutions cause present 
problems and rigidifies can set in. 
Gamsey (1996) argues that early growth processes are universal to firrns starting up but are 
overlooked in the literature: 
'Gro, wtb. pbases are g&ptoms of the dominantpmblems to wbicbgrortb processesgive ris  and 
vag in durafion and went of overla p. It is the earlygrowtb pmcesses that are univena4 not 
their pbase manifestafions. A firm must access and mobikse resourres in order to generate 
furtber resourres if it is to become a gstem of acfitiý, aitb the potenfial to grow. Growtb 
byond the capacýty to be sejF-sust2ining bas its own pmblemaUc and sets off ne , gafimfeedback 
e . 
fects whicb bate to be overrome qfgmutb is to confinue;, grvwtb setbackprocesses mg be sucb 
as to arate a &sfind rrvenalpbase' (1996. - 19). 
The relative strength of the growth-reinforcing and growth-constrnining effects determines the firm's 
abIty to accumulate resources (Gamsey, 1996). 
The resource-based approach to the firm concentrates on the internal processes within the firm; the 
industrial economics and strategic approach concentrates on the relations outside of the firm. Both 
can learn from each other (reece and Pisano, 1994). The firm develops knowledge as it the firrn! s 
external relations are used to achieve the market position that facilitates growth (Loasby, 1993). There 
are chance elements involved in the process (Arthur, 1990) but what events are significant and what 
are not depends on their effect on the access to resources, whether they alter key relations, and 
whether the events change participants outlooks. 
Ihe resource-based theory of the firm builds upon the ideas of Edith Penrose (1959). Penrose 
believed that the constraints on the growing firrn were not just market constraints but that internal 
constraints were significant. Gamsey (1995) argues that Penrose's view is consistent with a systems 
theory-, moreover, others have suggested that internal firm-specific competences, routines and 
organization, explain the difference in productivity between firms (Coase, 1988; Teece and Pisano, 
1994). The way the new start-up firrn access resources and develops its capabilities through the 
predictable stages through which a growth (Churchill and Lewis, 1983) firm form the basis of a 
73 
resource-based theory of the early growth of the finn (Gamsey, 1996). The challenges that the theory 
predicts suggest ababnce of growth reinforcing and growth consh-aining forces deterrnine the firtn! s 
growth. 
2.10 Empirical Studies of Small Firm Growth 
The UK ESRC conducted a major research programme in the early 1990s led by, and collated 
in, Storey (1994). He believes the performance of SMEs is a combination of three factors; the 
owner, firm and strategy. Lets look at these three areas in turn. Remember these specific factors 
combine to produce the performance of the SNIE. Firs% consider research on the 
owner/manager. 
A small company operating in a more uncertain environment with more change and less cultural 
inertia points to a much greater role for leadership in the SME sector. SNIE managers take risks 
in uncertain conditions, making judgements in complex, novel and often ambiguous situations. 
As entrepreneurs they play a pivotal role in the economy. They are innovators rather than 
inventors and how they lead their organisation is important. There are a number of empirical 
studies suggesting qualities of the successful SME manager. 
Storey reports up to 15 factors affecting the SME manager, including, the motivation of the 
manager, her age, experience, education, social marginality, gender. The significant factors are 
motivation, age, prior experience functional background and education (Storey, 1994). 
Studies on the entrepreneurial personality notably by Chell et al. (1991) matched twenty-six 
factors including some of the factors in the univariate studies reported in Storey. Their study 
highlights alertness to opportunities, pursuing a vision regardless of present resources and being 
high profile. Their data came from personal business advisors (PBAs). Other factors important 
to growth were: wanting to grow, the age of the owner, age of business, and being a founder. 
Ibus support agencies need to improve the management skills of entrepreneurs to enable them 
to 01 exploit opportunities and (H) cope with increased pressure on resources. As Deakins notes: 
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preneun air able to tract and the process of cbange We still know veg Attle of bow entre 
intulved in ge and lack of underytan&ng is a reflection ofthe , grvxtb. 
This paudDi of knowled 
focus qrprrtious rrsearrb, wbicb bas been quantitative, attei*fiq to idenfifi, jacton that 
inj'7uence growth. Since growtb is a co? *Iex pmeess, involting the app, 6cafion of su4iectite 
management skills and a learning process for the entrepreneur, we cannot begin to 
undentandng tbisprocess uitboutfurtber informationfmm qua&afive rrsearrb metbods. Tberr 
y etbnograpbic rrsearrb that tracks entrepreneurs, firms gitu&nal andpreferabl, is a needfor Jon 
and Ibeirgrowtb patterns over a number of yean. For exaVle, we do not know that extent to 
. 
preneun are able to learnfrvm their e%perience, bow tby adapt to changes and , wbicb entre 
. 
pted to achievegrowth. ahat strategies air ado 
port agencies are not desi, e entroreneuff In adifion, mag intenvnfions b : gned to en uragy su CO 
to learnfmm tbeir e, %periences to cope uitb pmblems that aill enable them to unlOck potendal 
and acbievegrowtb (1996.198) 
SAMs and entrepreneurs make an important contribution to the functioning and development of the 
economy. The performance of SAIEs depends upon the capabilities of the SME manager, their 
organisational bility, and the strategy they adopt. Further, measures of performance and potential 
performance are complicated by the need to understand thewhole, firm and its capabilities. 1hus any 
assessment is likely to use heuristic methods to make judgements about the performance of the firm. 
These heuristics might be subject o biases. 
Pugh (1971) defines organisational theory as the study of the structure, functions and 
performance of organisations and the behaviour of groups and individuals within them. The 
theory has a number of classic texts that consider performance starting with the structure of the 
firm. 
Bums (1963) describes two structures that are polar opposites; mechanistic structures and 
organismic structures. Relatively stable conditions favour mechanistic structures and changing 
conditions favour organismic structures. The mechanistic structure is akin to Max Weber's 
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formal bureaucracy. The firm organises in a hierarchy, with tasks limited by superiors; the 
mechanistic structure has defined boundaries that tell employees what are his or her concerns 
and what are not. 
Organismic structures cope with changing environments. jobs lose their formal definition and 
are continually re-defined through interactions with others and through solutions to problems. 
Communication runs across the organisation as much as up and down the hierarchy. The boss 
is not the source of knowledge. In organismic structures people perform tasks within the 
knowledge of the overall purpose of the organisation. One of the requirements of the UWs 
Investors in People programme is that employees know priorities of the organisation. 
Organismic structures are generally Tattee with less management layers. 
For fast growth firms you would expect to find less formality and flatter structures with more of 
a network structure of communication and control, requiring the SNIE manager to devolve 
responsibility. Argenti (1976) sees an autocratic chief executive unwilling to take advice as a key 
defect of the small firm. Deakins (1996) agrees. 
However, a major caveat to the appropriateness of organismic structures for fast growth small 
firms is technology. Studies by Woodward (1958) found that the structure of the firm depended 
to a large extent on the technology the firm used. Woodward studied 80 firms. Technology was 
defined by the complexity of the production process: unit production, for example a bespoke 
tailored suit, was the simplest technology; the most complex was continuous process 
technology, liquid gas production for example; mass production was in the middle range. The 
study found that differences in organisational structures mirror differences in production 
technology, and organisations change with changes in technology. Changes in production 
technology are inevitably accompanied by organisational changes. 
Woodward found no significant relationship between the size of firm and the system of 
production. There were firms employing few people with the characteristics of large firms; a 
well-developed management structure, highly paid staff in a wealthy organisation. In particular 
small process production firms who employed less than 500 people had large firm 
characteristics. The ratio of management staff to total numbers employed increased as 
technology advanced. The size of the management groups appears a reliable measure of bigness 
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rather than total employees. Further Woodward found that the control of the chief executive 
and supervisor and layers of authority increase with f= size within each separate group. 
The organisation was more flexible at both ends of the spectrum of technological complexity. 
Unit production and process production defined duties less clearly. 
Success appears related to averageness. The study graded twenty firms as outstanding successfiil. 
Their organisations were close to the median for each group. Supervisors in successfiil unit 
production firms oversaw 22-28 workers; the median for this group was 23. Supervisors 
controlled 45-50 workers each in successful mass production firms; the median was 49. 
Supervisors controlled 11-13 workers each in successful process production fmms; with a 
median of 13. In addition, firms graded below average 'in most cases dmqeduidelyfmm the me&an' 
(Woodward, 1958 reprinted in 'Pugh, 1971: 71). 'Me medians conform to the patterns of 
organisation advocated by management theorists. 
The technological sophistication of the firm has a large influence on the structure of the 
organisation. Technical change will change this structure. De-layering a firm will not necessarily 
improve its competitiveness. In the steel industry mini-mills can be successffil with three layers 
of management. However, that does not infer that US Steel (USXý will be more successfalwith 
three layers of management Blueprints of the successful firm cannot ignore the sector and 
production technology. As the quotation from Aaronovitch reveals, the advantage of being a 
large firm may not be in technology, or indeed in production at all. You cannot categorically 
argue that fast growth requires organismic structures without considering technology. 
Business planning methods including competitor and market analysis are additional capabilities 
for the firm to exploit opportunities and grow. The growing firm needs strategic management 
says Deakins. Yet as he readily states there is 'no researrb into the quakDt and effecfiirness of maly 
businessplans that areproduced'(1996: 223). He nevertheless believes that: 
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p ptplanningpoUdes that arv based on sound researrb and 
,p 
entre reneur you ado -Vas a start-u 
,g carrful consideration ofstrategy this uill 
have benefits throu h out the fife of the business... one 
g tvn rv y 
, gb 
death rates has been insuf7dent boqbt andfime i to p perl, of the reasonsfor these bi 
plannin w Im ... Agood business plan should 'han ,g the strateg of the ne 
ft g tgether... dfferent 
y knorledge of the market secdon should be interronnected .. undqinned ýy carfil rrsearrh, b 
O? p u d, i thefinandalforecasts podunity, and that the assui*fions and researrh should n ep n 
(1996: 239,240) 
North, Leigh and Smallbone (1991) examined 293 independently owned manufacturing firms 
employing less than 100 workers in 1979. 'Mey found surviving firms were older and larger than 
non-surviving firms, although these included sectoral differences. They found firms expressing a 
desire to grow in 1979 had lower failure rates than those who desired to contract. Subsequent 
research by the authors found those firms that adapted survived. Five types of adjustments are 
critical to the survival of the small firm. (Smallbone, North and Leigh, 1992) 
9 product and market adjustments; 
e production process adjustments; 
* employment and labour process adjustments; 
e ownership and organisation adjustments; 
* location adjustments 
Active fin-ns that made adjustments were more successful at both surviving recessions and 
increasing employment. Afore active market developments, identifying new market 
opportunities and increasing the customer base are the key to achieving real growth. Newman 
(1997) believes that a more adaptive culture requires leadership 
A study by Reid et al. (1993) confirms the importance attached to increases in the customer 
base. To survive companies can follow quite conservative marketing strategies, but to both 
survive and prosper the firm must manage the product profile, improve the product range and 
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the quality of their products. Declining firms took fewest steps to improve their competitiveness 
and when they did they concentrated on cost-cutting rather than quality improvements. The 
capability to make adjustments to the firm, the environment then implies some strategic 
management capabihty. 
The second survival characteristic of small firms was internal organisational adjustment. High 
performing firms were associated with top management delegating responsibility and freeing 
themselves from operational decisions. Ibis is a key task for the SNIE manager employing 
between 10-20 people. 
Ibc Smallbone et al. research found significant sectoral differences in survival and growth. The 
survival rate was 88 per cent in printing, 24 per cent in clothing, and 35 per cent in toys and 
games. 
The key message from the Smallbone et al. research is the need for flexibility. Growth forces 
the firm to adjust to internally and externally driven change, and it seems unUely that an 
inflexible SNIE manager will be at the helm of a highly successful SME. Organisation theory sees 
the SME manager leading by having high expectations, involving their employees, as a coach 
within a network of workers if the technology allows, not a rigid hierarchy, all within a fast 
changing environment. 
XNhilst the organisation may be flexible and its manager a coach, to compete in the market firms 
need a strategy. One might argue that unless a minimally successful strategy is in place there is 
little likelihood of there being an organisation to manage. 
Empirical work reported in Storey (1994) reports organisational factors under the heading of 
strategy, whether the firm makes market adjustments or plans, or innovates in new products. 
Successful strategies included being technically sophisticated, developing new products with low 
customer concentration and exporting. Exporting may be a reflection of success rather than a 
strategy for success. Economist arguments about comparative advantage suggest that more 
efficient firms be in the exporting group. 
There is an association between exporting firms and growth pointed out in Storey (1994). This 
might be due to an ability to exploit new markets. Firms that achieve growth do so through 
markets outside of their initial area and overseas (Curran and Blackburn, 1994). Another set of 
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managerial skills is needed for this, yet even with a willingness to export additional resources and 
insurance requirements can deter a potential growth entrepreneur from exporting (Deakins, 
1996) 
Age of Firm and Lifecycles. Smaller firms grow more quickly (Reid et al., 1993; Barkham et al., 
1994; Hart and Oulton, 1996) and younger firms grow more quickly than older firms (Reid et al., 
1993). There is a lifecycle approach to small firms developed by Churchill and Lewis (1983). 
Based on the product lifecycle this approach suggests that there are five stages of a firm's 
development. (i) Start-up - the firm is cash-poor, with limited markets and an individual 
management style. (fi) Survival - the firm manages to survive in its niche market. (iii) Growth - 
the firm reacts quickly to market opportunities that drive this fastest growth period. (tv) 
Consolidation - growth slows the firm is less entrepreneurial and takes fewer risks. (y) Maturity - 
opportunities decline, growth becomes decline and the firm sheds labour and may even 
eventually fold. There are many criticisms to be made of these lifecycle models (Storey, 1994). 
Growth is undoubtedly more complex than this. Moreover, North and Smallbone (1994) note 
that mature SNIEs are capable of growth. Growth comes in incremental surges rather than 
taking a smooth upward path. 'Ihe model may caution against an initial dash for growth by an 
SME. 
Strategy is taken to mean competitive strategy, how the firm places its product and sells it. What 
is the emphasis of the product? Ibis is a narrow definition of strategy. What has become a 
burgeoning area of management literature is strategic management. Strategic management would 
probably encompass all the issues considered so far plus the competition issues examined here. 
Competitive strategy positions the product within its market. For economists, competition has 
traditionally focused upon price competition. But in the 1930's both Chamberlain in the US and 
Joan Robinson in the UK independently came up with a model of 'monopolistic competition' 
where competitive strategy depends upon differentiating one's product. The firm stops being a 
price-taker and can now set its output to gain a contain price or vice versa, though if the firm 
targets price it must accept the corresponding output. Price becomes greater than marginal cost 
and the firm earns economic rent. For economists, the study of competitive strategy comes 
under the heading of rent-seeking activity, though for the individual firm this eams economic 
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rent for the economy as a whole it is a 'bad thing distorting competition and the operation of 
the price system. 
Porter (1980,1985) considers five forces that strategy has to work on: supply, potential entrants, 
barriers to entry, consumers and substitutes. Strategy mediates between these forces and the 
firm. Taking account of competitive response is important for the small firm. Storey (1987) 
found poor performing firms know least about their competitors. The supply chain is a 
potential source of advantage that has attracted interest. Japanese firms have used Just-In-Time 
as a method to achieve advantage. Potential entrants to an industry have attracted economic 
theorists to discuss entry-limit pricing (Sylos-Labini and Bains developed well-known entry limit 
pricing models). XNhen barriers to entry are high firms can earn higher economic (monopoly) 
rents. Firms might seek to increase barriers to entry by for example branding. Customer 
relationships are proving to be a particular feature of competition in the UK supermarket sector 
where different companies have copied loyalty cards. It is a truism of business that repeat 
custom makes or breaks the business. Finally substitutes for the product or service can develop. 
Margarine became a substitute for butter. In Brazil they developed Alcool as a substitute for 
petrol. Your industry may be vulnerable or this may be the opportunity for which a flexible 
organisation awaits. 
Porter (1980,1985) believes there are only three generic strategies a firm can follow, cost 
leadership, differentiation and focus. Cost leadership - low cost producers are often mass 
producers. In an industry with a few large firms and a competitive fringe cost leadership is the 
domain of the large firm that can spread overheads over large production volumes. 
The pursuit of cost leadership is a poor strategy for an SME. This appears to be sometimes 
unrecognised by SME managers themselves. Many small firms see price as crucial and are 
reluctant to raise prices. Reid et al. (1993) found many SMEs achieving rates of return at 3-4 per 
cent lower than prevailing real interest rates. 
'Ibis leaves the SME two generic strategies: differentiation, by providing what marketing people 
call a unique selling point 'USP'; and focus, tailoring their good or service to particular 
customers. Quality is a part of differentiation, enabling the firm to charge a premium price for 
its good or service. Porter warns firms to be clear about what strategy they are following 
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because the worst place to be is 'stuck in the n-ýiddle'. Irwin (1997) reports research that suggests 
there is: 
a super league of medium-si: Zedjastgmwtb coVanies wbicb bam adopted a stratý ,g of sening 
nicbe markets, incrrasiýg turnover ly se&ng more to exisfing customers, tripon&I ,g quickly to 
market need, ýy careful and susAdned control of expen&turr and ly seeking to rafse 
prvf7tabi, #ty ratber than cbasin(g turnowfor the sake of it (1997., 322) 
Alintzberg points out that events have superseded these three generic strategies. Japanese 
manufacturing firms by pursuing quality have ended up with cost leadership, through 'rotal 
Quality Afanagemene. Differentiation and cost leadership ends up as two sides of the same coin 
rather than a strategic choice. Nfintzberg et al. (1995) believes you concentrate on areas of 
strategy, on image, product design, quality, support and differentiation. He talks about the 
distinction between intended strategies, unrealised strategies, deliberate strategy, emergent 
strategy and realised strategy. Strategy is an outcome of a process and a process itself CK. 
Prahalad (1996) sees strategy as process of internal governance. He believes 'almost all tra&fional 
gement detvlop strateg and emgone lse dexs of strateg bam been vey e§fist. The assu)Vdon is that top mana 
implements i . ' He thinks this model of strategy precludes change and reinforces the status quo. 
Strategy for Prahalad is seizing all the opportunities that available to a company. 
'If you tbink about strateg as revolution, strate I-g as 
discoveg, strategv as innovation, strategy 
ge that no as ebanging indusýg norms and industy patterns, then you must acknoxied




He believes you create forums within organisations where more contrary individuals can meet to 
create strategy. Prahalad sees strategy as firstly, a process and secondly, too conservative. 
Herbert Kaufman (1991) is more critical of strategic choices. He believes the survival of some 
organisations for great lengths of time is largely a matter of luck. Moreover, he suggests 
pable of morr than mar 'Organisafions bj and lage are not ca ginal cbanges, wbile the endronment is so volafile 
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, ges arrfirquently 
insufident o ensure suniwZ (cited in Peters, 1992: 617) Changing that marginal cban 
strategy is not a real option for organisations. 
2.11 Much SNIE research is difficult to use. 
Chaston and Mangles (1996) claim that much SME research is difficult to use as a predictor of 
performance. They adopt the view that common characteristics shown in fast growth firms 
reflect the capability of the organisation, a view shared by Blundell (1996). Chaston and Mangles 
used four studies to show the key characteristics of the firm, Coopers and Lybrand, 1994; 
Bums, 1994; Brickau, 1994 and Trading 1990. These characteristics are from the UK, Germany 
and New Zealand. The characteristics they summarised were: the ability to identify a market 
niche, and exploit it through superior quality, development of a formal business plan, adequate 
finance, new product development, personnel management, quality management, optimising 
productivity and the use of IT and management information. Using this list they surveyed 
manufacturing firms with sales of between 100 000 - 3m per annum. 
Using discrirninant analysis they found that finns wishing to increase growth need to 
concentrate on: 
,g ag 
idenfified cqpabi, ýy weaknesses in the areas of eVlqyee pmducfitiy, new . 
p, gra&n u 
product management and product superibHO and ... ipgra&ng organisafional strudurr 
[to 
opfimise VIo I measuring customer expectations and identiffing cbanging yee pmducUdo 
market condfions (1996. ý 4) 
Firms already growing that wish to accelerate their growth have slightly different areas to 
concentrate on. Measuring customer quality is most important followed by new product 
development and more rapid development of new products. 
Chaston and Mangles conclude that firms should adopt a balanced approach to increasing 
growth. They cite one engineering firm that implemented a broad range of actions including 
restructuring, investment in new process technology and gaining greater customer participation 
in new product development. Grant aid was forthcoming from the UK government Investors 
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in People programme. The authors report that in twelve months the resulting upswing in orders 
had resulted in the creation of more jobs in the fin-n. 
Secondly, firms planning improved performance need to emphasise differing capabilities 
depending on whether they are experiencing declining revenue, zero growth, or revenue growth. 
Those growing at a lower rate should use a different decision rule from those growing at 
between 11-30 percent p. a. 
Chaston and Mangles used the characteristics of growth firms to indicate capabilities, and tested 
them on manufacturing firms. Measuring capability in non-financial areas such as customer 
expectation is what Eccles (1991) has called the performance measurement manifesto. 
Olson and Bokor (1995) examined the interrelation of strategy and marketing. They sampled 91 
of the fastest growing privately held small businesses in the United States, which were eight 
years old or younger, from the Inc. 500 in December 1987. Inc ranks businesses on sales growth 
over a five-year period. Firm's sales increased from between 526 per cent to 52244 per cent. 
They conclude that the interaction of fort-nality in planning and product service innovation 
effects the performance of small rapid growth firms (flyers). Formal planning represents strategy 
process and innovation represents strategy content. The authors also suggest: 'certdn contextual 
facron sucb as CEO cbararterisfics my iVact the nature of this interaefion. ' (1995: 41) However, the 
explanatory power of their model was very low with an R2 of just . 089. Further 50 per cent of 
their sample of high flying firms had no formal business plan and yet they made it into the fist 
of the fastest growing small companies in the US. 71bis suggests further research may be fruitful 
into this area. Many successful firms use a business plan but many unsuccessful firms also use a 
business plan. It may be that successful leaders not using formal business plans have a vision of 
their company and understand the business very well (Chell et al., 1991) 
Lothian (1987) in a Chartered Institution of Management Accountants (CIMA) study writes 
(nonfinandal measures can betterfufil the &aggnosdefunetion qrpeý(ormance m asurement -- because tbg measure 
prvdwczýve ac*ty &rrctý, nonfinandal measures mg befterprr&ct the &rretion offuturr casbfiojvs. ' (1987: 6) 
Performance measurement concentrates on measuring the capabilities and outcomes already 
noted like customer satisfaction. Schmenner (1995) thinks 'Jf a cotVag sfill ufi§ses the standard 
finandal after-tbefact measurements it is out of toucb. ' 
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Performance measures are not neutral. They are effective in focusing the managemenes 
attention on what is important. They also provide a strong signal to others in the organisation. 
In this fight they may have unintended negative consequences for strategy (Smith 1993) The 
famous use of the 'body coune in the US war in Vietnam is an example. Performance measures 
will affect and be effected by strategy. 
Kaplan and Norton (1993) developed a balanced scorecard. Their idea is to cascade the mission 
of the organisation into measures of performance showing whether the organisation is achieving 
its aims. The process is top-down, and rather linear with little feedback in itself. The scorecard 
shows the balance of organisation issues, financial outcomes, production and customer issues 
that together enable the firm to carry out its mission. Performance measures measure how 
effectively a company implements strategy-, does this preclude comparisons of firms unless they 
use an identical strategy in an identical industry? 
For example, cost leadership strategies require performance measures that effectively control 
costs. Khandwalla (1972,1973) found more managerial control procedures when competition 
intensified. Other studies show links between competitive advantage and managerial control 
systems (Simons, 1990) 
Having said that the different strategies lend themselves to different performance indicators, 
many facets of organisational life are similar. The idea of benchmarking assumes firms in 
different circumstances have much to learn from each other's performance. Eccles (1991) 
believes that although different businesses with different production processes and different 
strategies need different information to make decisions there are critical outcomes that every 
firm has in common. 
Simons (1990) studying large firms believes that very similar management control systems 
represent all organisations. The difference lies in the ways in which top management use 
controls, and which require attention: 'How and wby to p Managen cboose topenonagv monitor certain 
mana , gement contml ystems and to 
delegate otber tasks to subordinates' (1990: 135) show the concerns of 
the management. 
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Cranfield Institute of Management evaluated manufacturing excellence using non-fmancial 
performance indicators. Eight performance indicators measured the success of engineering 
companies. 
Schmenner (1995) asked transnational managers what perfort-nance capabilities ought to be 
measured and which were. He identified three groups of measures, gaps, false alarms and a 
group 'in the middle'. Gaps define areas that ought to be well measured but were not. False 
alarms measured areas that now firms should not measure. The group 'in the middle' were 
measured and ought to be they were: integration with customers, overhead cost reduction, 
volume flexibility, throughput times, quality and computer systems. False alarms were machine 
efficiency, labour efficiency and direct cost reductions. 'Ilie gaps were in new product 
introduction, customer satisfaction and employee involvement. Interestingly the gaps are similar 
to Chaston and Mangles recipes for growth. So similar measures might measure performance 
across most firms. Investors and financial analysts must rate performance and 'pick winners'. 
Financial numbers are not enough to give the answer to the crucial questions of management 
quality. 
To conclude, the ability of the SME manager, and the capabilities of the organisation and the 
organisation's trategy all interrelate. 
First, the SME manager brings experience, capability, personality and judgement. Age and 
experience may estimate capability. The motivation, the reason they have become an SNIE 
manager is also measurable and important. Leadership quality is important though perhaps less 
easflY measured 
If the SME manager is to be at the helm of a 'flyer' then the key task is to, create, lead and 
sustain the organisation. The difference between a small company and a large one is simply the 
size of the organisation. The prosperous SME manager creates an adaptable, professionally 
managed organisation, institutes a distinctive winning culture, a NW-Mart way of doing things 
and is 'lucky' in the pursuit of a differentiated or focused strategy. 
Thus growth 'occurs frvm a co? V&x inteolaj offacton that nig include variafions in all the market and 
managerial elements' (Deakins, 1996: 197). The need to adapt to change, develop staff, exploit new 
opportunities, and cope with changing environments are mentioned by ACARD (1986) and 
86 
ACOST (1990). The key role of management capability is emphasised by Barker et al. (1993): 
g tbegronin irm uill rrIate to its manqgement needr. The monitoring, Some of the most &fIcuItpmbIemsfadn Tfi 
co-oninadon and contrvI of its atfitifies in agmaingfirm aill rrquirr the ufiksafion of increasing amounts of 
gement (1993: 17). informafion, pladig an inctrasing burden on mana 
Warnes (1984) argues that many prominent business fAures during the 1979- 1982 recession in 
Britain were unnecessary. They happened because the company managers fAed to understand 
enough about cash flow, gross profit margins and breakeven. 
Warnes describes company doctoring, which in Gamsey's (1996) terms is coping with growth 
reversal. Essentially his message is to force breakeven point down to below 70 per cent of 
capacity. He describes a picture of a troubled company in 1974 that revealed a breakeven point 
where its breakeven point (fixed costs/gross margin percentage, where gross margin percentage 
is the gap between sales and variable costs expressed as a percentage) of 140%, which also 
represented twice the market sizel His answer; force margins up and accept a lower turnover. If 
the gross margin percentage (GNIP) increases from 3 to 6 per cent, with a turnover less than 
half that previously, then the firm is more profitable. For companies in trouble Warnes suggests: 
Tbefint objective is toget turnover to drop Uke a stone .. As turnover plummets, gilrngood 
contro4 laýge sums can be sbaken out of stocks and debton .. Tbisprotides casb: 
(1) to reduce 
V , gins to co e crrdtorr (2) tofinance bowever mag montbs losses occur before the co ag be m 
into profit (3) to refurNsb, overhaul and upgrade plant and equoment, rebuild and modernise 
the prvducdon Une, etc. (4) To embark on an extensive R&D and product rrdesign 
prqgramme' (1984: 152). 
Turnover for Warnes is fools gold. Instead firms should aim to breakeven at less than 70 per 
cent of their capacity. Firms with gross profit margins below 25 per cent await bankruptcy. 
Perren, Berry and Partridge (1999) trace the changes in management information when a firm 
grows from inception to beyond a n-&ro-enterprise Oess than ten employees). In a study of four 
successful service firms, they found that the owners' fears of business fAure motivated them to 
establish systems of control. Their control systems concentrated on cash but they calculated 
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break-even for their businesses. The study deliberately chose successful businesses and 
demonstrated their emphasis on control. As the business developed, controls became formal. 
Considering start-up businesses Warnes (1984) argues sin-fflarly that scaling back will extend the 
life of a company. Consider the table below. 
Table 11 Sc2ling Back - monthly, LOOO's 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Overhead say 10 5 5 
Gross Margin 40% 40% 75% 
percentage 
Breakeven 25 13 7 
Actual Sales 5 5 4 
Profit/ooss) (8) (3) (2) (1) b/e 
Source: Wames, 1984 
Given that many larger companies tend not to trade with small companies that are in business 
for less than three years because most fail, the small company needs to prolong its life. Warnes 
agrees with industrial economists when they argue that small firms need to reach their minimum 
efficient scale quickly (Devine et al., 1985; Audretsch, 1995). If the company in table 11 starts 
with C50,000 capital at losses of C8,000 per month it will run out of cash after six months. 
Cutting the overheads extends life to eighteen months, better but not enough. Ibus; forcing up 
margins will extend the life to over two years. With sales of just C5,000 per month the company 
can, at 75% GPM, become more profitable with two-thirds of the previous months sales. The 
message is clear. Companies can afford to lose custom to defend their profit margins. Warnes 
seem to concur with the industrial economics view that small firms need to make their 
n-dnimum, efficient scale quickly (Audrctsch, 1995). 
High profit margins may not reflect price increases, however. Reducing direct sales costs, 
reducing material content or improved production methods all improve margins without price 
increases. Indeed, Warnes decries managers obliviousness to productivity increases effect on 
profits. To make this work though companies need information: 
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Trrquent, rrasonably, accurate, mana gement informa4ron seems the kg ebaracte&&c of 
successful coivanies .. Vegfex coiVanies that bavejust gone bust orjustgenerallygot into 
jearr hatv bad tfeefim bud g andfinandal control trouble in the recesjions of thepartfiew gefin
Ustems. Vegfew of those wbo bam sunived and done well bam not' (1984: 57). 
Writing from a perspective of a venture capital fund manager in recessionary times Wames (1984) 
offers a "hard-nosed" approach to business success. He argues forcefully that profitability and cash is 
important; turnover is not Wames advocates halving output if your company profits by doing so, 
and he shows that in a surprising number of cases halving production will increase the profitability of 
the firm. Firms need to understand the management infon-nation, their real incomes (gross profit 
margins) their costs and their breakeven points. Finally owners seem to pass up the almost 
miraculous effect of productivity increases on profits. 
2.12 Decision-making, Heuristics and judgement 
Making assessments about the performance, strengths and weaknesses of SNIEs requires 
judgement. Casson (1992) defines judgement as decision-making in situations that are 'complex, 
novel and ambiguous'. These situations are what Knight would call uncertain rather than risky. 
Risky decisions are those for which one can assign objective probabilities. Having done so and 
assessing one's risk profile the economic actor can make a decision. However, when the 
situation is ambiguous you have to assign your own subjective probabilities. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) show that- ýeople rely on a set of beurisficprindýles uhicb reduce the conplex tasks of 
assessing prvbabi, ýfies andpredcfing values to simpler judgmental operafions' (reprinted in Kahneman, 
Slovic, and Tversky, 1982). In doing so, whilst these heuristics are useful they tend to commit 
three common systematic errors. The errors concern estimates of the representativeness of their 
sample, availability of the event, and being tied to an anchor. Representativeness describes the 
bias that afflicts even experienced researchers who believe their samples are more representative 
of the general population than predicted by sampling theory. Availability refers to the frequency 
of events. If asked about the level of crime, for example, people refer to the events in the news 
or neighbours and thus overestimate the frequency. People underestimate mundane events. 
Anchoring describes the occasions where estimates are too close to an initial value because 
estimators are reluctant to leave it behind. Heuristics are short-cuts used by people under 
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uncertain conditions, in doing so they represent information in a useful way but are subject to 
systematic biases. PBAs are using heuristics to advise SNIEs to improve their chances of success. 
Yet, Krueanski (1992) takes issue with the dichotomy of decision-making between rational 
'normative' and heuristic and holds that all judgements are administered under the same set of 
precepts. He calls this the lay-epistemic model (LE). 'Ibis model assumes judgements are reached as a 
sequence of hypothesis generation and testing. Even when hypotheses are tested under Bayesian 
statistical methods, he asks where hypotheses originate? The LE model believes hypotheses come 
from the individuars available world knowledge, subject to cognitive processes. Hypotheses, 
constructed from mentally accessible categories, depend upon how recently or often the categories 
were trýed, and how vivid these memories were. 'Ibis takes us back to the biases inherent in 
heuristics but 'within a rational model'. Krugbnsk? s point is that the biases in heuristics are endemic 
because they come from human information processing. 
The LE model assumes that hypotheses are tested through disputation with relevant data. But what 
counts as relevant? 'Ibis again depends on connections in the mind of the decision-maker between 
'specific cognitive categDries'. All relevance is subjective so inferences are part of the normative 
(ration4 rules of Bayesian decision analysis. Krug[anski says 'all cases ofju4gement intvhv the knoxe-r's. Prior 
,g some 
hnkage beta een dfirent categones, bence inifeafing wbat eadence is relevant assui*&ons oriýerrnee rules wn 
to wbajudgement' (1992.460). 1hus, representativeness bias is a special case of inference rules, 
indispensable in all judgements, heuristic or not The key problem is the lack of attention paid to 
base-rate and other evidence. Base-rate evidence describes known fimdamental data. For example, 
Vertzberger (1990) argued that US President Johnson believed (wronoy) in the Mekong River 
development project (in Vietnam 1964-68) because he saw it as similar (representative) to his 'Great 
Society' - He ignored known 'base-rates' of past fOures; of US foreign aid programmes. 
The key 
problem with all the heuristic biases noted by Tversky and Kahnemann (1974) is the early closure of 
information gathering, particularly base-rate information. Yet there are search costs associated with 
gathering evidence. 'Ibis early closure has more to do with motivational and cognitive factors rather 
than biases inherent in judgement heuristics. Clarke, Mackaness and Culligan-Dunsmore (1997) argue 
that intuition is an essential part of decision-making. They cite studies that suggest non-native decision 
analysis and intuition is a powerful combination. They say that intuitive judgement is composed of 
gous henchmarks; rq%cfion , gnittant and 
learned 'hardfacft'- cotVarison aitb analo four sources 'tbe 4pp§aeion efji 
on unique and contbduýlfaam; and the use of otber surrogate measures gdnedfirom perronal operieners' (1997: 2). 
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Krabuanrat and Phelps (1998) argue that the rational model of decision-making is flawed: contrag to a 
midely, beld be&f, the rafional model of decision making may not be an ideal at wbich to am (even in the sense of 
)Jor dynamic strategic decisions; instead the demlopment of beurisfics and mental models my bounded rafiona§_4 
. 
prrsent a morr trIevant am (1998: 92) 
PBAs are bound to use heuristics to simplify their (complex) task. These heuristics will derive not 
only from prior research but importantly, experience from ýving business advice and prior business 
experience. 
Iheoretically, heuristics are expected in business advice. Decision-makers short-cut to 
concentrate on key areas. Turning to the practice of SME assessments, bankers' lending 
decisions, and investments by business angels and venture capitalists provide practical examples 
of this decision-making studied by researchers. 
2.13 Financiers, Heuristics and the Small Firm 
In their study of lending decisions by bank managers Deakins and Hussain (1993) assert: 
The combinafion qr the non-speda&st appmacb and the addce on a narmw range of 
informadon on ithieb to bare tbeir assessment meant that eicen mW on tbeir e-%peiience 
, gb 
banks tg to contml this mle of tbumb dedsion- wben making len&ng dedsions. Altbou 
y hating their ornguide§nesfor oficen and requiriq them to report dedsions to makiq b 
su perion, oficen ni4l use their ouw intuifion based on their prrtious expefience. Wbere a 
dedsion bas been successful in tbepast, it is #ke# to be re pbisficafion of risk peate4yet he so 
anajlsis bebind this dedsion may be reak- '(1993: 184). 
As we already discussed, the nature of the problem, the uncertain and ambiguous conditions 
lend itself to more heuristic decision-making. Lending decisions are a ýrvcess ofinterface between the 
rules and a mana i ve, heuristic ger's operience' (Fletcher, 1996: 12). Bank lending is a partly intu ti 
decision made by experienced managers. Green (1991) suggests that ', manq genget an omrall tiew Sr 
thepotenfiah qf thepmject at an early stage thanks to an intuifive general iiVression' (1991: 284) Most 
assessments of firm performance are likely to fall into this category too. Is this necessarily bad? 
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Altman (1971) in a study of commercial bankruptcy in America suggests an element of intuitive, 
qualitative analysis is necessary in decision-making, as do Clarke et al. (1997). Moreover, 
quantitative analyses (like investment criteria, net present value, etc. ) and experienced managers 
can manipulate credit scoring (Fletcher, 1996). Deakins and Hussain (1993) argue that training 
for bank staff in risk analysis is part of the solution to the problem of small firm assessment. So 
what can we glean from academic research about small firm assessment of SME performance? 
Deakins and Hussain (1993) interviewed 30 bank officers. They presented a real business plan to 
gauge the criteria used by managers. 71bey found a remarkable difference of opinion concerning 
the viability of their proposition. They found managers to be rather short-term in outlook, 
concerned with cash flow forecasts for the next twelve months. Managers' criteria concentrated 
on gearin& the personal financial position, and forecasted balance sheets; whereas only 13% of 
managers asked for the business strategy. 'Ibis may be due to the specific business proposition 
put before managers because it had relatively high gearing. The possibility exists that the 
managers use a process whereby the concentrate on 'error signals'. Parts of the business 
proposition where the managers were satisfied; therefore, may not have received much 
questioning. Moreover, Managers may well have expected the academics to be adept at strategy. 
The research might have put several different propositions before managers. In addition, 
changing interviewers might have made some difference. Deakins and Hussain asked managers 
to discuss criteria used to assess lending propositions. They found little correlation between 
these and the criteria used for their proposition. The variance in the rank order of the criteria 
was high. Managers were not in total agreement about which were most important. Again this 
might be due to the process of the decision. 1bus trading experience, profitability and projected 
income might be equally crucial for any business despite an apparently arbitrary order between 
these three. Managers talked about the 'mix! of factors. Managers viewed mnemonic guides such 
as PARSERS as aids for inexperienced managers. 
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Table 12 Ilie importance of Criteria used to assess lending propositions 
Criteria Rank order Afean score Standard eviation 
Trading experience 1 4.43 .5 Projected income 2 4.37 . 85 Existing profitability 3 4.3 .6 Equity stake 4 4.18 . 69 Repayment of previous loans 5 4.12 . 76 Gearing 6 3.82 . 95 Client an e--6sting customer 7 3.78 . 76 Net profit to sales 8 3.75 . 89 Previous loans 9= 3.73 . 69 Personal guarantees 9= 3.73 . 69 CVs of clients 11 3.7 . 76 Trade debtors 12 3.65 . 71 Liquidity ratios 13= 3.62 . 85 Gross profit to sales 13= 3.62 . 85 Trade creditors 15 3.57 . 85 Charge on personal assets 16 3.55 . 65 Fixed charge on business assets 17 3.52 . 91 Floatine charee 18 3.00 1.07 
Note: 6 pt scale from 0-5 
Source: Deakins and Hussain (1993) 
Character, and the ability of the entrepreneur to sell the proposition was rated as important. 
The authors found no significant association between ranking of criteria and the decision on the 
proposition. Further, the authors discussed the reasons for rejection of proposals, though not 
with all the managers. Table 13 below shows the percentages of managers mentioning criteria 
for rejection. 
Table 13 Reasons for rejection of propositions 
Criteria 
Under-capitalization/gearing 
Lack of exTerience/track record 
Poorly prepared business plan 
Management ability 
Lack of security 
Serviceability 
Sample = 21 
Source: Deakins and Hussain (1993) 








These reasons to reject proposals might suggest an assessment method. Product experience, a 
familiarity with the market, was rated as important for new businesses. Hence, it was important 
on all counts. 'Me gearing that the authors found to be most important in their proposal tops 
the poll in table 13, indicating a negative assessment of proposals perhaps. Thus just as 
researchers might accept a theory unless it is falsified, do managers accept applications for 
funding unless the aspirant triggers their reasons for rejection? One can imagine an algorithm 
that states: if gearing is less than 1: 1, the applicant has a track record in the industry, a well- 
prepared business plan, demonstrates some managerial ability and has security, then accept to 
proposal. 7hus, bank managers may be using a series of hurdles to screen applications. 
Deakins and Hussain note the role of personal collateral. It is one method by which banks deal 
with moral hazard. Collateral and a personal equity stake signal commitment to the business for 
the bank. Banks rarely use the loan guarantee scheme and are unwilling to back ventures without 
personal collateral. Ibis may reduce the exploited opportunities within the economy. Moreover, 
the relatively unsophisticated lending criteria are no real approach to the adverse selection 
problem, which is essentially the decision to do business with an entrepreneur. 
Fletcher (1996) investigated how Scottish bank managers make lending decisions. Following 
from Deakins and Hussain, Fletcher interviewed 38 bank managers in Scottish banks. A 
proposal was presented with the researcher as entrepreneur, seeking to raise L60 000 with an 
equity stake of C30 000 in the recession affected Scottish construction industry. Gearing was 2: 1. 
Secondly the interview asked about criteria for lending. 
Fletcher found Scottish managers were significantly more likely to support the proposition. 'Ibis 
reflected the stance of two of the three Scottish banks. Scottish managers were more 
favourable. These attitudes might reflect lower numbers of business proposals due to the 
relatively lower number of small firms in Scotland (Gallagher, Robson and Keff, 1993). These 
bankers were also concerned about gearing but not so much as the West Midlands banker. 
Those deciding to lend were impressed with the credibility of the owners and viewed the equity 
injection as showing commitment. Managers had guidelines but varied in their use. One bank, 
for example, had a manual with expected financial ratios for 200 business sector, used by one 
manager, not used by another. Management capability was the top criteria sought by managers. 
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Ibis n-ýight indicate the differences in the presenter of this proposal. Fletcher produced a table 
that showed the rank order of decision criteria. 
T2ble 14 R2nk order and mean scores of criteria used on all propositions 
Criteria Rank order Mean score Standard eviation 
Trading experience 1 1 4.29 . 69 
Equity stake 2 4 4.11 . 83 
Gearing 3 6 3.95 . 84 
Existing profitability 4 3 3.87 . 88 
Debtors 5 12 3.68 . 78 
Net profit to sales 6 8 3.53 . 92 
Liquidity ratios 7 13= 3.45 . 92 
Fixed charge on 8 17 3.42 1.03 
Business 
Creditors 9 15 3.37 . 79 
Gross profit to sales to 13= 3.34 1.10 
Repayment of previous loans 11 5 3.26 1.11 
Projected income 12 2 3.24 . 97 
Presentation of the business plan 13 NA 3.21 . 94 
CVs of clients 14= 11 3.18 . 96 
Floating charges 14= 18 3.18 1.21 
Personal guarantees 16 9= 3.03 1.08 
Previous loans 17 9= 2.82 1.14 
Cbarge on personal assets 18 16 2.79 1.04 
Client an existing 19 7 2.29 1.29 
Customer 
Source of referral 20 NA 2.21 1.19 
6pt scales from 0-5; *= Deakins and Hussain rankings. 
Source: Fletclier (1996). 
The most important criteria are relatively consistent: trading experience, existing profitability, 
and equity stake, in the top four each time. There are differences. Scottish managers show less 
concerned that the client is an existing customer. Fletcher believes that Scottish managers might 
be more pro-active due to the shortage of proposals in Scotland. 
Other financial competitors to banks, venture capitalists and business angels also make funding 
decisions in similar circumstances. The balance of risk and return for these, predominantly 
equity investors, is different. These investors are more interested in growth than mere survival. 
Research into these groups identifies their methodologies for investment. 
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Writing in the Financial Times Mastering Enterprise series, Colin Mason and Richard Harrison 
point out that business angels are motivated by capital gain, though altruistic motives and the 
opportunity to play a part in the business are important motives. Investors reject over 90 per 
cent at an initial stage. Proposals must overcome the business angels 'reasons not to invest' - 
Essentially, the angels accept a proposition because they cannot find enough reasons to reject it. 
Mason and Harrison say ý41tboqgb the identfitcadon of one or two perrdved weaknesses in tbeproposal is 
un§kely to be suf1dent to make the investor stop rea&ng, the accumuladon f several weaknesses mill lead to a 
rýeaion'(1997: 9) 
The decision to invest therefore depends upon not failing the criteria for investment. Angels 
might have personal criteria such as industrial market, finance required and location. Angels can 
be specialists not generalists. Some have expertise in particular industries and are willing to back 
ventures in that area. They may back ventures in particular technologies. the may be more 
opportunistic and quicker to decide, and stump up the cash but they may want to play a more 
active role in the business than the owner/ manager would wish. Stevenson and Coveney (1996) 
identified six types of business angel using a survey method. Their 484 respondents represented 
a response rate of only 7%, though the number is five times the size of previous surveys, 
according to the authors. Stevenson and Coveney found the reasons for making investments 
were financial. 
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Table 15 Principal attraction for angel investment 
Attraction Percentage 
Greater financial returns than stock market 51% 
To create a job/income 341/o 
Fun and satisfaction 29% 
Sense of social responsibility 3% 
Other 7% 
Note: respondents could rank jointly 
Source: Stevenson and Coveney (1996) 
The rates of return expected by angels varied considerably. On average they expected returns of 
21% p. a. and expected investments to be for six years. Their criteria for selection depended to a 
large extent on the management. 
Table 16 Principal criteria when assessing aproposal 
Impression of the founder/manager 59% 
Experience/understanding of the sector 29% 
Projected profitability 9% 
Content and presentation of the business plan 8% 
Attractive margins 7% 
Location of the venture 5% 
Source: Stevenson and Coveney (1996) 
The impression of the management of the business was by far the principal criteria for business 
angels. Most preferred to receive a five-page report surnmarising the business plan with a full 
CV and contact numbers which enabled them to form an impression of the management. The 
understanding of the sector was important for almost one in three. Business angels, therefore 
are, unlike bank managers, not all generalists. The location of the business was less important 
than previous research suggests. Stevenson and Coveney found 45% of angels willing to invest 
more than 200 miles from their place of work. The survey found business angels to be 
overwhelmingly males (981/o), middle aged and university educated. Half the angels founded two 
or more businesses and the principal source of their wealth was their own business for just 
under half with only one in eight inherited their wealth. Yet the group was not homogenous and 
differed in investment strategies. 
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The survey identified the six types of angel: virgins (370/o), latent (90/6), wealth maximisers (20%), 
entrepreneurial (100/6), income seekers (160/6), and corporate (90/6). Statistical differences at the 
1% or 5% level identified these types. The first two groups were willing to lend but either had 
not done so, virgin angels, or had not done so in the last three years, latent angels. 
The virgin angels in this research had funds to invest but had yet to find a proposal to back. 
They were less wealthy, came from a less entrepreneurial background and were less concerned 
with their impression of the management and more concerned with the business plan and 
location than the other angels. 'Meir principal investment motive was fmancial. The latent 
angels were wealthier and more entrepreneurial than the virgin angels. These angels were more 
concerned about location than others. They were local investors. They would invest more if 
they had a better knowledge of the management of the local businesses and evident exit routes. 
Wealth maximising angels were the largest group of active angels (37%) and the least concerned 
with location, 47% willing to invest over 200 miles away from their place of work. They are rich 
and experienced businesspersons. Not as rich as entrepreneurial angels they make as many 
investments as the entrepreneurial by investing slightly smaller amounts. Their median 
investment was L40 000. Ibus they adopt a portfolio approach. They often provide support and 
are probably the most likely to use business introduction agencies to fmd proposals. 
Entrepreneurial angels are older, and richer (61% had net worth more than C1m) than other 
angels. Less likely to co-invest they invest for the 'buzz' and as a better option than the City. 
Two in every five are willing to invest in locations over 200 miles away. 
Income seeking angels are less affluent. They invest to generate an income or even a job for 
themselves. 71hey have founded the fewest numbers of businesses, prefer to co-invest and are 
concerned about location. In many ways Stevenson and Coveney believe previous surveys 
depicted all angels as income seeking angels. The authors argue that this distorts the picture 
because these are the minor players. Undoubtedly, they may play a useful role in local small 
businesses. 
Corporate angels are companies making numerous angel type investments. Their motives are 
financial but they mentioned a sense of social responsibility. They invest larger amounts in each 
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proposal. The authors argue that corporate angels have been overlooked in the literature and 
made the largest and most frequent investments despite accounting for only 16% of the survey. 
'Mis typology of business angels whilst changing the view about the nature of angels is also used 
to tell us something about their investment behaviour. The limiting factor for investment is the 
lack of suitable proposals. Afore investments would be made if the angels trusted the 
management. 
99 
Table 17 Reasons restricting investment 
Reason Angels Twgin Angels 
Lack of suitable proposals 70% 66% 
Lack of faith/trust in 42% 30% 
management 
Lack of reliable inforrnation 32% 22% 
Lack of available funds 32% 20% 
Respondents could mention more than one 
Source: Stevenson and Coveney (1996) 
Tax incentives would stimulate angels but not virgin angels and it appears incentives for 
investment in higher technology companies are on the way in the UK Available exit routes are 
seen as the second most important factor to stimulate investment. 
Table 18 Factor stimulating more investment 
Reason Angels Virgin angels 
Better knowledge/trust of management 63% 57% 
Available e: xit routes 441/o 45% 
Co-investment with experienced angels 38% 42% 
Better tax incentives 45% 34% 
Knowledge of successful angel investments 25% 23% 
Corporate finance advice 16% 19% 
Other 241/o 21% 
Source: Stevenson and Coveney (1996) 
The better knowledge of management is one reason why the introduction agencies for angel 
investment appear to work better when the agency vets the proposal. However, Stevenson and 
Coveney's finding suggest here is a large room for improvement. To do so the problem appears 
to be concerning how angels make their decisions. We know that they judge a proposal looking 
for reasons to reject it. We know those management concerns are the top priority what we do 
not know is how these concerns might be allayed or confirmed. Stevenson and Coveney found 
45% of angels favoured a detailed 4-5 page appraisal of the business plan, written by agency 
staff. This is exactly what VCR network use and half of the respondents were subscribers to 
VCR. 
In order to uncover further the decision processes of business angel subscribers to VCR, Mason 
and Rogers (1997) used protocol analysis. 'Ibis asks respondents to 'think out loud' while they 
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go about their business, in this case screen business proposals. These verbal statements are tape 
recorded and transcribed. Ten investors evaluated in the region of 150 proposals. Active 
investors, they had founded businesses (median average of two per investor), and were 
predominantly male between 45-64 years old. The decisions to accept or reject the proposal 
took an average of 11.25 minutes to determine. The authors believe the tape recording lead 
investors to discuss the proposal after they had made their decision. Consequently the figure of 
11.25 minutes is probably a maximum figure. Most business angels took between five and ten 
minutes to screen the proposal, with two taking only a few minutes whilst others taking over 
twenty minutes. A frequency count of investment criteria found market and financial 
considerations followed by the management team. Investors preconceptions of the market are 
strong. They are likely to rely on these to evaluate the market. Conclusions on financial 
considerations or the management eam depend upon information in the proposal. Investors, 
using their own money with little outside pressure to invest, are particular about whether the 
investment 'fits' their investment criteria. 
The most significant element of the fit between the investor and the proposal is the investor's 
knowledge of the market. Business angels are specialists. An investors commented Tiv no interrst in 
the segment.... The second element of fit is the amount of capital required. This research found 
the third factor location, followed by the stage of development. Some business angels are wary 
of start-up investment. There are some non-financial aspects to investors fit, so-called hot 
buttons. One engineer's interest in the engineering aspects caused him to read on. 
The research described the decision-making process as 'three strikes and yotýre oue. Angels 
look for reasons to reject the proposal. They authors quote one investor thus: 
Tbrougbout this I'm meg gnical and sarrasfic and i bate to be because i know that Id bam to 
look at ten [investment op -y aim 
if to 
. 
Pottunifies] toget seriously involved uitb one. Reagv, m 
e, ýfflinate nine, ratber tbanfind the gem nox.... YI can't eAminate this one, tbat's the gem. So 
the assui*fion I start uitb is that it's loug and as I go on I [may] cban , ge ig mind 
(1997: 38). 
The cumulation of several perceived weaknesses will lead to a proposal being rejected. 
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Investors need convincing that entrepreneurs understand the market. One investor inferred 
market information based upon the Finandal Tivies only as representing insufficient market 
research and thus a doubt regarding his competence. Highly competitive markets and those 
businesses with high marketing costs were judged as weak. The next critical factor is the 
experience and track record of the entrepreneur, especially sales and marketing. Financial 
considerations concentrate on the upside potential. Ibis returns to the market for the product. 
In addition, the reason for the equity becomes important. Requests for capital to repay loans or 
shore up a weak balance sheet are frowned upon. Investors want to provide expansion capital. 
71he unique selling proposition (USP) of the product or service must convince investors. An 
investor lost interest because 'Merr isn't tra, ýt an indsite coVarison of tbepmduct tmus its co)Vefifion' 
0997: 40). 
Mason and Rogers (1997) concluded there are four key investment criteria. 
1. Market. The level of competition and costs of marketing and distribution. 
2. Entrepreneur/management team. Credible track record particularly sales and marketing. 
3. Upside potential. The use to which the money will be put. 
4. Competitive advantage. Ihe USP of the product. 
For business angels, then screening business proposals is a rather rapid 'three strikes and you're 
out' rejection of proposals which do not fit investment criteria. Ibis does beg the question of 
what happens next. Only one-in-ten business proposals get this far but it is not clear that these 
businesses will end up with fimding. Moreover, the number of investors in this exploratory 
paper is ten. The rather cynical approach also strikes one as plausible. Business angels are not 
the only equity providers, venture capitalists provide equity though too. 
Daniel Muzyka and Sue Birley (1997) discussed screening of business proposals by venture 
capitalists. They asked 70 venture capitalists for the factors that they considered when weighing 
up an investment decision. Their criteria fell into seven categories. Product market fa ctors 
considered market size, growth and seasonality. Strategic-competitive factors on the other hand 
related to the competitive elements of markets, the ability to create barriers to entry, the extent 
of competition. The leadership and track record of the management eam constituted another 
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category. The time to break-even projected rate of return were important facets of the financial 
category. The funding and nature of the funding requirement vis-a-vis the existing portfolio of 
investment. Finally, the venture capitalist considers specific nature of the deal. Table 19 details 
the ranking of factors considered when assessing proposals. 
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Table 19 Ranking of Factors considered in assessing venture capital 
opportunities 
Factor - ntunber denotes rank 
1 Leadership potential of lead entrepreneur 
2 Leadership potential of management team 
3 Recognised. industry expertise in management team 
4 Track record of lead entrepreneur 
5 Track record of management team 
6 Sustain share position 
7 Marketing/sales capabilities of management team 
8 Organisational/administrative capabilities of team 
9 Ability to get the cash out of the investment 
10 Degrees of product market understanding 
11 Expected rate of return (return on investment) 
12 Time to break-even 
13 Financial/accounting capabilities of team 
14 Ability to create post-entry barriers 
15 Business meets funds constraints 
16 Process/production capabilities of team 
17 Uniqueness of product and technology 
18 Market growth and attractiveness 
19 Degree of market already established 
20 Tune required to payback the investment 
21 Ability to influence nature of business 
22 Importance of unclear assumptions 
23 Stage of investment required 
24 Ease of market entry 
25 Strength of suppliers and distributors 
26 Nature and degree of competition 
27 Location of business 
28 Business and product fit with venture capitalises portfolio of investments 
29 Projected market size 
30 Sensitivity to market cycles 
31 Ability to syndicate (bring others into) deal 
32 Number and nature of co-investors already in the deal 
33 Seasonality of product market 
34 Scale and chance of later financing rounds 
35 Location of business relative to fimd 
Source: Aluzyka, and Birley (1997) 
Muzyka and Birley conclude that primarily venture capitalists want to establish that the 
leadership and managerial capacity is present in the managerial team. As in Penrose's theory of 
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the fmn, it is the managerial constraint that is seen as the key to the growth of the firm. In this 
they are in agreement with business angels. 
Although, research reveals many quantitative factors associated with the growth and survival of 
the small fin-n; knowledge of these is impossible to translate into effective business advice to 
small business owners. We have seen that the educational background, the marketing experience 
and exporting associate with growing firms. However, many of these factors are given before an 
advisor comes into the firm. In addition, the survey research to correlate factors with growth, 
inevitable constrains the findings. These are biased towards individual ability and personality on 
the one hand and on the other non-price competition. For advisors and for many researchers 
the problem with all the factors and ideas is that the key is management, or entrepreneurial, 
capability. 'Ibis is not directly measurable and thus academicians and practitioners alike use all 
sorts of proxy measures to try to assess the ability of the firm's management. The academic 
research suggests a number of factors, some of which are already given; practitioners are more 
likely to generate elements that point to specific business advice. 
2.12 Conclusion 
Government support has shifted from support for new firms; to a targeted, customer-focused, 
pro-active support for existing firms with the potential for growth. 'Ibis shift has its roots in the 
recognised aspects of the UK SAIE sector. Government support to established growth 
businesses recognises the high turnover of SAIEs, that employment growth is highly 
concentrated and that many businesses are lifestyle' businesses. However, although the policy 
shift is recognised in policy and academic circles, implementation is through local Business 
Links. Business Links have to make the policy work on the ground. 
In practice, the new policy is complex. The factors that make a growth SME are a puzzling 
combination of entrepreneurial behaviours, management capability, strategic knowledge, timing, 
hard-work, environmental and competitive changes, location, macroeconomics and luck. PBAs 
are thrust into this complex mix and make heuristic short cuts to make the problem tractable, 
and develop their own tacit knowledge. Ihey may mirror investors' judgements of firms from a 
shortlist of criteria, and indeed they must help firms to raise finance and forestall the heuristic- 
using bank manager. The research wanted to examine the heuristics used by PBAs and other 
advisors as they sought to help firms with the potential for growth. 
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In doing this, the research followed those advocating a more qualitative analysis of the small 
firm sector (Cooper, 1995; Deakins, 1996). 1be heuristics of the advisors - and subsequent 
questionnaire self-administered to PBAs - provided an opportunity to develop a model of SME 
performance capable of being used in an advisory capacity, and one that would reach more 




Methodology describes the research procedures. The degree of methodological rigour and the 
peer review within the academic community separate academic research from mere assertion. 
However, the choice of methods has mushroomed and though this provides researchers with 
more 'tools'. it also forces researchers to make more choices about method. In particular there 
is a great deal of controversy and debate between qualitative and quantitative methods. There 
are no perfect answers to the issue of research methodology. All methodological choices involve 
trade-offs; although, many argue that some methods are more 'rigorous' than others. 
Ibis section considers the methodological choices open to the research on small business 
advice, then justifies the methods chosen, and details the trade-offs involved in the research. It 
first looks at the controversy surrounding qualitative and quantitative methods. Ibis involves the 
beliefs of the researcher, as well as the choice of tools -a pragmatic approach. It touches on the 
reasons to choose a method and the methodological arguments surrounding qualitative and 
quantitative research. 
Having considered the more philosophical issues surrounding the methods used in research the 
next section considers the choices made for this research. Given the large number of available 
research tools a justification for which particular tools were chosen has to be made. 'Men the 
section considers the unit of analysis, the business advisors and the sample. After this one 
considers the limitations of the method before looking at validity. 
3.1 Qualitative Vs Quantitative methods 
Burrell and Morgan (1988) have given focus to a debate that splits acadenks into qualitative and 
quantitative researchers. The debate involves different views about what constitutes warranted 
knowledge, what constitutes academic rigour and what are correct subjects and methods for 
academic researchers. And some, notably postmodernists, have attacked the scientific method's 
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myth of objectivity. The so-called lack of rigour in postmodernism, for example is lauded by 
Paul Feyerabend: 
The only, pinqýle that does not inhibit Progress i : anytbiq goes .. Without chaos, no 
knowledge. Witbout a firquent &smissal of rrason, no pm , grrss .. 
For wbat ap ean as 
pment of those `sbypiness', 'cbaos', or opportunism .. bas a most itVortantjun&on i  the develo 
veg tbeories ubicb we todaj ir gard as essentialparts of our knoivled , ge... 
Tbese dedadon, these 
errors areprreon&, 6ons ofprqgrrss' (Agdnst metbod 1988). 
Qualitative approaches derive from phenomenological philosophy. Phenomenological 
philosophy emphasises meaning given to events, by actors, within their normal context. 
Qualitative research concerns itself with shared subjectivity. Many qualitative researchers believe 
the social world is not an objective fact but is constantly being created and re-created by 
participants. In this approach, theory is generated from data, and the qualitative paradigm has a 
different competing model of warranted knowledge (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1992). Van 
Maneen (1979) suggests qualitative research is: 'at best an umbrella term covering an array of 
interpretafive tecbniques ahicb seek to describe, decode, translate, and otberuise come to terms mitb the meaning, 
not tbefrrqueng, of certdn more or less naturagv occurfingpbenomena in the sodal world, '(1979, : 520). 
The process has resisted reification. Wbereas quantitative research has a specific set of 
procedures, qualitative researchers have resisted such step-by-step guides. Ibis has let qualitative 
research open to attack for being less rigorous and, is often difficult for the novice researcher. 
For Creswell (1998), there is a theme running through qualitative research. Qualitative research 
is inductive, looks at the how and what, is exploratory, and detailed. He might also have said 
that it aims to explain the focus of the study within the context and aims to take a holistic view. 
'Me method is inductive rather than deductive. 
The inductive process is the primary way that we find out about the world (Holland et al., 1986). 
Holland et al say Tbe study of indu&on, tben, is the stui# of box knoxIed m gb use' ge is modfied Ib u 
(1986: 5). Ibis is described as 'going from the specific to the general'. Deductive methods are 
opposite, involving 'going from the general to the specific'. Beginning with a hypothesis, you 
believe to be correct; you make systematic observation to see whether data supports that 
hypothesis. You might want to compare two groups to see if one were particularly different 
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from the other. It is very important that the search is for falsifying evidence. A problem of 
whether the hypothesis or the observation comes first is debatable because the two interact. 
Our hypothesis determines what we choose to observe and our observations determine our 
hypotheses. In this context of the interactions between hypotheses and empirical observations 
are paradigms (Kuhn, 1970). Paradigms constrain the way in which the researchers view their 
subject. 1bus the feelings of small business owners, difficult to quantify, are not the focus of the 
quantitative small business research reported in Storey (1994). 
Quantitative research is also seen through a framework, notably logical positivism. It tends to be 
regarded as the 'scientific' method, often called the hypothetico-deductive method. The process, 
seen as value-free, apes the success of the natural sciences. A hypothesis is advanced, building 
on previous research, operationalised and then tested against empirical data. The researcher 
decides which ideas are those representing the key aspects of the problem. In a real sense the 
deductive method tests the researchers view of the world. The source of hypotheses in the 
hypothetico-deductive method should build upon the previous research. Thus the research 
needs a literature review. Uterature reviews place the research within a context of the previous 
theory and should demonstrate how the piece of research fits with existing knowledge, and, thus 
how it will contribute to the body of knowledge within a discipline. Then the concept is 
operationalised in a way to define the rules for deciding what is, and is not, an observation of 
the concept, then one tests observations with the theory. If the tested theory is not disproved 
then evidence for the theory is presented. 'Ibis process gives a clear set of instructions about 
what is or is not falsified theory. Moreover, by explaining and setting down all these elements 
any research can by replicated. So other researchers can find the same phenomena when 
following the same steps, or not. And, if they cannot then the theory might be rejected. 
Scientific methods are concerned with causal explanations and prediction, this caused this, and 
controls for interfering factors are a problem, whereas interfering factors for qualitative 
researchers might be seen as context. Karl Popper (1920) argued that scientific method should 
falsify theory rather than confirm it. Following Hume's problem of induction, Popper suggested 
that, for example, if you are to find out whether the proposition all swans are white, counting 20 
white swans indicates some validity, counting 200 may indicate more but in essence you have to 
find swans that are not white to disprove the hypothesis. Gill and Johnson (1991) note three 
elements to Popper's definition of scientific theories. 
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1. They should be capable of empirical testing. Tbus, Freudian theory in psychology is not 
scientific for positivists. 
2. Scientists should not find support for their theories but should strictly attempt to falsify their 
theories. 
3. Once a theory has not been falsified, it then stands up as avalid' theory. 
Science proceeds as falsified theories fall away and those left are the core of substantiated 
theory, having stood the test of time. Proponents of the hypothetico-deductive method view 
social science through similar lenses as the natural sciences. It may also be seen as attempting to 
appropriate of at least share in the status of science, hence the term social science, rather than 
social studies. Value-free social science is a result of the surge of logical positivism through 
science in the early twentieth century. Ibis has, however, not been without criticism from 
outside the tradition. 
Critiques in the social sciences have tended to focus on the difference between the subject 
matter in the, highly successful and high status, natural sciences and the social. The natural 
sciences view of a change in x causing a change in y 
Y=f(X) 
is seen as a stimulus-response model. Are humans, the subject matter of social science, the 
same? Laing (1967) points out the essential problem with following the natural science 
approach: The ermrfundamentagv is thefdIure to reaUse that there is an ontological &sconfinui_4 between 
buman beings and it-bein gs .. Penons are &sfin guisbedfmm tbin gs in tbatpenons experience the world, wbereas 
Min wi am n gs bebam in the world'(Laing, 1967: 53) Faced th the se set of stimuli, humans respond i 
disparate ways because of their experience. Gill and Johnson suggest here are four points here: 
1. Human action follows an internal logic. Social science should make this internal action the 
subject of research to explain the action. 
2. The matter in the natural sciences does not contend with the subjective self-reflection. 
Consequently, the natural scientist can focus on the external logic to explain the behaviour of 
matter. When involving humans, this is inappropriate, any explanation must involve the 
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subjective experience. The behaviour of a football can be explained without recourse to its 
subjective viewpoint-, the behaviour of a footballer cannot. Their interpretations and motives 
have to be considered. 
3. The social world cannot be seen as following causal relationships that disregard the actor's 
interpretation of events: social meanings, attitudes and beliefs. Tberefore buman aefion is seen as 
puiposim and becomes intelhgible on# ahen ne giin access to that suiýecfive &mension' (Gill and Johnson, 
1991: 34). 
4. Social science must explain human actions with meanings and interpretations of those 
studied: an ernic analysis. Those etic, externally focused, analyses of the positivists are 
inappropriate where the 'subjects' have subjective experiences. 
The stimulus response model is rejected in favour of one of two models in figure 6 
Figure 6 Inductivist models 
(1) stimulus - experience and interpretation - response 
(2) interpretation and meaning - action 
Source: Gill and Johnson (1991) 
In the first model the experience and interpretations are intervening variables that interrupt and 
condition the process of stimulus response. It is, if you like, an amended view of the stimulus 
response model. You can imagine thus a set of factors contributing to youth crime, if the 
youth's attitude contained a set of interpretations. The second model accords much more 
emphasis on the interpretation and meaning of actors in situations. In this view the subjective 
experiences and processes can create the reality experienced. In a sense the interpretations 
create the stimuli rather than the other way around (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). The stimulus 
is insignificant; all is subjective. These are two traditions but both share the view that actors' 
interpretations create human action. 7bus tbepossession ly buman bdn s of a mind basfreed tbemfrom ,g 
the slimulus-response rrlafionsbos that dominate the bebatiour of 'naturalpbenomena' (see Mead, 1934) 
Obviously this view has created particular methodological commitments. 
ill 
1.71he positivist view of dealing with social affairs as if they are matter, is seriously objected to. 
'Sodal, #fe.. ispro&iced ly its coiVonent acton, prrdse# in tems Sf tbdr acfive consfitufion and ir-consfitudon of
frames of meaning wberrýytbyoqanisetheir xperience. '(Giddens, 1976: 79) 
2. Social scientists must explain human behaviour adequately, and therefore need to understand 
actors' the frames of reference used for behavioural decision-making. This is 'vcrstehen'. 
Researchers must be true to the phenomena under study. 
3. Following from 1 and 2,71be implication for methodology is to reject the highly structured 
deductive approaches that obscure the actors' subjective meanings. The deductive researcher, 
with an existing theory of the behaviour of interest, is imposing a view of the world, an external 
view of the world, on a phenomenon that has an internal logic of its own. It is precisely the 
internal logic that interests inductive or qualitative researchers. 'Ibis requires unstructured 
approaches: t.. ahat is recommended are unstructured ara be to ea b that ostensibly aLlowfor access to , 
pp vcs rrs rr 
buman smyeefitio, sitbout creadn ,g 
&stonion, in its natural or etrgday selfing. ' (Gill and Johnson, 1991, 
35). 
4. Tbeprrsaipfions out§nedpmAce the counterfromposifitists that the lack of structurr infen a lack qrtigour 
Bias cannot be ruled out. Afanyposifitists re , gard quaRafive researrb as apossible sourre of 
býpotbeses but not a 
methodfor r searrb. (Giddens, 1976,19) 
Quantitative researchers often suggest hat reliable research should be repeatable and thus the 
impact of the research is something to be controlled. In qualitative research the researcher is a 
social being who will have an impact on his or her surroundings. We cannot stand out as 
objective from outside the human race. Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) say. 
.. We are tart of the sodal world we study.. Tbis is not a matter of metbodolo , gical 
commilment; it is an vdstenfialfaa. Tberr is no way in wbicb we can esca pe the sodal ivorld to 
slu, # it; nor jorfunate# is that necessag. Fe cannot avoid rel )ing on 'common-sense' 
knou*dge nor, qften can re avoid affeaiý ,g the sodalpbenomenaue stuýv' 
(1983: 15). 
Waddington (1994) points out that all research is done within a social context. Quantitative 
researchers test their view of the world in constructing his or her hypothesis. just as decision 
analysis takes place within a context determined by memory and cognitive processes, so too 
112 
with hypotheses. Unlike quantitative researchers those employing qualitative methods must 
reveal their biases. 
Nornothetic methods emphasis the research techniques that are embodied in the natural 
sciences, and positivist research. Ideographic methods describe the subjective accounts of those 
involved and getting inside the situation, emphasising theory grounded in empirical observations 
of the subjects' meanings and interpretational systems (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, pp6-7). 
Table 20 Contrasting Nomothetic: and Ideographic Methods 
Nornothetic methods stress Ideographic methods emphasise 
1. Deduction Induction 
2. Explanation through analysis of causal Explanation of subjective meaning systems 
relationships and explanation by covering laws and explanation by understanding (emic) 
(etic) 
3. Generation and use of quantitative data Generation and use of qualitative data 
4. Use of various controls, physical or Commitment to research in everyday settings, 
statistical, so as to allow the testing of to allow access to, and minimise reactivity 
hypotheses. among the subjects of research. 
5. Highly structured research methodology to Minimum structure to ensure 2,3, and 4 (as a 
ensure replicability of 1,2,3 and 4. result of 1) 
Laboratory experiments, quasi-experiments, urveys, action research, ethnoo2hX. 
Source: Gill and Johnson (1991: 36) 
Besides the philosophical issues, researchers might view research through ideological glasses. In 
particular, researchers may adopt post-modem, critical or feminist perspectives. Researchers 
might use these perspectives as a counterpart to their bias. 1hus a socialist might use a 
perspective of critical theory to examine the condition of alienation in the factory. An 'armchair 
radical' might use a post-modem perspective (Momas, 1993, p23), and a feminist could use a 
feminist perspective. All these ideological positions are critiques of the status quo from the 
perspective of the oppressed, though they differ in the groups oppressed and the method of 
their oppression. 
3.2 Pragmatists 
Gill and Johnson (1991) argue for a multi-method triangulated approach. They say that '. a tiew 
of metbodolo , g, puirly-, 
in terms of a &cbotomy, isfundamenta, ýiflawed' (1991: 127). They turn to what 
they call the methodologically pluralist position, taking the pragmatic stance that different 
methods give differing answers and to some extent answer different questions, a combination 
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can be converge on a fuller, yet generalisable answer. A rapprochement between ideographic 
and nomothefic research methodologies might be both possible and desirable (McCall and 
Simmons, 1969). 
Trow (1957) proposes that different kinds of information can be gathered efficiently and 
effectively using different techniques. We return here to the idea of the technical reasons for 
choosing methodological procedures. The metaphor usually referred to is that of the 'toolbox'. 
The choice then of techniques depends upon the trade-offs between reliability, (internal and 
external) validity and the appropriateness to the topic in hand. The researcher's choice of 
method should be judged for information adequacy and efficiency Zelditch (1962). HAV. Smith 
(1975) however, uses the term methodological pluralism to discuss the use of different 
complementary data in the same empirical study, also known as methodological triangulation. 
'Ibis is thought to overcome inherent bias in any one method. It is a pragmatic approach. And 
in some senses it means putting some ontological issues on one side whilst the research is 
undertaken. Specifically Burrell and Morgan (1979) suggest that pragmatists must take on the 
realist assumption about reality, that there is such thing as a real world outside our 
consciousness. Structures exist outside perception. Some important structures may exist of 
which we know little and lack 'names'. Nevertheless if the researcher is going to use any 
quantitative methods at all, then they must accept the assumptions underlying this methodology, 
at least for the purposes of the research. Thus the individual is seen as bom into a social world 
with a reality of its own. The individual does not create this social world; it is out there. Given a 
social reality then, experimental or analytical survey techniques, where researchers impose their 
operationalisation of social reality, are legitimate. The need for research to explore the meanings 
attached to social reality requires ideographic methods. Hence, the explanation is of quasi-causal 
explanations, as in position I in figure 6. 'Ibus, the actors' experience and interpretation mediate 
stimulus and response. 'Ibus with this position the deductive method can be used to examine 
the stimulus - response element. The ideographic element then can be used for taking into 
account or controlling for the interpretation given to events by actors. That is, however, a rather 
positivist leaning view of the pluralist method. Alternatively you might consider two levels of 
analysis, the macro and n-dcro. Methodological pluralism can be used to check the research 
findings within one research project, increasingly called qua]-quant studies. Some studies stress 
qual more than quant (QUAL-quant) whilst others stress the opposite (qual-QUANl). 
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Whilst the pragmatic mixing of research methodologies is attractive some researchers reject the 
pluralist approach. Gill and Johnson (199 1) refer to these researchers as parochial. They believe 
there are two main causes of parochialism. 'Me first cause is where researchers downplay the 
role of interpretation by social actors, and thus favour the hypothetico-deductive method. A 
second method of parochialism for Gill and Johnson is the nominalist view of social reality. 
The nominalist views social reality as nothing more than a construct of the actors involved, for 
nominalists: 
.. the sodal rodd as an emegent sodalpmeess mhicb is arated ly the in&tiduals concemed 
Sodd rra§ty, in sofar it is recqgnised to bave any &)dstence outside the consciousness qf ag 
single inkidua4 is rtgarded as being Attle morr than a network of assuVfions and inter- 
su4iecfitrý sbared meanings. The ontological status of the sodalworld is dered as extremely 
questionabk andpmblemafic. (BurrrLl and Afoqan, 197A 30-3 1). 
Ibis makes the methodological pluralist position untenable. 1be implicit acceptance of a realist 
position is necessary, for all experimental and survey methodologies, since operationalising 
social elements and the independent variables all imply a social reality (Gill and Johnson, 1991). 
In such case then, a version of events can be seen as being more than confined to one context 
but applicable for more individuals and/or over similar contexts. For strict nominalists the 
scientist imposes his version of the subject in question upon the data awarding their view an 
unwarranted superior status. A second element is that the participants should check the 
constructs of the researcher so they understand and share the interpretation made by the 
researcher. 
As Schulz (1967) puts it ethnographic methods assemble reality '. undentandablefor the actor bimsejY 
as well as for bis fellow men in terms of common sense intqrrtafions of etvgday Aye. ' (1967: 4). The 
implication is that the piece of research must connect with the participants themselves. Validity 
therefore is demonstrated by the consensus of the participants. Now, given the view of social 
reality as a shared consensus of actor's consciousness, this is a reasonable assumption. 
Moreover, the researchers' views of reality accord no more status than any other of the 
participants. The other implication is that such things as mathematical models must be readily 
understood by participants. Given that many are not the paraphernalia of independent variables 
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and algebraic sets of equations are not considered pertinent. If the language or mode of 
representation is obscure or difficult then it is more difficult to share the consensus. Clearly, 
then methodological pluralism requires a realist view of ontology. 
Philosophers have some bad news, however, for realists. In conversation Singer (in Magee, 
1987) repeats Ilegel's criticism of Kant. 
The only, solution, Hqel says, is to rýed this idea of a knower and wbat's known, the tablefor 
. 
paratefmm the mind that knors it. What you hatv to say is instance, as vdifing on its oaw, se 
. ge, 
ifitr to vdit, must be imme&ate. There must be no me&um tbmugb wbicb we that knoukd 
, gs. 
How can that bappen? Only if the knower and the known are one and the same. know Min 
How can that happen? Since the knower is mind, what is known must be mind, so all of 
rra§ty must be mentat (Afage, 1987,201,202). 
3.3 Research interview fbUowed by survey- why these methods were chosen 
The methodology used for this research can be characterised as QUAL-quant. The research 
method chosen reflects that the research investigated a research question rather than a set of 
hypotheses. A survey created potential generalisability for the model developed. The research 
question considered how advisors made assessments of small companies. 
Assessments of small companies are going on all the time, from credit rating agencies, to 
bankers and financiers; myriads of interest groups make assessments of companies. The 
research then started to look at these groups. Notwithstanding economisfs views about 
difficulties in pickingwinners, there are in the private sector institutions continuously 'picking 
winners', or 'avoiding losers'. The latter phrase is usually referred to as the adverse selection 
problem, where banks try to Emit bad debts. 
Given that institutions are involved with 'picking winners' among SNIEs, and that the 
hypothesis underlying the research was not clear, it seemed logical to attempt to understand 
how the institutions and economic agents went about their task. The institutions most involved 
with assessments of small firms, banks and advisors; use both managerial judgements and 
quantitative assessments. Iberefore, the research concerned the perception of managers, and 
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advisors. Implicit in this is the assumption that the perception of the manager was the subject, 
rather than the success of the STNIE. 1bus the unit of analysis is the advisor. Put another way the 
concern is with what the manager thinks defines success for the small firm rather than any data 
regarding 'objective' assessments of SME success. We know that the intractability of complex 
information requires decision-makers to use heuristics or rules of thumb. 1bus, the research 
concerned itself with the decision-makers' heuristics when they judge SME perfortnance. There 
are previous research papers to draw upon. There is a body of knowledge. The particular area 
was researched by interviewing the decision-makers. Ibis was to provide a view from the 
practitioners side, rather than another quantitative methodological investigation. 
The choice of research interview was based on three factors: access, speed and generalisability. 
In order to do qualitative research you have to gain access to the phenomena under study. The 
research must be complete within a time-scale of about three years. Finally, the various trade- 
offs within research design can facilitate more or less generalisability. 
Firstly access, although the research had help from a business link initially, there was no 
opportunity to sit in on or sit alongside with the advisors. The first reason, therefore is the 
amount of access available. Widst, we gained access to interviewees the request for much more 
access was never tried, with hindsight this may well have been an error. Methods such as 
discourse analysis of the reports written by business advisors might well have yielded 
comparable results. Access to these reports from PBAs would have been another method to 
(dis)confirm the model. It may be particularly useful to confirm the use of error messages as a 
way to view assessments where the congruence of strategy and objectives were concerned. The 
constraints of time do, however, conspire to severely limit the thoroughness with which one can 
concentrate on the research and it is inevitable that some sort of compromise solution will, 
ultimately, be adopted. With one interviewee, a part of the Prince's Youth Business Trust, I sat 
in on an interview before a business being accepted onto the programme. Subsequently, the co- 
ordinator persuaded me to be his advisor; this added an element of participant observation to 
the research. The amount of access available was enough to facilitate semi-structured interview 
research. From structured interviews, akin to questionnaires, which are on the deductive side of 
the spectrum of methods to the unstructured or semi-structured more inductive, interview style, 
the research interview can be moulded toward the methods preferred. The use of the 
unstructured interview might reveal the variables and techniques used by the advisors. 
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Another reason for using interviews is that there is a perception that, was borne out by the 
research, that different decision-makers use different heuristics and that to design a small 
ethnographic study would miss the differences between relative institutions. Advice received by 
SNIEs varies from individual and institution. SNIEs are surrounded by a plethora of institutions 
purporting to help them, must of whom they ignore. A survey might well be presented to 
different institutions and decision-makers but the deductive design would require testable 
variables set out in the questions. Frankly, I did not know which variables were the ones that 
were used. Testable factors could be deduced from previous research yet this would firstly, 
replicate previous deductive research, and be academic for advisors, the subject of criticism in 
the literature re-6ew. For example, deductive research has found a correlation between exporting 
and business growth but an advisor cannot walk into every business and suggest they export, for 
one thing they might have no capability to research a foreign market; for another the link might 
be extremely complex and the causality might be from business growth to exporting or indeed 
there could be an intervening variable, such as management capability or the value or the 
novelty of the product. I wanted to do research that would be relevant to the job. Therefore, 
the use of deductive techniques, at least to begin with, was ruled out. 
3.4 My other methods were ruled out 
I had to decide between the various qualitative techniques. Table 21 below from Creswell (1998) 
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Clearly then, the research interviews fit into the area of phenomenology and 
grounded theory. Biography is rejected because the requirement for differing 
participants with differing heuristics. This also rules out a case study. Besides 
the researcher gained experience as a volunteer business advisor for PYBT. 
Ibis added an element of experience to the research; I experienced for myself 
the frustration of trying to instil good management records in a business that 
lacked the understanding of them. Ethnography is inappropriate because the 
research focus is on the experience or technique rather than a shared culture. 
Ibis leaves an uneasy tension between grounded theory and phenomenology; 
both of which use long interviews, variously described as semi-structured or 
unstructured. The qualitative research fell into the area of phenomenological 
rather than grounded theory, for two reasons. Firstly, the research investigated 
existing theory at the beginning of the research, not after theory building. 
Secondly, the researcher did not code research interviews after each and before 
the next as is suggested in grounded theory. Ibirdly, the research did not use 
theoretical sampling but a criterion sample that found multiple people who 
have experienced the problem. 1hus the qualitative research fell under the 
banner of phenomenology. 
Research interviews uncovered the heuristics deemed important by the 
participants in business advice. The interviews would, I suggest, be fairly 
repeatable. However, the population validity is likely to be low, interviews of 
five or so bank managers will not be generalisable to all bank managers. The 
interviews took place in the offices of the advisors, where they would 
sometimes meet clients, although many went onto their clients' premises. 
There was some element of artificiality. 
Triangulated research (as in a qual-quant study) checks its findings. 
Triangulation is one method to establish credibility within qualitative research 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Eisner, 1991). The first consideration is whether 
secondary data would support the findings. But secondary data on the 
perceptions of business advisors is simply not available. It could be used to 
assess the soundness of the views expressed by the advisors by, for example, 
using financial data to describe 'good businesses'. The problem is that many of 
the variables used by advisors are very difficult to measure. It is unlikely, for 
example, that the tidiness of a business will be mentioned in official statistics, 
although prosecutions under health and safety legislation may be documented. 
Nevertheless, because the focus was on the perceptions and experience of 
business advisors, secondary sources are unlikely to help. The use of further 
interviews as a check was considered. This too was disregarded. Firstly, it was 
repeating the same method and, whilst this might have ontological reason, this 
would not mix methods and therefore produce a triangulation between 
strengths and weaknesses of different methods. 'Ibus, mixing a qualitative 
method and a quantitative method gives the researcher the potential to cover 
each method's weaknesses with a strength from the other method. The 
weakness of the research interview is deemed to be its lack of population 
validity and replicability, although I might suggest hat the lack of replicability is 
a little overplayed. In addition, both the researcher and supervisor 
independently came to a similar set of overall codes -a procedure 
recommended by Dukes (1984). Moreover, it is possible to select a group of 
interviewees who are business advisors, use the open-ended questions and 
attempt to replicate results with a given tolerance. 
To generalise the findings from the interviews a questionnaire was designed to 
support our theory. 'Ibis would give the population validity that the interview 
method lacked. Population validity is the main strength of the survey method. 
Given the use of interviews the questionnaires were a check a method to 
validate findings; therefore, the questionnaire asked closed rather than open- 
ended questions. The type of survey would be characterised as analytic rather 
than descriptive. 
The weaknesses of the survey are the use of correlafion and the lack of 
ecological validity, both of which are relatively stronger for the research 
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interview. Consequently, the use of a self-administered survey was considered 
as a quick and convenient check to the interviews. 
The survey was sent to all the personal business advisors employed by business 
links in England and Wales. The survey was mailed to the PBA managers at the 
various business links. Ilie total mailed was therefore 712. Some business links 
sent the uncompleted survey back, London Central and eliminating those two 
makes the total 688. The number returned was 175 representing a return rate 
of 25%. The spread of the returnees showed no significant variation from the 
non-retums. Thus, the research used a quantitative check on the qualitative 
data. 
3.5 Subjects and unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis was the advisoes perception. The decision to study the 
advisor rather than the level of the small business was conscious and deliberate. 
The advice given to the firm depends upon the model of the firm held within 
the advisor (Beer, 1979). The phenomenological framework complements the 
unit of analysis, since the philosophical stance requires the researcher to take at 
face value the experiences of the subjects of the research and to take as true 
what is true for them. To be clear, this research is concerned to explain the way 
advisors conceive of the small business. WIlether the model is a realistic 
predictor of small firm performance is not a legitimate concern. Indeed to ask 
goes beyond the paradigm. Maybe a future research project would answer this 
question. For me I am content to try to model the perceptions of business 
advisors. There are two points to be made here. Firstly, there has been any 
number of studies, albeit univariate, surrounding the factors associated with 
small business growth and survival, which can be taken as a proxy for small 
business success (Storey, 1994). Secondly, whereas the factors associated with 
the growth of the small fmn are fairly well known, the usefulness of these 
factors for the actual task of advising small business is in some doubt. For 
example, you cannot change the location of the business, as an employee of the 
local business link you would not want to, you cannot ask entrepreneurs to take 
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on partners, you cannot suggest the owner takes a business degree. Yet the 
numbers of partners, educational background and the location are all factors 
considered to affect the growth of the small firm. Hence, a qualitative approach 
is one that can generate a useful discussion of the models and factors actually 
used and updated by additional experience of business advisors. Hence, I would 
argue those research interviews in a phenomenological fi-amework made the 
research more practical. It is not necessary to test the heuristics at this stage. 
XVhilst the heuristics were not tested, a wide variety of advisors were 
interviewed, based on a Shropshire TEC, survey of business advice. (Worrall, 
1996) In this survey, businesses were asked where they found their advice. In 
response, the more frequent answers were accountants and bank managers. 
This is confirmed other studies. (Cook and Weatherston, 1995; Smallbone, 
North and Leigh, 1993; Woods, Blackburn and Curran, 1993) Business link 
advisors were further down the list. Since these professionals were giving 
advice to the small firm the interviews were conducted with accountants, bank 
managers, and business link advisors, other specialist advisors interviewed 
included a university corporate enterprise centre advisor, two Princes Youth 
Business Trust managers, and a manager of start-up seminars for potential new 
businesses. 71he interviews then involved a wide variety of those participants in 
the process of business advice. The wide variety of factors captured added to 
the research's internal validity. 
The number of interviews conducted was thirty. One of the interviews was not 
tape recorded although the interviewee allowed the researcher to sit in on an 
interview with a prospective new business subsequently recruiting the 
researcher as a volunteer business advisor for the Princes Youth Business 
Trust. Ibis enabled the research to experience the process of business advice, 
albeit at a small start-up level. Another interview involved ten business advisors 
from a business link. This was akin to a focus group although the questions or 
prompts used remained the same. 'Ibis was commented on in the interview 
and with hindsight and more experience this group might have been set up 
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differently. The group was told that the research intended to develop a 
computer model that they found either not credible or threatening depending 
on your point of view. It made the group difficult, but probably just as 
enlightening for all that. 
The sample all told were thirty-nine including the interview group. 'Ibis 
criterion sample, all the participants experienced giving business advice, was 
found by a snowball method; besides finding accountants in the West Midlands 
region from adverts in Yellow Pages. Ihe research interview sample then can 
in no stretch of the imagination be called random. The sample rolled from 
individual to individual. 
3.6 Individual advisors 
The decision taken was to take the findings from the various advisors, analyse 
the data and develop theory from the data using a process akin to Hycner's 
(1995) fifteen steps to analyse data phenomenologically. After the theory 
building had taken place the questionnaire was used to confirm or more rather 
potentially falsify the findings using business link advisors, a more homogenous 
group. In a sense this is a reversal of grounded theory's technique theoretical 
sampling. In grounded theory the process originates with a relatively 
homogenous sample of individuals; as the researcher collects more data and 
categories emerge, the sample becomes more heterogeneous. 'Ibis enables the 
researcher to describe conditions for which the theory holds. Here a 
heterogeneous sample of interviewees generated a theory. From this theory a 
sample of comparatively homogenous business link advisors tested the theory. 
Moreover, the questionnaire acted as a feedback to those involved in business 
advice, recommended by Hycner (1985). The population of Business Link 
advisors in England and Wales is 712. Given, that the sample needed to be of 
over one hundred to have any validity. This was because the study considered 
that there may be two categories of advisor, one that had higher education and 
used a fairly structured method to advise companies, and another more 
experienced group that used more judgmental methods. For a large sample 
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each group would need to be represented by a sample of thirty. If the groups 
fell equally, an unlikely occurrence, then at least 60 usable responses would be 
needed for a statistical test to be used. Consequently, if a return rate of 20%, 
which is typical, was established then 500 questionnaires would need to be sent 
out. Given the coverage would be 5/7 of the population it seemed easier just to 
send questionnaires to every advisor. The questionnaires were sent through a 
list of the business advisors' managers that the Business Link Company 
supplied. These were mailed either side of Easter 1998. 
3.7 Protocol of interviews 
The interviews were held between November 1996 and April 1997. All bar one 
were taped. The researcher transcribed the tapes, and the data analysed based 
upon fifteen steps by Hymer (1985). The interview protocol was what is 
variously described as semi-structured or unstructured using open-ended 
questions to encourage a wide-ranging discussion. 
The questions were designed to follow up some of the initial areas identified in 
the literature review. In addition one of the first tasks is to try to put the 
interviewee at ease. Hence the first questions asked simply about their job and 
how long they had advised small businesses. Following on from that the 
questions asked about their visits to small firms and asked to be taken through 
a visit. This in part sets the interviewee at ease and in part elicits information. 
1he next set of questions all considered areas of the business, from marketing 
strategy to innovation. Although these were phrased in a closed manner as in 
'do you think marketing is important? ' The intonation surrounding the 
question encouraged the interviewee to discuss the issue in an open-ended 
manner. 1bese questions were followed up by supplementary questions asking 
about how the issues were assessed. 'Ibis had two effects, it asked for more 
information and it acted as a check on the more closed question. So for 
example if we asked a closed question do you think innovation is important the 
response was often yes. If you then followed up asking whether there was any 
assessment done often a response such as well no its not very relevant to many 
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small businesses indicated that in reality although innovation might be 
theoretically important for many small businesses it wasn't relevant. 1bus 
whilst, say, innovation was seen as important in abstraction; it was not 
considered important for individual business advice. This added to the richness 
of the data considerably. The issues of marketing, innovation, culture and 
business formality were considered in this manner. If the interview protocol 
was a self-administered question, I would be concerned about these questions; 
under those conditions they may have been leading. Within this study, 
however, there were two mitigating factors: firstly, the subsequent probe 
revealed more of the question than a simple yes or no; secondly, the simple yes 
or no was not considered in any event. Unless it was in the negative the actual 
yes/no response was not coded or quantified. After this the attention turned to 
what the advisor would advise a growing company. Self-evidently the bias of 
considering growth as success is revealed in this question and the responses to 
it tends to pick up this bias. Nevertheless, the question did elicit interesting 
responses. Next, the interviewer asked whether the respondent would make a 
choice between a strategy-centred or people-centred business. 'Ibis question 
came from the perceived split in academic departments between professorships 
of entrepreneurship that seem to emphasise leadership of an individual, and the 
area of strategic management that might be said to stress the development of a 
strategic process or planning. Further, it may clear up two areas of SME 
research: that of strategy and founding processes on the one hand and the trait 
approach on the other. The dichotomy may have been false but served a 
purpose. Following that was an issue of tidiness. Ibis came from the 
interviewers' experience of work in a warehousel Finally the interviewer asked 
whether there were any areas that the interviewee did not cover. The question 
of financial issues did not arise formally but respondents talked about such 
issues. The research had started from a position of looking at non-financial 
measures of performance. Hence, financial measures were not stressed in the 
protocol. 
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The research interview questions were prompts for the interviewer. The same 
individual interviewed every participant and, by encouraging the interviewee to 
speak the interviews became more open-ended, by head nodding, and 
agreement he participants were encouraged to talk extensively. Contrast this 
with a technique whereby the interviewee is challenged to reveal what she or he 
really thinks. The phenomenological method is to take the responses largely on 
face value. Nevertheless, by developing rapport the interview can relax the 
participants and discussions become much more fruitful. The prompts 
concerned the task; issues such as innovation, marketing, advice to a growth 
business, strategy and leadership, and finally tidiness and a chance for the 
interviewee to put their response. 'Ibus the prompts covered a wide range of 
non-financial issues of SME performance. 
The questions in the self-administered questionnaire, on the other hand, need 
careful consideration. Firstly the questions are closed rather than open, for ease 
of analysis. Moreover, our research design uses the questionnaire as a validity 
and generalisability check on the model generated from the research interviews. 
The questions then are intended to validate that model. As we have discussed, 
unlike the grounded theory approach, the sample was a more homogenous 
sample than the interview participants. Ihe questionnaire intended to falsify 
that personal business advisors assess a firm's control, in then the interaction 
between the firm's objectives, strategy and control. 'Mis theory would provide 
some implications that we framed into questions and invited the PBAs to agree 
or disagree. The questions were varied so that there would not be agreement 
with all of them. Consequently a section of the questionnaire was put together 
with a series of statements about firms on a Likert scale of I-5 from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree through agree, disagree and a neither, neutral 
response in the middle. The implication for the data is that this produces 
ordinal data. Consequently testing this data must be in a non-paratnetric 
manner. The questionnaire further explored the views of business advisors 
concerning the systematic nature of their task. Given our presumption that the 
task requires judgements based upon heuristics, we asked advisors about their 
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task and gave them a series of dichotomous descriptions of their task such as 
simple ... complex. Ibis sought to uncover whether the task was one where 
heuristics were used. NNhat PBAs thought were important factors for growth 
and failure was explored. Ibis was to explore the degree of consensus between 
the PBAs and secondly to gain an insight into the factors they thought were 
important, which, in future, could be cross-referenced against studies of the 
same phenomena. The questions in this section did tend to follow the usually 
cited factors for growth and failure but the issue of control did appear. 
Specifically, what element of control affected growth of the firm? Did the 
PBAs think control of the cash that is debt management important to prevent 
failure but irrelevant for growth. Finýally, I wanted to know whether the division 
of the management of the small firm into specialities of leadership, strategy and 
control, was comfortable for PBAs. Consequently a series of activities such as 
setting targets were presented; with an option of deciding whether this is to do 
with leadership, strategy or control. A degree of consensus of PBAs might 
indicate a degree of comfort with these functional divisions. The questionnaire 
contained questions on the background of the business advisor, the 
proscriptiveness of the business link, the training and educational background 
of the advisor, his or her view of their job, his or her agreement or 
disagreement with a series of statements concerning firm performance, the 
factors deemed important contributors to business failure, the factors deemed 
important contributors to business growth, and locating tasks under the 
functional headings of leadership, strategy and control. 
Given all these questions, how are these to be analysed? A simple index 
represents the Likert scale responses. The numbers that strongly disagreed with 
a statement were subtracted from those who strongly agreed. Ibis was added 
to the numbers that disagreed with a statement subtracted from those who 
agreed. Ibus (strong) disagreement cancelled agreement and the resultant 
number is a residual. Further, the cross tabs should bring some generalising 
confirmatory evidence for the research interview data. The other data referring 
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to factors concerned with increased growth or the potential for failure. A table 
ranks the importance of factors that advisors believe are the most important. 
3.8 Description of participants 
The participants in the research interviews were business advisors. Business 
advisors need to be defined. The question arises as to where businesses get 
their advice from, and where, therefore the research should go to interview 
business advisors. The first piece of information was a survey by Shropshire 
Training and Enterprise Council that asked owner managers of small 
businesses where they found their business advice shown in table 22. 
Table 22 Small firms source of business advice 
Organisation Small Firms L0/6) 
Accountants 49.6 
Banks 33.6 
Shropshire County Council 18.5 
Shropshire TEC 16.8 
Local district council 15.2 
Shropshire Business Link 14.6 
Private consultants 10.3 
Shropshire Chamber 10.4 
Department of Trade 7.5 
Other agencies 5.4 
University of Wolverhampton 2.9 
Telford Development Agency 2.7 
Commission for New Towns 1.8 
European Business Centre 2.2 
No contact 32.3 
Source: Shropshire Training and Enterprise council - Employer Survey 1996 
It is clear, then that the definition of business advisor ought to take some 
account of exactly to whom small firms, in this case deffied as firms employing 
less than twenty-five full-time (equivalent) people, are going to for business 
advice. Accordingly, the definition encompassed accountants and bank 
managers. This introduces a potentially confounding factor and that is the 
differing structure of incentives for some of the advisors. Bank managers, in 
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particular, are faced with a risk-averse set of considerations when they deal with 
a small firm. As providers of loan capital they charge an interest rate above 
base rates. This incorporates a risk premium yet it does not allow for many 
STNIEs to default on their loans. Hence, bank managers are concerned with firm 
survival and ability to pay debts and loans; business advisors from a venture 
capital group, by contrast, are set with a strong requirement for growth by the 
fin-n. As equity providers, one firm's success can compensate for several 
defaulting SNIEs. Moreover, the reasons that firms seek advice may well differ. 
It is probable that the local authority is seen as an excellent source of advice on 
planning matters but perhaps less so for day-to-day business issues. 
Consequently, the definition of business advisors, for the research interviews, 
included accountants and bank managers; along with government and 
voluntary agencies specifically set up to assist small businesses. The local 
councils were not approached, largely because their capability was felt to lie 
outside the area of general business advice. The other agencies' category was 
used, in particular two interviews were conducted with Princes Youth Business 
Trust co-ordinators who worked with young disadvantaged, potential 
entrepreneurs to work up a business plan. The table below shows the 
background of each research interview participant, and the date of interview. 
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Table 23 Advisors' roles 
University Services Marketing Manager 16 October 96 
Start-up Enterprise Manager 22 November 96 
PYBT Co-orduiator 5 December 96 
Bank Manager 6 December 96 
Bank Manager 16 December 96 
Bank Nfanaoer 19 December 96 
PYBT Co-ordinator 15 January 97 
Bank Manager 17 January 97 
Business Link PBA co-ordinator 23 January 97 
TEC IIP assessor 30 January 97 
Group 10 PBAs Shropshire 5 February 97 
Business Link PBA (Technology) 4 February 97 
Business Link PBA (Finance) 4 February 97 
Business Link PBA co-ordinator 7 February 97 
Business Link PBA 14 February 97 
Technology Counsellor 18 February 97 
Accountdnt 24 February 97 
Accountant 24 February 97 
Business Link PBA co-ordinator 25 February 97 
Accountant 27 February 97 
Accountant 6 March 97 
Accountant 10 March 97 
Accountant 12 March 97 
Accountant 12 March 97 
Accountant 13 March 97 
Accountant 13 March 97 
Accountant 14 March 97 
Production Counsellor 17 March 97 
Accountant 18 March 97 
. 
Venture capitalist 18 March 97 
The participants broke down into 11 accountants, 4 bank managers, 9 Business 
Link or TEC advisors (not including the group of ten Shropshire PBAs) and 4 
others. In terms of the survey the sample in table 23 is overweight in Business 
Link and other agency participants. Nonetheless it is broadly characteristic of 
those to whom businesses go for advice. 
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3.9 Limitations of the method 
The combination of the qualitative and quantitative methods described here 
provides a pretty good compromise. The intention was to go back and recheck 
all the findings with the participants but in the end it became infeasible to do 
this. The limitation of the method is that it in a sense inductive. The research 
interview technique gave a real insight into the process of business advice. The 
interviews coded into clusters of three areas and the surprise was the 
importance given to control. The model developed does owe something to the 
idea of a conceptual leap, mentioned by Moustakas (1990) amongst others as a 
phase in the research process. To test the model and what is more important 
to test the ideas that following on from this a series of error messages are 
examined is difficult within the context of a questionnaire. Asking some key 
questions did this. The questionnaire then was as confirming evidence or rather 
potentially falsiýying evidence. 
The question of ecological validity is more Of a problem with this research. The 
research interview did take place at the place of work of the participant. 
However, except for the case of the respondent who would not be taped 
where the researcher sat in on a real interview with a potential, and subsequent, 
new business, the interview situation was to some extent false. The 
questionnaire is also a crude method as it lacks requisite variety. Some 
respondents have pointed these limitations out on the questionnaire itselfl 
Some questions' respondents found to be a straitjacket, some are not quite 
what they would reply given the full freedom of an open ended response, but 
this is inevitable in a questionnaire. 'Me method is adapted to the particular 
fi-amework of phenomenology. There is no attempt made here to test the 
views of the PBAs against a set of objectively derived data. Secondary data on 
the performance of SNfEs is not presented along with the views of the 
respondents. The attempt here has been to elicit heuristics used by business 
advisors not to test whether they are, in any sense, 'right'. They might be the 
received wisdom presently dominant in business advice. The real point here I 
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think is to connect with the way in which experience and academic information 
is used in the practice of business advice. 71hus new information, if it is to be 
useful to business advisors must be packaged such that advisors can use it. It 
does mean that the research is unable to answer questions that regard to 
whether such and such a factor is really associated with success. I cannot say 
yes or no to such a question. This does tend to meet with a variety of facial 
expressions from questioners that are not usually of a complimentary nature. 
Having said that-, the research methods do manage quite well to elicit and to 
document the heuristics used by business advisors. 
3.10 Validity 
Regarding the criteria to evaluate research Gill and Johnson (1991) use four 
criteria to evaluate any research: internal validity, population and ecological 
validity and reliability. 
I. Internal validity. Have the causes or stimuli produced the effects or 
responses? Were there confounding variables? Some other effect causing both 
cause and effect? 
2. External validity. ibis refers to the generalisability of research findings. Can 
the research sample say anything about any other sample or setting? Ibis, in 
turn, is sub-divided into population and ecological validity. 
(a) Population validity refers to whether the sample is generalisable to a wider 
population that is, is the sample representative of the population involved? 
(b) Ecological validity refers to whether it is possible to generalise from the 
context in which research has taken place to other settings. Ibis relates to the 
artificialness or naturalness of the research. Experimental data might have low 
ecological validity. 
3. Reliability. Ibis is about consistency. Would a subsequent investigation find 
the same explanation as the researchers found? 
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Gill and Johnson apply these gauges to a cross-section of research methods to 
give a feel for the trade-offs involved in research. In laboratory experiments, 
for example, independent and dependent variables are defined and controlled, 
in highly structured circumstances. These are replicable, and by controlling 
extraneous interfering variables, the link between cause and effect is relatively 
transparent. The strengths of the method are the internal validity and 
replicability. The weaknesses are the artificial nature of the environment and 
often the sample. Experiments are low in ecological validity. There is a danger 
that the peculiar surroundings make generalisations difficult to make with a 
great deal of confidence. Moreover, in my view, the significance of some 
extraneous variables will be lost, and, though this will not damage the method 
itself, it does suggest hat the data might 'miss the poine. 'Ibus research might 
take a very roundabout route to the explanation. Further, the samples in 
experiments are often unrepresentative, although the method could easily cope 
with this. Hence, experiments present high internal validity and easy 
replicability but are weak in ecological validity and, often weak in population 
validity. 
To overcome the weak external validity researchers have taken experiments out 
into the field in quasi-experimental nd action research methods. By doing this, 
however, the methods lose some of the internal validity of the laboratory 
experiment. In addition, the quasi-experiment become more difficult to 
replicate and finally the sample is often not random or of sufficient size to give 
population validity. In essence there is no perfect method, all involve trade-offs 
and weaknesses. 
The survey method gives high populat: ion validity, and is easily replicable. Yet 
its internal validity relies on correlation rather than causality, giving some 
weakness in internal validity and the questionnaire design leaves little room for 
naturalism, so its weakness is ecological validity. 
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Ecological validity is the strength of ethnographic or qualitative methods. The 
study loses replicability, however, by being true to the field of study. There are 
some debates about the other criteria and ethnography. Mitchell (1983) 
disputes the received wisdom that ethnographic methods are low in population 
validity because of the small number of subjects. 'Ihe question of internal 
validity is more problematic too. 
First, the method cannot climinate researcher subjectivity, though the biases 
should be acknowledged, and some attempt made to consider the effects of 
said bias. The naturalism of the method carries with it difficulties in establishing 
experimental groups, control groups and the paraphernalia of experimental 
design. For all this though, the large quantities of data produced inductively are 
the most likely to identify the variables for any subsequent analysis. The 
researcher is more likely to consider the factors that are important for the 
study. Moreover, factors that are not considered on a theoretical level or 
because of measurement obstacles and variables not involved in a preconceived 
notion are more likely to be included in the study. Cooper (1995) alludes to this 
problem in a critique of entrepreneurship research. Gill and Johnson conclude: 
, gVbj 
is problemafic as it it seems that the internal vaMDi of etbno 
, gorvusness and 
the ipedfic concerns of the de pends 4vgel- yu pon ri 
etbnographer: When that enAdIs anqlý, fic inducfion and rvjkýdty, the 
internal va, #&ty of the etbnqgVbe6 theorrfical conclusions may well be 
proacbes (Gill and tvy bigb in coijarison to many of the dedutfite a .p 
jobnson, 1991: 125). 
The arguments over validity probably replay the discussions that have already 
taken place during this chapter. Nonetheless, they are crucial. As stated there 
are four elements to validity. A fifth that I might add is does the questions and 
responses answer the research question and problem that you seek to answer. 
In other words, are you testing what you think you -are testing? 
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In terms of the first four elements then: the internal validity of the research is 
good. There may be a tendency by one or two respondents to gloss over the 
truth and to dress up what they do in a manner deemed more acceptable to 
research, hence the usefulness of more open-ended questions in the research 
interviews. However, the question of tidiness in the workplace might be 
deemed unlikely to attract much academic support, yet respondents almost to a 
man confirmed tidiness as an important indicator of SME success. In a sense 
the question one is asking is quite nebulous. As a business advisor one tends to 
use outward behaviour to assess management capability, an inward 
phenomenon. The internal capability of an individual or team is assessed using 
external factors. Ibis is partly what creates the requirement for judgement. 
Now testing this is quite difficult. To ask the participants to take part in 
research interviews is the quickest way to access the methodology used by the 
business advisors. Other methods such as participant observation or discourse 
analysis of the documentation might also be considered. The researcher's 
experience as a PYBT advisor did add some participant observation to the 
research. But participant observation would narrow the population studied 
dramatically and one of the assumptions made is that methods and factors 
differ from different experiences. Thus you might find more internal validity 
but only for one institution. In the second, apart from the difficulty of access, 
there is a filter already applied to the assessment by the time that document is 
written. It might be written up in a standard format, for example. It n-dght be 
useful for a follow up study to try to do this. Overall, then internal validity, is 
relatively high in an open-ended research interview. 
Population validity in the research interviews is relatively weak. Although 
interviews concluded with 39 individuals, including one group, which by 
grounded theory standards is more than enough, they were a heterogeneous set 
of business advisors. Ibis is the opposite of the process of Strauss and 
Corbin's theoretical sampling. The idea behind the grounded theory approach 
is to firstly derive theory concerning phenomena, from a homogenous group. 
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Following this group to seek more heterogeneous respondents so that the limit 
of the ability to generalise can be set. The method here did not follow this 
procedure, although by interviewing SME managers a type of theoretical 
sampling could have been used. Instead a different method, the questionnaire, 
attempted to generalise the theory to one population. This does leave the 
question of where else the theory would apply unanswered. What it did do, 
however, was to clearly answer the question regarding whether the theory can 
be said to cover the population of business advisors, in addition it enhanced 
the credibility of the research through the use if different methods. As Eisner 
argues: We seek a conAence ofetidence that breeds ar&bikty' (1991: 110). The study 
in terms of business advisors has excellent population validity depending upon 
the response rate and the significant difference between those responding and 
non-responders. 
Ecological validity was relatively high in the study. The interviews were held at 
the respondent's place of work in an area where they might interview potential 
clients. However, a participant observation study might have increased 
ecological validity at the expense of population validity. The internal validity 
and ecological validity meet in the problem of responder truthfulness in the 
research interview. If the researcher had accompanied the business advisor to 
the client, then accessed the documents and written reports then this might 
have both internal validity and in the former case ecological validity. 
Reliability I suggest is relatively high. The research interview protocol and the 
questionnaire are both presented and a researcher is quite able to take these 
two and replicate the research. 71hough the argument is made against qualitative 
research that is less easily replicable it does not seem to be all that difficult. You 
can take the same research question and use a different set of respondents and 
consider whether there is any difference in the findings that you come to. 
Questionnaires of course are quite easy to replicate. 
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Ibis brings me to a crunch question. Do the questions on the questionnaire fit 
with the theory derived from the research interviews? The theory presents the 
key problem as one of making sure control is present in the firm and many of 
the statements concerning the firm are precisely to uncover this. The division 
of management function into three areas is presented at the end of the 
questionnaire. The questions regarding, for example, the hallmark of a well- 
managed firm is that its objectives, strategy and control are well aligned is a 
bold statement of the theory. Respondents are asked whether they agree or 
not. From that point of view it does test the theory and the theory is capable 
of being falsified from the questionnaire. By combining the qualitative and 
quantitative techniques herein, this study has covered the issue of validity well. 
The triangulation of qualitative and quantitative methods in this study enabled 
the research to build theory regarding the business advisors' heuristics for 
assessing SME performance and generalise these over the population of 
Business Link PBAs. In doing so, the methods enabled revealed issues such as 
inferred capability from one behaviour to another area, along with some 
processes involved in the phenomenon. The research thus considered factors 
from the practitionees viewpoints rather than restricting factors due to ease of 
measurement. Ibis gave an opportunity for the participant's views to lead the 
research, leading to a more rounded investigation of the task of business 
advice. 
The methodology chapter discussed the issues surrounding qualitative and 
quantitative research. It noted the differing epistemological views that underpin 
both traditions but this research adopted a pragmatic approach where both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods combine to triangulate the results. 
The research methods involved research interviews with business advice 
practitioners f6flowed up by a survey of Business Link PBAs. The findings 





Ilie data from a qual-quant research project lead to two stages of findings. 
Presentations of findings in these two traditions are to use words to tell a story 
on the one hand and to use statistics to validate hypotheses on the other. 
Qualitative and quantitative data are presented in different ways. 
The history of the research project was that the qualitative data was found first. 
The presentation of the results then follows this pattern. The qualitative data 
presented first, followed by the quantitative data, and follows the sequence of 
events as they unfolded. Given the quantitative data relies on the qualitative 
analysis of interview data, this appears to be a sensible way to continue. Ibis 
does mean that there is a sense of presenting two sets of findings. 
Findings presented to what end? The findings suggest a practitioner-based 
model of SNIE management. To put the findings in this context, the chapter 
presents the model first. Thus, the model presents the connections and themes 
developed from the research interviews. The chapter then is not chronological 
but, rather like the short story, the key scene comes first and the rest is in 
flashback. 
The first set of findings concerns the interviews with a wide variety of business 
advisors, the second with advisors from business links. Data from the 
interview's content analysis informs the model of business advice., which the 
questionnaire then aims to find confirming or falsifying evidence. 
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4.2 A practitioner-based, systems model of SNIEs 
The challenge for researchers is to model advisors' perceptions of SME 
management. The model attempts to represent the internal and external 
processes within small businesses, and the model developed from the analysis 
of the research interviews. Developed from serni-structured interviews with 17 
business advisors ranging from Business Link advisors, bank managers and 
business start-up counsellors, the model draws on developments within 
academic thinking that focus on the importance of 'systems'. The key concept 
of the model is a feedback loop. 
Feedback loops are a circular arrangement of causal links such that each affects 
the next and eventually back to the original thus producing a self-regulating 
(homeostatic) system. The simple example given in Capra (1996) is of a 
feedback loop representing the steering of a boat: see figure 7. 
Figure 7 Feedback Loop - Steering the Boat 
A 
., messina Deviation firom course 
Chan2e of Deviation Counter Steeriniz 
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The feedback from assessing the deviation from the course is used to counter 
steer the boat. Also sometimes referred to is the principle of 'cybernetic' 
control where the word cybernetic is derived from the Greek for 'steersman'. 
The feedback signals the changes in direction and the deviation from the 
course passes around the loop. The link between assessing deviation from the 
course and counter steering is a positive link because the link amplifies the 
previous link. The greater the counter steering from the course, the greater the 
change of deviation. The next link is negative because it curtails the previous 
link. The greater the change of deviation, the less the resulting deviation from 
the course. Cyberneticians say there are two kinds of feedback loops, self- 
balancing and self-rein forcing. Self-balancing feedback loops need an odd 
number of negative links. The example above is a self-balancing loop. Feedback 
loops create self-balancing systems capable of adapting themselves to changes 
in the environment. Ibis is a useful concept for small business management. 
The more the SME owner wants to grow, the more output, production and 
sales the strategy will have to produce. So objectives and strategy are positive 
links. The greater: the greater, see figure 8. 
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Figure 8 Feedback Loop - Objectives and Strategy 
Oýjecfives 
Strategy 
For example the SME wishes to grow by 10%. The strategy to put those 
objectives into practice is to increase marketing effort and sales. If successful, 
next year the firm's objective may be to grow by 10% again or by 15%. 
Meanwhile, the firm may be heading towards the rocks as increased sales are 
'bought' through lower prices and increasing turnover requires more working 
capital - overtrading. 
Such dangers even for apparently successful firms are due to the lack of 
management information and control, the lack of a negative feedback loop. 
Ilie simple point is that a company without firm management control has no 
mechanism to self-balance and is inherently more risky from an investor and an 
advisor perspective. A PBA advisor mentioned the challenges and remedies in 
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Warnes (1984). Yet if managers measure success solely on turnover growth, as 
many businesses do, these problems will, at some point occur. An interviewee 
said: ýf jve'rr looking to lend eim... ivould inquirr about it but I tbink, at the end of the 
day Al we're lookingfor is contrvI, and a xell run coiVany. ' 
Now what would a self-balancing loop look like for a small business? Advisors 
may be seen as if they are concerned to confirm or initiate a closed feedback 
loop within well-run small businesses that match objectives, strategy and 
control. Control provides the negative link because the greater growth; the less 
control, pushing the firm into cash flow difficulties. The key issue is to establish 
whether this element of control exists. Control will requires the strategy to 
generate profits and cash and for the owner to know his position. An 
organised (tidy) place of work is considered a strong signal of control by PBAs. 
A business with this feedback recognises, and can adapt to changes in the 
environment, which impact on the business. Without control, the steersman 
has no stars to guide him. This loop is shown in figure 9. 
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The first question for PBAs to evaluate might then be the element of control. 
A second issue may concern congruence between strategy, objectives and 
control, whether strategies and measures reflect company's objectives. A way 
to consider views here is as error messages from incongruity among these three 
themes. For example, the objective to increase profits when the company 
heavily discounted sales gives an error message. 
The different elements of this model appear to be of more interest to different 
stakeholders in the firm. For bankers the element of control and the objectives 
of the management are important, reflecting an interest in the profitability of 
the firm but less interest in growth. Academics have tend to neglect the area of 
control in regression studies. Business Links are told to find firms with the 
ability to grow that means the objectives of a firm are given in their terms of 
reference. PBAs highlighted the objectives of the business owner; despite the 
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remit of Business links to help firms with the ability to grow. Every firm is 
different, they said. Equity providers such as venture capitalists, though a small 
part of the SNIE world might be interested in control and strategy; they will 
assume the objective is that companies want to go public. So putting interests 
of actors on two of the comers of the model yields figure 10: 
Figure 10 Interests and SmaU Business 
Management 
Academic Regression Studies 
Objectives/" Strategy 
Bank Managers 
Risk averse investors 
Control Business Links, Govt Agency 
Risk-taking investors. 
Do different firms have different emphases? Are there growth-oriented firms 
for whom profit margins would be sacrificed for increased sales, and profit- 
oriented firms for whom profit margins would not be shaved for sales? 
4.3 Open and Closed Systems 
The feedback loop with control is a closed system but the firm is also an open 
system because it takes inputs from the market, land, labour, capital, material 
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and produces a service for consumers. Ibis model of the firm fits an open 
process around the closed managerial process. The firm takes inputs from the 
economic system and, using knowledge and production technologies (including 
services), processes and organisation, creates marketable products. If the 
products are not marketable, then the firm has a strategy problem, to say 
nothing of control. The process from inputs to sales is called the strategy of 
the firm in this model. Customers' cash for the product or service pays for 
inputs, with a surplus for capital depreciation and a return. Monitoring the 
profitability and cash position of the firm provides control. Arrows 
surrounding the closed system represent what the firm does. A difficulty here is 
the role of organisation and culture that we have conveniently forgotten. Is this 
part of control, strategy, or both? 












The model is then a closed managerial self-correcting system surrounded by an 
open production system. SNIE advisors make sure the closed system is 
working: ensuring control is present as well as the usual marketin& productivity 
and exporting advice. 












Figure 12 puts the model together. The open system, denoted in figure 11, 
envelops the closed feedback loop, introduced in figure 9. The significance is 
that in trying to understand and evaluate the SNIE, advisors concentrate on the 
closed internal system rather than the open system with which the manager 
may be overwhelmed. Ibis can lead to misunderstandings. SNIE advisors 
openly admit that they do not know, and cannot know, all about the particular 
industries and sectors within which the firm trades, although they want to 
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check that the management knows this. Small business owners might consider 
that the advisor has no knowledge of the industry and generalises this lack of 
knowledge. Ibis model shows that the reason for this is that the two 
concentrate on different systems. 
Practitioners learn on the job to supplement their existing knowledge. The 
interviews with advisors informed this conceptual model. Advisors are much 
more concerned with issues about control in the business. Academic research 
has largely emphasised the capabilities of the individual and the strategies 
adopted by businesses that may be easier to measure than such concepts as 
tidiness, staff attitudes and organisation, concepts understood and used by 
practitioners. 
4.4 Error Signals Interpretation 
Another way to look at the heuristics is to consider the model a cohesive 
framework for looking at small businesses. In this way then there is a higher- 
order model. Although the first step maybe to identify control, to talk about 
vision with the manager and to tease out the, often implicit, strategy of the 
firm, the higher-order version of the control model is to assess the match 
between the objectives strategy and control. One can re-code the research 
interviews looking for mis-matches or matches between strategy and objectives 
and strategy and control. What you find is a whole list of error signals, either 
positive or negative. In terms of the model considered, the error signals form a 
T. 
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Figure 13 Ihe Closed System and Error Sigaals 
Objective/. g ......... Strategy 
y 
Control 
Dashed lines indicate the 
(lack of )congruity 
that produce error signals 
It is this search for congruity that makes the error signals stand out. Re-coding 
the research interviews reveals a long list of error signals. 1hus, not only are 
PBAs using heuristics to discover the existence of control and its role to enable 
strategy and objectives to be realised but also the heuristics provide a list of 
error signals. The model in figure 4 depends upon feedback for its structure, 
the feedback available within the firm. Thus, the feedback for the firm is 
indicated by the element of control. Feedback for the PBA, however, involves 
another level of messages. For the PBA not only will they want to know that 
the feedback mechanism exists so that the firm can control itself, but also they 
would like to assess the congruity between these factors. My? Because if 
congruity exists then the system of objectives, strategy and control will be 
working effectively. An indication of objectives and strategy being out of sync 
indicates that the feedback mechanism is not doing its job. Cybernetics links 
control mechanisms in the natural and mechanical sciences. The term was 
coined to cover work on the theory of messages and how those messages were 
communicated (Wiener 1948,1950). The key concept in all this is feedback. 
Feedback transmits performance information back to an earlier stage to modify 
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its operation. Negative feedback reduces the difference between actual and 
intended performance; whilst, positive feedback reinforces a change and 
instability, for example, when people shout in a public bar, increase the general 
noise level and cause others to shout. Wiener believed that problems of control 
engineering and communication engineering were coupled. The core concern 
then is how messages are sent. Moreover, the extent to which a message was 
signalled and the message deciphered from background noise is as important. 
The messages also involve hierarchies. Control involves some constraint, and 
this means one level must be constraining another. Generally hierarchical 
control exhibits three properties. 
1. Constraint involves an imposition of higher-orders. 
2. Imposition must be optional in which, neither too tight nor too loose. The 
constraint is not operative all the time. 
3. The constraint acts upon the detailed lower level dynamics. 
The basic idea in communication system engineering is that information 
sources produce messages. Signals produce messages along channels, which are 
subject to noise. The extent of the distortion of the message is a problem. 
Wiener (1948,1950) suggests three problems: 
1. the technical problem - signal transmission; 
2. the semantic problem - how symbols convey meaning and; 
I The effectiveness problem - how the meaning affects the receiver's 
behaviour. 
Points 2 and 3 depend on point one. 
The use of error messages then will indicate that effectiveness of Wener's 
points one, two and three. Given congruity between the objectives, strategy 
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and control then a feedback transmission must be present, meaning must be 
conveyed and the meaning must affect the firm's behaviour. Consequently, the 
use of error signals between objectives, strategy and control to assess congruity 
is eminently sensible. 
The model presented developed from the interview data. The next section 
presents this interview data in terms of the responses to the interview prompts. 
4.5 Data for each question presented 
The interview protocol was developed through the first, pilot interview. Semi- 
structured interviews were used to encourage participants to share their views 
regarding advising small and medium sized businesses. 
Firstly the researcher explained the purpose of the research. 'Ihese often 
elicited responses to clarify the terms used. Performance for one thing can be 
defined in different ways. 
Following the practice of many of the researchers on small business the growth 
of the firm is seen as reflecting good performance. Thus a successful firm is 
one that grows and growth is defined in terms of increasing the number of 
employees over time. The best performing companies, therefore are those 
companies that grow from a one person operation through to a firm 
employing more than 100 and then more than 500 employees. Hence the best 
performing SMEs grow out of SMEdorn as it were. Many respondents 
disagreed with this tack. 
As I explained what I was doing respondents discussed the issues surrounding 
growth and measurement. Different participants measured growth in different 
ways. I followed much of SME literature in defining growth in terms of 
turnover. 
A PBA believed that the issue is whether there were signs of a commitment to 
progress, however. He saw working conditions as a demonstration of 
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commitment to the staff, with negative impressions given by 'if youlm to c§mb 
over a load of cardboard boxes to get to the office. Displays of health and safety 
messages, displays of something that they are proud of in reception, and 
commitments to training all indicated commitment to staff, and therefore 
progress, argued this PBA. 
Some mentioned the question of profitability as opposed to turnover as a 
measure of success. A PBA with a background as a bank manager suggested 
that turnover measures of growth were macho. He quoted an aphorism: 'top kne 
is tianit . y, 
bottom kne is sanity. Moreover after profit the role of cash was brought 
up. These advisors were concerned that the business had enough cash to 
support their level of operations or growth. They pointed out that business 
could be profitable but cash poor, which might lead to possible insolvency. In 
addition, small businesses can be unaware of the pitfalls: Yt's vey &Vfmcultjor 
someone ivbo's unk bis kfe sadn , gs 
into sometbing, Suddenly to be told that tbere's no mony 
in the bank, said an accountant 
Further, advisors discussed the motivations of those in charge of businesses. 
One PBA suggested that: 
I can certdnly tbink of two wbere mong is doesn't even come into the 
equafion the reason tbg're running the business bas notbing vbatever to do 
y sometbing mitb making mony being secure beiq comfortable. Its diitvn b 
absolutely &Jerent and not even business-related k. ' bt. But tbg're in 
business and tbg're tijing bard and I think lby're worthy of SUPPorf 
(PBA) 
A PBA manager eferred to the will of the owner/managers. In contrast to the 
previous respondent he argued that the PBA had to differentiate lifestyle 
businesses from those that wanted to grow. An accountant noted those 
businesses that showed potential for further business. 
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The discussion of growth in terms of turnover raised two issues, measuring 
success and the motivation of the owner/manager. Advisors stress that 
turnover must be converted to the cash and profit for the company. Top line 
versus bottom line. In this they reveal a risk-averse position essential for 
survival. Survival may be the major objective of the firm's owner rather than 
growth, and advisors need to work with the desire of the company's directors. 
4.5i visit 
The second question asked about visiting companies. 'Ibis elicited a number of 
responses pertaining to the participants' individual positions. I then asked 
whether the participants could talk me through a visit. I wanted to know 
whether there were key things that participants would do. 
A bank manager talked about why he visited businesses. He stated that they 
visited 80% of the 1400 businesses that they look after. The manager went to 
see businesses twice a year, even if the company is in credit: once to examine 
the financial side, and once as a 'general chae. The bank manager looked at the 
machinery and stock and gave advice on various options open to them, on 
projects, staffing problems and ways of saving tax, for example. Ibis same 
manager discussed the changing relationship between bank managers and their 
business customers. He reported: thy now see us as a su pger of senices that tby can 
gb dfferent cbannels sucb as gb street banks but tbrou getfmm, not only tbroqgb the bi 
cot*uters and teLipbone banking that sort of tbing. 
A PBA manager explained the processes that PBAs go through. He discussed 
the questions that PBAs were expected to ask when visiting clients. The 
manufacturing section contained only two questions: what are the production 
processes, and what are the perceived weaknesses in the process? 1hus, he 
suggested that these were aide-memoires rather like semi-structured interview 
prompts, which he contrasted with a rigid tick-box approach. In his 
organisation PBAs are expected to think creatively and write reports using their 
experience. Although financial ratios were not requested, experienced PBAs 
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reported by exception. An example was debtor days. Traditionally debtor days 
should be between 3045, if debtor days are between 75-80, and the firm carries 
a high overdraft, then this might indicate cash flow difficulties and that debts 
are not being chased hard enough. The same interviewee was concerned about 
the amount of management information, collected, delivered and analysed. He 
felt that this was essential for a company to know their direction: included in 
this information would be a business plan. 
Afore specialist advisors concerned themselves with their specialities. A 
technology counsellor concerned himself to eliminate waste from the 
shopfloor, though even he used accounts as part of a diagnosis of the business. 
A second technology counsellor confirmed that they assessed the general 
aspects of organisations gained from walking the premises. Again this advisor 
linked a tidy, well-laid out premises and caring management. Further, the 
counsellor believed that the manager's manner and appearance reflected the 
business organisation. 
The group of ten PBAs visited to establish rapport through empathic listening 
to the owner/managees views. A bank's small business lending manager 
explained the thinking behind visiting premises. He believed in visiting clients. 
In a small hotel you look for things such as the decor, whether the hotel felt 
comfortable, just like a customer. In a manufacturing firm the manager looked 
for the movement of stock through the premises, whether machinery handles 
signified its continued use - without use the lathe handles become very dull 
very quickly. He wanted to examine the relationship between proprietor and 
bookkeeping. All visits required a clear idea of what you wanted to see to make 
a judgement about the firm, believed this lending manager, the hotel's decor 
and ambience, the manufacturer's materials flow and machine use, and the 
service industry's prompt phone answering. 
Business advisors use visits to assess the quality of management. Tidiness, for 
example, and the layout of the business infers a capable management. 
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However, there are no stereotypical companies and the background of the 
advisor makes a difference to the quality of the relationship between client and 
advisor. Presumably the personality of the client affects this relationship too. 
Advisors are in some sense expert SME assessors. The research asked about 
how advisors go about their task in a question that in some ways overlaps with 
the last question. 
4.5ii expert 
The bankers were concerned about the fmancial side of the business. However, 
with numerous ostensibly healthy firms liquidated in recently, the managers 
were keen to get timely information. 
A bank manager would ask for three years accounts (profit and loss account 
and balance sheet) from a going concern that wished to bank with them. They 
bank looked for rising turnover, steady profit margins, controlled overheads; 
and that the bottom line results reflect these top line increases. The balance 
sheet reveals whether they invest or divest. The combinations of all these 
factors make the business a success. The bank would calculate: gearing, stock 
turnover, creditor and debtor repayment, gross profit margin, and the 
break-even point to check: '(q) i)tbgtrpqfomed to the same standard as last_year and 
(b) ahetber tbg are in fact in Une uitb the rest qf the industg' The manager 
commented: '... the bigest ivordfor us is trends. 
For a start-up business co-ordinator specialising in disadvantaged young people 
a more hands-on approach was needed. 
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99, per cent ofpeople I see don't know a business planfrom breakfast fime. 
, ginning 
it's an idea. In the norm me rould look to see (a) is So in the be 
lbat. penon qua§f7ed, and if so could be or sbe oMdn letterT of intent. In 
otber xords batr tbggot sufident contacts mitbin the trade to make ago 
of it. Naw if tbg bam the experience, mom often than not tbg can get 
those letten of intent and tbg can at least break-emn. (PYBT Co- 
or&nator) 
Another bank manager discussed the competition faced by the SME. In 
response to: would you expect them to know who their competitors are? 
Absolutely. tby do know wbo their coVefiton arr, ' he said. He expected a 
reasonably comprehensive competitor analysis, but small retail outlets took too 
small a market share to do this. And, he questioned whether suppliers posed 
any risks of disruption. 
A PBA manager suggested that small businessmen knew their problems. For 
example, they usually knew that 110 debtor days were excessive. If the PBA 
gained the businessperson's confidence, they became someone to talk to about 
the business because the MD of an SME was a lonely job. After the PBA 
establishes rapport the owner may open up: 
be'll sy 7 bave tbougbt about tbis, bave_youjou knor well do-You know 
anyone rbo's got expeiience of doin ,g 
this bit of business or tbat? And then 
My start to o 
. 
pen up, it works veg welZ (PRA Manager) 
Again the difference between specialists and generalists came up. At one 
Business Link two specialist advisors explained their role. After the generalist 
business advisors wrote their key issues report and carried out their diagnostic 
business review, they introduce consultants. The specialist advisors in this 
Business Link resolved finance or organisational issues quickly without the need 
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for formal consultancy. For example, a business experiencing bank problems 
may need to present information better, or the business may want more money 
but 
_ýou 
find veg quick# that tbg need more debtfinance Re a bole in the bead ' All 
these advisors went to Durham University Business School (DUBS) for 
introduction training. The course, according to the advisor, focused on the 
financial management suggestions of Warnes (1984). These advisors believed 
that persuading a few more companies to plan ahead it would be worth it. 
The bank managers were comfortable with the fmancial side of SNIE 
assessment. The non-bank mangers emphasised non-financial aspects but all 
emphasised control. 
4.5 iii personality and skills 
Entrepreneurial research stresses the attributes of the individual SNIE manager. 
I asked about the personality and skills. Did they think it was important? What 
they thought about the individual manager. A University Services Marketing 
Manager suggested the importance of the manager's vision. Although a recent 
client did not understand the technology in a project she understood the 
market implications. Often the small business' managing director is several 
things in one. 'Me company manager must, according to the University Service 
Marketing Manager, improve competitiveness, including attacking new markets 
and developing new products. 
One start-up co-ordinator believed that the key was determination, indicated 
by the quality of market research - understanding risks, predicting market share. 
A bank manager wanted to understand why the owner wanted to start a 
business. Although redundancy or as a hobby were poor reasons to start a 
business, he did mention a case where a group of managers in a factory facing 
closure, contacted customers, bought out the business and started trading 
successfully. A bank manger explained that those who knew their cash position 
commanded more trust than those who did not. The youth adviser pointed to 
the element of which service sector the proto-company inhabited. In the West 
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Alidlands, the PYBT co-ordinator reported the results of a comparative analysis 
of over 5000 business supported since the in the last ten years. Ihe most risky 
ventures were car valeters and graphic designers. Car valeters undercut each 
other constantly. Their market lacked order. 
A PBA manager, who believed that this factor drove companies onwards, 
talked about the chief executive's vision and his ability chief executive to make 
decisions. He argued that a company with 50 employees and a management 
structure needs a top manager capable of making decisions. If the top manager 
is poor at making decisions, not that they make poor decisions, the company 
flounders. Further, the top manager needs a certain amount of product 
knowledge, the ability to lead a team (because all companies are run by some 
sort of team), and they need vision. Companies where the top group knows 
what they are trying to achieve invariably get there. Again the technical or 
financial expertise need not reside in the managing director. 
One PBA advisor mentioned the personality trait approach but even then it 
was in the guise of entrepreneurs being at the tail end of distributions rather 
than a set of personality traits. He argued that the atypical business owner was a 
character with a high self-regard who delegated reluctantly. 
Finally in this section a technology counsellor pointed out that management 
can be the problem, and at the smaller end an accountant made the same 
point. The accountant argued that many small business people managed badly, 
failed to control paperwork, fOed to collect moneys owed, and failed to 
control outgoings. You had to judge the individual personality of each client. 
Ihe technology counsellor said: 
And somefixes coVanies are successful des ite the MD. You know the 
.P 
AID is the bi, nmww , gestproblem rragv. 
And that ofte co es out ben e start 
doin 
,g the worksbops mitb the vork/orre. 
But we tend to do that work aitb 
coVanies uitb more than aboutfifý, people. (FecbnoloU Counsellor) 
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Clearly, the personality, and management skills, of the small business owner arc 
deemed to be very important. 'Ihis is particularly true at the start-up and 
smaller end of the small business. The specific skills, however, are not crucial. 
4.5iv innovation 
Next the questions talk about different specific areas, firstly innovation. 'Ihe 
University Services Marketing Manager noted the relationship between 
innovation and SME success. He stressed innovation because surveys and his 
experience revealed that those prepared to consider new markets, methods and 
products were more successful. Other respondents suggested that most 
businesses were not innovative. T would reafirm that the miýoiiD, qf ideas involveprr- 
&ýdsfing senices, suggested aPYBT start-up co-ordinator. 
The three views noted above may not be incompatible. It might be that 
innovation and the ability to exploit new markets are associated with Storey's 
flyers the 4%. For less entrepreneurial firms, the vast majority, innovation is 
not high. A discussion about innovation by advisors leant toward 
considerations about environmental change in markets. 71hus directors must be 
aware of new ideas and developments in the marketplace. 
Some pointed out drawbacks to innovation. Innovation and sensible working 
practice must work together and new products should enhance rather than 
hurt their existing reputation. 
4.5v formality 
From innovation one turned to the formality of the firm Olson and Bokor 
who suggest that the role of business planning can be correlated with high 
performing SNIEs. 
KNI And are you ever concerned about, if you like, the formality of the firm's 
processes? A bank manager explained: '.. at the very bottom end of the scale, 
that isn't the area you want to focus on. You have to accept I think that 
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business is done in a very tacit manner. ' Another suggested that lending 
managers discern the good managers, over time, by the paper they produce and 
the organisation in their pren-dses. A PBA suggested that planning was 
important, that his task, as he saw it, was to introduce business planning and 
market research into a company. 
4.5vi technology 
I asked about the role of technology. The advisors often took this to mean 
information and communication UCT) technology as well as production 
technology. 
A technology counsellor believed firms could improve their technological 
competence by listening to their skilled craft workers. However, a technology 
advisor had mixed feelings about new technology. The firm required 
appropriate technology because new computer-controlled machines are 
unlikely to be fixed on-site. Another technology counsellor talked about the 
importance of the flow of materials rather than the introduction of new 
technology. Ibis technology counsellor argued that materials handling and 
shop floor layout should ease the material flow through the workplace with 
minimal work-in-progress. He described SME owners as 'rýSular kale bamsters' 
After such organisation existed would the counsellor consider new technology 
because buying in machines can create as many problems as it solves. 
Technology was treated in the perhaps peculiarly British way, to keep up just 
enough to maintain competitiveness, not to forge ahead. Ibis may reveal the 
UKs low levels of investable funds. Computer technology was making strong 
in-roads into SNIEs by the time these interviews were conducted. 
4.5vii marketing 
The literature on marketing is extensive and this area was covered next. Storey 
(1994) reports the benefits to owner/managers of a prior background in 
marketing. We might expect therefore that the participants stress this aspect. 
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However, although bank managers asked their business clients about their 
market and where they wanted to position their product or service, they did 
not expect a formal plan or strategy. Advisors mentioned the owner's prior 
knowledge of, and contacts in, the market. A PBA manager with an accounting 
background had learned the folly of marketing cuts in a recession. Now he 
stressed keeping products at the forefront. In all facets of running a company, 
he believed in balance, in making small incremental decisions keeping a balance. 
he said. gerous ifyou start turning tbings on and off coi*letel- 'It's Jan 
A technology counsellor struck a sceptical cord: 
Evaluafing of a markefiq strategy to those actually in business i  a bit 
hypotbeficat And um SMEs arr tberr, tbgrr morr intent to sunim and 
eam a hing then tbg are to consider tbeorefical and bypotbefical 
markefin gies don't ,g strategies. 
But that's not to sig that markefig strate 
bave a place in industg. I'm sure tbg do but tbere's aplace and aplace 
and I don't tbink SM Es are it, unfortunatelyk (Tecbnolog Counsellor) 
A PBA described a company where the sales director had not visited any major 
customer in the last two years - shooting themselves in the foot, in his opinion. 
In his view they knew too little about their competition. 
4.5viii sector 
There was some disagreement regarding the importance of sectors. In response 
to the prompt is the sector very important? A PBA replied typically: 'Not rea4 
no' 
An accountant, who dealt mainly with micro-businesses, suggested that small 
businesses depend on their reputation in local markets. Most liýairdressers in his 
locality competed on price, yet the two most successful had a good reputation 
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and charged higher prices. Nficro-business success awaited those businesses 
with little local competition, but if local business dried up, bankruptcy loomed. 
Marketing appears to be one of the more difficult areas for the small business 
owner and indeed advisor too. It would appear more important for those 
concerned with growth businesses than for those involved in lifestyle or Wom 
and Pop' businesses. It is sector specific, of course, and the ability to advise 
does depend on knowledge of the sector. Generalists are poorly placed to 
advise businesses on this area - crucial for growing businesses. 'Ibis may indeed 
be a serious criticism of the Business Link set-up. 
4.5ix culture 
In the first interview the interviewee discussed the subject of company culture. 
I persevered with this prompt, despite the difficulty in defining the term. I 
compared the Marks and Spencer's and British Home Stores 'way of doing 
things' thus 'way of doing things' embodied the firm's culture. 
A TEC advisor declared that Investors in People programme resulted in a 
cultural change within the firm toward a more open, democratic culture. And a 
technology counsellor believed a %lame-free culture' was a great deal of what 
they did. Another technology counsellor said: 'a coVany ititb a culturr, a mindset 
for cban , ge, 
in place nill be morr approacbable to nex ideas" 
A PBA advisor sounded a note of scepticism: 'You're in a &fferent worldfrom an 
SAIE... Fed bow mag &fferent ppes qrculture dojou tbinkjou migbt bave in afirm? 
Others were more engaged with the concept. Many advisors commented on 
the relation between the owner and the business. An accountant suggested that 
a strong personality with drive and ambition would carry his or her business 
along. 
Culture produced different responses. Culture came to be seen from these 
responses as analogous to the personality of the manager. The TEC advisor 
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argued that changes at the top would require a new EP. Ibus the culture of the 
organisation, insofar as you can identify such a thin& reflects the individual 
SME manager. For some advisors the concept appeared esoteric. 
4.5x organisation 
'Ibis is another matter to do with the way in which the company operates. 
Small companies generally are said to operate with flatter structures. Although 
some advisors want the layer below the managing director to impress them 
with their competence, small businesses do not possess bureaucratic structures. 
One advisor bemoaned the stripping out of middle management because there 
is no works controller for the operations specialist to deal with on an 
appropriate basis. Another technology counsellor argued that the production 
process distinguished a product-oriented old manufacturing techniques firm 
and a process-oriented new manufacturing technique company. 
4.5xi strengths and weaknesses 
KNI So what about, um, do you think most companies need to know their 
strengths and weaknesses? 
I tbink tbg do need to know them and quite often tbg do know tbeffl. It's 
just a quesfion of tby don't veg often quite easily address them ivy 
quickyl. I don't tbink. you ask a small businessman wbat bis strengtbs 
. 
you ask bim rbat bis weaknesses vere weir be'll telljou strxý, gbtawg. PI 
be would probab# know them but as to actually, doiq anjthiý ,g about 
tbem. (Bank Manager) 
Strengths and weaknesses then were self-evident to business people surviving 
in businesses. In a sense the advisors job is to see these, though many believe 
the owners know them already. However, doing something about them was 
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considered more difficult. The PBA advisors had to tread carefully and the idea 
was to create quick hits or something that would engender trust. 
4.5xii fast growth 
Given that the Business Links were intended to foster fast growth and thus 
advice is supposed to increase performance I asked about advice for a fast 
growing fmn. 
KAI And what is it you see makes for a fast growing firm? If you had a, if you 
like, a magic wand and you can say well do this, this, this, this and this. 
The University Services Marketing Manager suggested: (1) start in a field where 
he had some expertise, (2) have the right people and contacts, and (3) seek all 
possible help. He added that if he had all the answers he would be in business 
now. A start-up counsellor believed: Most essenfialis to beprv perlý-, financed' 
The bank managers suggested that fast growth ate cash, and they were 
concerned about overtrading. Rapid increases in turnover and supplier's credit 
and an insatiable appetite for bank borrowing signified overtrading. To satisfy 
their appetite for rapid growth they shave margins, the profits are not 
generated and their ability to service their debt and the cash to service their 
supply side creditors can come under pressure. Then a supplier might stop 
further credit and precipitate a cash flow crisis. A bank manager conceded that 
no business ever became successful without a significant increase in turnover 
but that business planning must mediate the stresses and strains. Good 
managers anticipate and react to the external impact of environmental change, 
he added. And the key to small business success was good management, which 
was Yorward-tbinkin& innovafive, crrafim, could take touSb dedsions. A TEC advisor 
believed fast growth firms should plan and evaluate themselves. Whereas a 
technology counsellor opined that organisation capacity must advance the firm: 
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Because tberr is no point in produdq excellent quakogoodr, if you can't 
,g enougb of tbem, if , gb of 
tbem. There is nopoint inprodudn , pm&ice enou 
jou bamn'tgot an outletfor them ... andpossib# markefig is an essenfial 
iqrr&ent in tbatformula. 
A PBA summarised fast growth firms thus: 
It's got to have a prodrict wbicb is needed There's got to be a markeo5lace 
for tbepmduct of senice. You need an AID, or the bead man in the 
business needs to bave some tision to drive itforward You need a good 
mana gement team. it's basica4 most of the tbings re've been taLUng 
about. Tberr's got to be concentrafion _pmfaabi§ty. (PRA) 
A relatively new PBA manager eported what came through his reports. He felt 
that fast growth firms set themselves unachievable targets and therefore 
achieved more than they would otherwise 
A PBA approached this within the constraints theory about small business 
management, after Penrose (1959). The key to growth was to identify the 
limiting factors: factory space, market space, money, or people management. 
And, similar to Penrose (1959) he suggested that: 
And the one tbgfaLl dozvn on most isn't the mong. It isn't the men. It 
isn't the market It's the management that tbgfall down on sofrequently. 
Because wbat tbg be§etv tbg can do. And rbat tbg can actually, do arr 
usually a loý ,g way a patt. 
(PRA) 
A technology counsellor wished for a lean, adaptable company that continually 
developed new products. A PBA cautioned that advisors never approach the 
problem in a manner designed to encourage fast growth from every company. 
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A PBA manager answered the question from a policy point of view. He 
reported finance as the most requested area of advice for SAIEs. A national 
funding regime may help provide cheaper finance for smaller businesses. The 
second problem he saw was the ability of firms to hire educated, trained labour 
even in areas with high unemployment. Finally, the urban area lacked space for 
growing companies. 
Finance came top when advisors were asked to consider fast growth. Fast 
growing firms require cash. Ibis requirement put many advisors into a cautious 
standpoint. Here some advisors stressed control in the face of a fast rate of 
growth. Advisors suggested having the right production facilities, markets, 
championing of the product, competitiveness and flexibility. 
4.5xiii leadership versus strategy 
KNI Right So, there's urn there seems to be sometimes in the literature a bit of 
a debate between do you need leadership and the capability of the individual, or 
getting people in; or can you just switch strategies and then immediately. I 
mean I'm not so sure these are mutually exclusive. Have you a view on that? 
Some people can say well look if you've got somebody that understands what 
they are doin& and they've got, if you like a vision. Then they're going to be 
flyers and they'll self-select and leave them alone but they might come to you 
but they know what they're doing in effect. That group will and the rest if you 
like won't. And then other people will say 'well look, you know, these strategies 
are associated with success, whether you export, if you can get new markets. If 
we can get everybody to do this then everybody can take-off um. I wonder 
whether there's a tension between, if you like, bom and made companies? 
A bank manager suggested that most business omitted a strategy that reached 
beyond twelve months. When the manager talked to the lending team they 
probed what the manager wanted to achieve. A PBA spoke of only two small 
businesses with realistic long-term strategies - both succeeded well. 
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Another believed retailers needed people more than strategy but manufacturers 
needed strategies more than people. Many though the answer to the question 
was both. A bank manager replied: 'I tbinkgood management aiLl bam a strateg and 
I tbinkgood strategy rrquirrs good manq gement to acbiem it. 
A PBA manager mentioned the relation between strategy and company size. 
He argued that entrepreneurial strategies ucceed for a short period but cannot 
consolidate. After a number of years businesses must consolidate, he said.. 
4.5xiv categories 
Turning from the advise to fast growing firms to whether categories of firms 
like Storey's flyers or gazelles, trundlers; etc. are used by practitioners. Do you 
categorise firms when you go and see them? 'Ibis often provoked rather 
embarrassed responses. 
The University Services Marketing Manager categorised firms by SIC number 
and by how welcome the company would be to an approach from the 
University. Companies were warm or cold. They still approached cold 
companies but spent little effort there and focussed on the warmer companies. 
They could move a firm from a cold to a warm. firm. 
A Banker categorised in terms of risk. A technology advisor considered how 
far the company exhibited best practice. And a member of the PBA group 
propounded that the type of employees gave a clue. Many young people and 
much IT denoted a growing company as did management's relaxed and 
controlled attitude. 
According to the PBA group all companies differed. The PBA earned respect 
from the way they responded to comments; respect earned the PBA the 
business development review. It is non-prescriptive. 
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A technology counsellor attempted to focus on customers but found that many 
were unaware of their needs. Ibis interviewee categorised informally into 
'movers and shakers', 'fire fighters' and those in the middle. 
Formally then many advisors do not categorise firms into flyers and the like. 
Informally they may do. But there are difficult issues surrounding categories. 
Often the advisor categories are based upon their interest financial, 
technological, and approachable categories were all mentioned. 
4.5xv take-off 
I then turned to the idea of surprise changes in companies. Is growth a steady 
upward curve or do some firms leap off into growth for nefarious haphazard 
reasons? 
KNI Have you come across um, I was at a meeting one time and somebody was 
there and they were from a company in an industrial estate, it was actually in 
Stafford, and they said 'well we've done so-and-so and so-and-so and then two 
years ago we started exporting and now we're growing really quickly. Have you; 
is that usual? Do you quite often, often find companies that, sort of, seem to 
almost go, progress very slowly and then suddenly something happens and they 
take-ofP 
Advisors suggested that take-off happened for a myriad of reasons: a new 
member of staff brings new ideas, or the firm learns of an opportunity. Some 
healthy well-managed companies begin with one idea and end up with quite 
another. A bank manager suggested that it had to be to do with trade. Another 
bank manager suggested 12 out of 1400 client businesses took-off, less than 
one per cent, but the number of times that take-off happens is the subject of 
some disagreement. A technology counsellor suggested that it was relatively 
common but that take-off fails to follow through because fmns lack the 
management structure, people and technology to sustain it. 
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4.5xvi tidiness 
The next area I asked about was tidiness and again probing the idea of looking 
around a factory, due to my experience on the shop floor. 
Actually the only other thing I've got on my list is. I used to work on a fork-lift 
tuck and people used to walk round the factory, and they always used to say 
'Quick tidy up. Do you think that makes any difference, I mean do you look 
for things like how tidy the place is? 
Tidiness was associated with organisation, often called 'good housekeepine. 
'Good housekeepine enables workers to perform their tasks easily and many 
advisors associate it with a caring attitude toward the workforce. A bank 
manager commented: 7 could takejou to two diries, andjou could see wbicb was the 
most successfuL The one that is neat and M# and rr-invests. 'A PBA opined: 'a mesy 
jactog is a badly organisedfacrogý A technology counsellor examined a number of 
, gress, 
bottlenecks, factors when he visited a manufacturing premises: Vork-in]pq 
,g tbat's value-adiq 
to those 
,g somethin people, aditifies, 
bow many people air actua4 doin 
that aren't. ' 
Tidiness, a factor that I have yet to see in a research project about SME 
performance, came across strongly as a predictor of good housekeeping and 
hence good management. Tidiness equals organisation, which equals a 
management in control of the business. Another factor mentioned was staff 
attitudes as you looked around a firm. 
4.6 Data that does not fit into question categories 
I asked participants for areas where they wanted to raise but had had no chance 
to do so. 
A bank manager talked about the relationship between banks and SNIEs. He 
argued that many businesses needed not just capital, equity but additional 
expertise because people meet their personal barriers. 
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A bank manager talked about the issue of controlwithin the business, which I 
have quoted in full. 
How mucbjou draw down is it*ortant Yyou am making C40 000 but 
on# dram, domw (tbat is SAIE ounen'personal spen&ng) k 10 000 then 
jou arr okay but if you draw domm L42 000 jou arr in trouble. He told a 
stog about aplumberfor Brifisb Gas. He made mongfmm sbares in 
Btifisb Gas. He then rent seý'-ei*loved asaplumber and made mongfor 
g' - the account sboxed bim losing a few jears. He then 'hit the cei§n
mong. Anýv rent to see him and bis businesses were out of controZ He 
rrcdt, ed twelve messa , ges wbile 
the manqlger sat there talkin ,g 
to bim - and 
rrmemberrd tbree qf tbem. Ani# wommended beget in an accountant and 
Business Unk adtison and it turned out two businesses were subsi&sin ,g 
txo otben. Nox be has cbxts on the xall and four people who kee p 
contml of the business. Control is a big issue. (Bank Afanagr) 
Ihe growth presumption. The PBA group took me to task regarding my 
presumption of growth. They said: Touir workingfrom apresuiV, 6on of co? Vanies 
wanti . ng togmw and develop. In that isn't necessaii# the case is it? ' 
The ky quesfion is xbat does the cot*anj want to do? ' 
Because otbemiserego inpmscribing wberv tbg do and wbat tbg do. IF, e 
batv togo in uitb a blank sbeet ofpaper and Asten to rbat tbg vant. 
You knov, and it can be anytbingfmm I rant to refire to i mant to be a 
muN-mi&on. pound mcket sdenfist. And anytbiq in between. 
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The group argued that the starting point was the manager's wants. They enter 
the relationship with a blank sheet of paper. Academic research fails to engage 
'with the PBA group. Although the psychology of the owner manager 
interested them the experience of the real world is what counts. The process of 
advising constantly re-created rapport. Constant note-taking and questioning 
dug out the answers to the issues within the SNIE. Models did not help. 
4.7 Analysis of the data 
The data was analysed using a content analysis. The results of which are 
presented in table 24. The categories of data the factors considered by the 
advisors. Fell into three categories; the table thus lists the categories under 
these themes. 
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Table 24 Categories mentioned by the first 
fourteen advisors, grouped into themes. 
The manAger Strategy Control 
N-1sion Developing new markets Plan 
Marketing skills Fleidbility to innovate Conservative financial 
policy 
Forward-looking Niche marketing Properly financed 
Culture- attitude and vision Adaptability Sensible objectives 
Determination and commitment Market research Keep control 
I lonesty Knowing competitors Trend aa2lyse financial 
information 
Flexibility Room in the market Quality of management 
data 
Prior experience and background Good service Factory organisation. 
Vliy started business Strength& and weaknesses Monitoring and 
business planning 
Drawings Nfark-et growth 
Credibility Barriers to entry 
Management succession (forward thinking) Keeping pace ith 
technology 
Reliability Strategy looks further than 
twelve months 
Listens to advice 
Each firm am individual 
Knowing where they we and where they are 
going 
Owner being the key to it 
Qualifications 
Contacts- prior in trade 
Team approach 
Got a feel for the business 
Ambition 
Confidence 
Capabilities of the management team, 
Can they manage through recessions? 
Leadership skills 
Knows what the or he wants 
Relauonship between employees and NID 
Successful business format? 
11inking creative innova6ve management that 
can take tough decisions 
Personality affectmg thewhole culture 
III? culture to grt the best from staff 
Flexible and forward-looking 
Openness -clarity of NID 
Know's what he's looking for 
Communication - the basis of it all 
Objectives of the owner/maaager 
Skills and background 
Management style 
Fast growth needs a driver to stretch 
themselves 
Is the management team capable of getting the 
best from the companv? 
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Now the categorisation under the different themes might be considered 
controversial. The major question concerns whether there are three categories: 
manager, strategy and control; or four including culture. 
Advisors assess the management's capability. One advisor said: 
I can seefmm those management accounts oirr, 6me the qua§pi of the data 
tbat's produced, bow quick_4 its produced lFhat the peo le are about .P 
rr, dA. I mean jou can bave two idenfical coVanies with &fferrnt 
manqgement o  dy one. The one v iLlSo upxards and acbieve itsgoaiý mitb 
good management, Vitb poor mana , gement 
it mid struggle, or can stmggL- 
Oen, o)? en, thg can bave aprvduct that se&s itself. You can't rea: 4 define 
aig, thing spedfic itsgot to be eacb care on its ments butmhat I would sg is 
that oirr time as a knding manqger_youget to know who tbegood 
managen are, majust b y the paper thg produce but ýv the organisadon in 
thefacroy wbenjougo tbere. 
His point was re-iterated by another Yf yougo and look at thegood, succesiful small 
and medium shZed enterpnies, and an4sed all the rra: 4, the dfferrnt aspeas, I tbink_vou 
wouldprobably, bave topinpoint to thefact hat the Ming in common was good management. ' 
Good management depends on, and is demonstrated by, many factors. One 
interviewec mentioned the SME manager's vision, marketing skills, his or her 
awareness of culture and being forward-looking, and adaptable, pursuing 
conservative financial policies and planning. In the strategy cluster, he stressed 
developing new markets, having the flexibility to innovate, and the ability to 
exploit niche markets. A second interviewee thought the (start-up) 
businessperson needed to be honest, determined and committed, with proper 
finance and control. Involved in advising start-ups, he remarked '.. a new 
business; tbefiryt. ) ear is sunriv4 being rraýstrc about zbatjou can acbietr We alwaysgo 
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on The sun it ul budget. you can sun he onjourfint jear, if you can do better than that. 
Fine. 'Along with its direct benefits, market research indicated commitment and 
determination 7 ix uI guess out Sribefourreen u-e have at The moment, fite or siI start a 
business. I OU can tell #tbg'rr interrsted in the workbook, tbeir rrsearrb.. ' He believed 
service was important than price. Many small business people appear to believe 
price competition is more important than their advisors. As one counselled 
t-and don't do it cbeapjust go on prodaYng agood senice.. ' The importance of prior 
experience, particularly in the industry, was borne out We look at the background 
we look at a-berr lbg've been nhere thy arr now wherr tbgrr oin in ts of on- g g, erm n 
finandals a-bat thg'rr doij(g in the markeiplace ... And one arra that we're pari*ularyl 
interrsted in to get at if x-by thy nunt to start the business. ' Others mentioned 
motivation: 'a lot of it actuaay comes back to where the co)Vag aaua: 4 wants to go. ' 
Many interviewees referred to a metaphor of the car driver. 'Soyou need someone 
nitb tision, drite, ambidon and. Youget veg much into the sort ofpyebological aiped 
Businesses ziýty rarelyprtgrrss oftbeirou-n accord" The example of a lack of drive was 
highlighted by an advisor 'You know and somefimes ýy asking those quesfions thy 
py rraýse that thy arr perhaps diiAng. Thgrr not actually doing agplanning.. Perha s Ib 
olýgbt to hairgoals that tbg'ir aimingfor 'Tidiness too was thought by many of the 
advisors as an important indicator of organisation and therefore management 
capability- 7 think itr if as#: ou o to afactog, sherr it is # these dy -Y jougo, 
pariicu&ý g 
fidy, it's we& Lid out etc. I think that's indeadir of the manqgement. It's inaVeadir that 
their's maybe an element ofpride and I think that mid translate into sucress. 'Ibese were 
typical quotations. judgements about the management's capability draw on all 
these factors, with capable management as a leading indicator of business 
performance. 
Advisors suggest profitability, rather than growth, measures business 
performance. An advisor noted the aphorism, Top Ene is tvni6i, bottom Ne is 
sa; u .i Warnes' (1984) management formulae: to control cash, a low break- 
even point, and prices that produce acceptable profit margins, were evident 
when talking to advisors. An interviewee said 'I'm brougbt into the businessAvberr the 
ay is Ve zunt morr mony and ae can'tget it' Andyoufznd trg quick# that tbg need 
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morr debtfinance 6ke a bole in the bead The pmblem of the business is it dn't prvfaable 
enoughforn hatei er trason, .. Yet uhimamly tbg my need more debtfinance or rbatever But 
if )-ou enVneer Major Them u i1bout pulfing rigbt The basic bs of the business wbat pm lem 
essenfial#jou xould be doing is buiLing them a sc4Fifold and ban&ng them a rope. ' Ibe 
bank managers' risk-rcward trade-offs were different from the Business Link 
advisors. Whilst the latter are charged with finding and encouraging rowth 
companies, the bankers need to be repaid by all their companies due to their 
risk and return trade-offi t-obtiously, if xe'rr len&ng mong av look to securio because 
z rrr not eqidty prvi iden in the purr sense of the aor-d So ae e. %ped, ive don't cbar e sk ,g ri 
capiW rates. Ve cbxge a mvgin otrr base rate and ue expect the pqplietoff of a business 
to sutport a rrquestjorfunds zherr appmPriate vitb securip,. ' Advisors stressed control 
and profit rather than growth. 
Advisors emphasised 'sofe issues like culture, team working and morale. But 
yr because of ezrobod g together much note and the teamwork is nowada y sort of workin 
varrmely i? *orfant. 1016 te got a lot morr. In rg tiew there's a lot morr camaraderie. In a 
,g 
between the management at whateter leml and the , good 
factog Iberr's a good fee§n 
pmducUon people a mucb betterfeeZ And ýf g round the factoy and the jou arr walkin 
managing drrao6 walking round relaxrd vitbyou and he's sbomins-you the machine. And 
be nys to the chap on the machine lob Hello, so and so Ive come to show this consultant, 
go business a&isor ahateirr dem n trate it ir you munt to call us, this machine, can-You 0Sm, ZYn 
somethin a -you 
know tbgtvgot a ,g or other 
M" and the chap says IN gy Afr sos and so' 
rnnn good, there's agood rapportjou knox. The place is fidý'. It git sjou the, it e ge de the 
the tisitor ,g 
the machine, the &recror right sort offeehýgs in etegbody, the cba p operafin 
UN. - I think that's, that is quite, it's not c7ideal but it's quite iVortant, The whole aura of 
Y trg Mf 10 the business. yyouvegot agood team xpiritfmm top to bottom then ou' ot an a ul t 
, goingfor the coixpag, 
for a tvrietý, of reasons, one of the mdn one is tbatjouget trust. 'A 
y technology advisor believed communication was linked to innovation: t.. ft ou 
ksten to The skilled tradespenon, tbg can contribute signtfteant4 in some instances to the 
technological competence of the cotxpaqygenera, ýv. ' Advisors generally reported little 
innovation in the small firm sector. The same advisor felt organisation was 
important for growth. His advice for fast growth firms was T think ryfiryt kne of 
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adz ice a vuld be to make xurr that the oqaniýafional stmeturr is capable of advandq the 
firm and its potential in its market sector' An advisor linked people, planning and 
growth: Dut of coune therr arr some coVanies in that siZe that hatrn't etrn got a husiness 
, plan to start mith. But that's been idenfifted as the jingle bigest rrason that stops coVanier 
, gm, u
ing ahen tbyget to a crrtcin siZe and tbyjust Ytop. I 
A senior ad-6sor mentioned balance: 
. 
ferrntfacets Sf runniq a coVag it's a 7 fbink in all tbese, in a4l these & 
quesfion qrstriking a balance. It's Jan , gemus 
if you stad tuming things on 
and ecoiVIete4. It's mueb better to try and tum the beat up a kale and 
tum it dom wa kitle, and balance the xeigbt tbatyouput in eaeb Sr the 
separate aitW&es of ninning the business. ' 
When it comes to strategy the advisors were often sceptical of the amount of 
strategic management in small companies. An advisor commented: 
'Etubiafing of a markefig strutegv to those actually in business i a bit 
jýPotbeficaL And um SAfEs are tberr, tbg'rr more intent to sunite and 
potbefical eam a Ating then tbg are to consider tbeorrfical and by 
,g strate markefig strategies. 
But tbat's not to sg that markefin gies don't 
bat ie a place in ihdusýiy. I'm surr tbg do but tberr's aplace and aplace 
and I don't tbink SA fEs are it, unfortunately. ' 
Terms like strategy are loaded. The firm takes inputs from the economic 
system and, using knowledge and production technologies (including services), 
processes and organisation create marketable products. If the products are not 
marketable: the firm soon has a strategy, never mind control, problem. Now all 
this produces sales and the process from inputs to sales is called the strategy of 
the firm in this model. Scholars debate whether strategy is derived from 
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objectives or emerges from the firm's activities. Of course, advisors might 
adopt the top-down model simply because that is the model they have come to 
know from their management training. Ibe model can apply just as well if 
strategy is the starting point. Strategy might emerge and then realistic managers 
with good control match their objectives to it. 
All the elements of strategy, control and capabilities attempt to answer the 
question are the management capable? Is the firm well managed? Strategy, 
control and objectives are management concerns, combined in a conceptual 
model of small business management. Culture is included in the SME manager 
cluster. In a small business, the manager establishes the culture. In response to 
the question on the personality of the owner, an interviewee said: 
'Yes, betause it eeas the ahok cu&urr traffy. Tbat's aby, just for 
exampk, if an oganisadon basgot Investor in People and has rrcent! y been 
freogniW as an Investor in People if tberr's a buge stmaural cban , ge at 
the 
top, or the cbief execufivegoes; it mg be that the assessor wbo got their 
gnifion wants togo in afgdnjust to cbeck that it's not ebanged Because mo 
, gs work- 
tbg bair a big in/2uence rway, on theug tbiý 
A recurring theme of business advisors was control. Advisors were concerned 
for example if basic financial information was not available or adequately 
understood by the owner-manager. Control involved knowing the cash 
position of the firm, whether the firm was profitable enough and 
understanding if the firm was well organised. Ibus control might be seen as a 
correcting mechanism in the firm ensuring its continued prosperity. Ibis model 
attempts to fit control into a representation of the concerns of business 
advisors. The model considers three questions that business advisors might 
want to understand. 
What does the manager want to do with the business? 
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Are the firm's activities consistent with the objectives? 
NN'hat systems or information is there to control and measure whether the 
finn's activi6es arc succcssful? 
RME performance depends on the management's capability to set objectives, 
implement them (strategy) and keep control. Advisors use a great number of 
factors to form a judgement of capability, highlighting areas of strengths and 
weaknesses with in firms, which, by their size and variety, may be in very 
different sectors and locations. 
4.8 Error Signals within Research interviews 
The heuristics used by business advisors suggested congruent vision, strategy 
and control within the well-managed business. A second issue concerned how 
the advisors approached verification of the model. In a sense then this takes a 
step back. Besides considering the what of heuristics; this considers the how. 
One PBA suggested that assessments could be made using a mixed metaphor 
of traffic lights and baseball - three red lights and you are outý two greens and 
an amber and you are safely at first base. Another approach, based on an 
engineering metaphor, is to use error signals. 
The data was revisited in order to investigate whether the use of error signals 
fit. Error signals might be either positive or negative. 1bus a signal might 
indicate congruence was present or was not present. Congruence can be noted 
between vision and strategy and between strategy and control. 'Ibus interview 
transcriptions were re-read and coded under the four themes. Indicating 
positive and negative signals and the two areas of congruence, see table 25. 
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Table 25 Effor Siga2ls 
Positive Negative 
Signal Signal 
Vision and ab 
Strategy 
Strategy and cd 
Control 
I decided to re-code the PBA transcriptions because, in a manner it was these 
interviews that were most important. 
T2ble 26 Re-coding for Error Signals 
Vision and Strategy Strategy and Control 
Interview No. Positive -a Negative -b Positive -c Negative -d 
9 Ability to Striking a Debtor days 
make balance in line with 
decisions sector 




Product Tidy place 
'knowledge 
Vision - idea industry 
of where you average ratios 









- team spirit 
Personal tidy, well-laid cross-transfer 
appearance out of materials 
and attitude across the 
of NID shopfloor 
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A structured, stock levels of 
logical and commensurat stocks 
cohesive e with level of 
approach work 









12 Vision, drive Too busy Forum where Mess 
ambition running day- management everywhere 
to-day can no hoper 
operations communicate 
A motivator Attitude of Business Plan 
the 
receptionist 
Number of management 









13 Alanagemene They have got lack of a basic 
s objectives the plans but reporting 
and business thefte not system 
- plan 
fortnalised 
whether he's whether he doesn't know 
got the vision hasn't got the cost to make 
vision, product 
14 team working little a business ifs efficient or 
approach communicatio planning not by the 
communicatio n between the process general 




on the n between the 
strategy. people at the 1 
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top and the 
work-force 
know what upsetting the 
the market is staff and key 






no products a failure to understanding a fAure to 
have you have much of financial have a proper 
brought to idea at all managemen% handle on the 
market in the about order, records finances 
last year or marketing 
five years? 
customer base ignorance of The fail to 
market share understanding understand 
of break-even, the need for 
and gross working 
margin capital 
the attitude of the general Lack of 
the key people appearance -a business plan 
then-nometer and cash flow 









19 smibng faces don't assess good Tuyine in 













The results from table 26 seem to indicate that it is indeed possible to consider 
the interview transcripts in terms of error signals and congruence between 
vision and strategy and strategy and control. The positive signals between 
visuion and strategy included such terms as leadership and vision, particularly 
the idea that the owner-manager knew where he or she wanted to go. Others 
mentioned the products and innovation the customer base and that the 
entrepreneur concentrates on strategy. Negative signals from the congruence 
between vision and strategy included the tendency for some entrepreneurs to 
fire fight, the attitude of the receptionist, lack of communication and planning 
and marketing ignorance. The positive signals between strategy and control 
involved business planning processes, market knowledge, understanding 
financial management and good housekeeping. The lack of financial 
management and efficiency constituted negative error signals. 
The table is exploratory, not conclusive, however. It attempts to show that an 
error signal approach to the issues of assessing business management is 
possible. Some questions within the questionnaire sent to PBAs included the 
question of congruence between the various internal management, although 
the error signal approach itself was not tested. 
4.9 Questionnaire 
To test the model of advisors heuristics a questionnaire was designed. The 
questionnaire's rationale was to validate, or not, and generalise, or not, the 
interview findings. The questionnaire was sent to every English Business Link. 
'Me PBA managers were asked to pass on this self-administered questionnaire 
to all their advisors. 712 questionnaires were mailed and 175 complete 
questionnaires returned, a response rate of 24.57%. Most Business Link's 
agreed to help though Business Link Macclesfield (6) Business Link London 
Central (19) Dorset (6) St. Helens (4) and London City (30) declined to take 
part. Subtracting these leaves 647 potential respondents and an adjusted 
response rate of 27%. Approximately I in 4 of the PBAs in England took part 
in the survey. 
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The questionnaire was eleven pages long but took just over 15 minutes to self- 
administer. It divided into sections about the respondentý the organisation, the 
task in hand, the views about small business, causes of business failure, factors 
for business growth, and views about management functions. Ibis section will 
now go through these sections and consider the answers to all of the questions 
containedwithin the questionnaire. 
4.10 Results from Questionnaire 
4.10i about you 
The first section asked respondents about themselves. The first question asked 
about the current job tide. Most respondents were PBAs although there were 
several (technology) counsellors. The length of service was of interest. A 
hypothesis was that those with longer experience were more likely to used 
heuristic methods as opposed to those with less experience. Rather like the 
bank managers, the relative newcomers may be more hkely to rely on 
mnemonics or models as opposed to intuitive experience. Ibus the 
questionnaire asked for lengths of service. All told the respondents had over 
1000 years of experience between them and averaged 6.2 years, with variations 
from 1 year or part of up to 33 years experience. The questionnaire asked 
about whether the advisors had working experience in the small fmns sector, 
the expectation is that most have but eleven out of the 175 lacked small 
business experience, representing just 6.3%. The overwhelming majority of 
advisors worked in small business before their present employment. The next 
question asked them to say in what capacity and the options ranged from 
managing director. Respondents were asked to tick all that apply so the results 
add up to more than 175. 
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Table 27 PBAs' Prior Experience in Small Firms 
Capaci! X Number 
Managing Director 88 
Finance Director 26 
Sales Afarketing Director 50 
Other Director 42 
Business Planning 67 
Manager 89 
Supervisor 24 
None of the above 11 
Most PBAs experience was as a manager or managing director with business 
planning and sales and marketing directors next in line. Comparatively few of 
the advisors had held the position of fmance director. Interesting to cross 
tabulate the other directors with those having engineering experience to 
suggest that many were production directors and perhaps a weakness of the 
questionnaire was that it did not include this area. Prior experience in small 
firms was at senior levels according to table 27. 
Prior academic experience was another area of interest. The argument may be 
put that extensive academic experience is less of a help for advisors that hands- 
on practical experience. Table 28 shows the highest qualifications earned by the 
advisors. In addition, respondents were asked whether they held a professional 
qualification. 
T2bIe28 PBAs'Prior Academic Qualifications 
_Qualification -- 
Number ýi 
r-s --d--eg, -re-e--o-r--a-b-ov-e---- ----4-8 ---  ---------- -- 
Degree 60 
* levels 35 
* levels 25 
none of these 7 
Professional qualification 123 
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Those that have graduate qualifications are in the majority with 108 PBAs 
having prior higher education while 67 PBAs have not. 'Ibis divides into those 
that maybe called more practical and those with a more academic background. 
This divides quite nicely for an analysis to split the PBAs into distinctive groups 
and see whether this is reflected in the attitudes to certain types of questions or 
to the nature of the job and, for example biases about firm fAures. Another 
way to divide the PBAs is along the fines of those with professional 
qualifications. Certainly evidence on fast growing businesses have used 
professional qualifications as a proxy for education- the type of qualification 
though night be important. In particular, accountants and production experts 
might hold distinct views. The next question asked the 123 who declared their 
professional qualification whether it fit into the following types. 
Table 29 Types of Professional Qualific2tions 
Qualification Number 
ACCA/FCA - 12 
Other accounting such as CIMA 14 
Insfitute of Bankers 7 
Chartered Engineer 20 
Institute of Marketing 22 
None of the above 50 
Total 125* 
*Two respondents held qualifications from two bodies mentioned, from other 
accounting and Institutes of Marketing and Banking respectively. 
The table shows a fairly even split then between accountants and financial 
professionals, engineers and marketeers. A fault in the questionnaire was the 
none of the above. if these were sent out again there should be a space for 
respondents to write in other, this n-ýight have missed personnel qualifications 
or other production orientated qualifications, which is a shame. 
Tables 28 and 29 give us a number of groups whose responses can be 
compared to test the homogeneity of views in the PBAs ranks, and will also 
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give an indication of the importance of the prior back-ground to the attitudes of 
PBAs. 
The next question asked for details of the PBAs experience in the small firms 
sector. Ibis was a check on the previous table 27. 
4.10ii your organisation 
Following from the section about the respondent this next section asked about 
the organisation. There has been much discussion about the way different 
business links have gone about their tasks. Business Links are local 
organisations that are accountable to local boards. A difficulty with this 
approach, a difficulty shared with local government, is that this inevitably leads 
to many Business Links having to learn the same things in parallel. Many 
people refer to these phenomena as 're-inventing the wheel'. However, it does 
mean that organisations can do things differently and thus provide some 
outlets for experimentation. Consequently, the questionnaire asked how far the 
organisation prescribed the way clients were interviewed from not at all to very 
much. 
Table 30 flow far does your Organisation 
Prescribe? 
Prescribe Number 




Very much (5) 0 
Declined to answer 1 
We can see therefore, that PBAs are largely left to their own methods to 
interview clients, although that does not necessarily mean that the way in which 
they report is not standardised. The research interviews with PBAs and their 
managers found a difference in view between the various links, -with one 
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stressing an approach whereby the analysis is standardised whereas another 
argued that they wanted their PBAs to exercise their experience and judgement. 
To pursue this judgement approach training might be necessary and thus the 
questionnaire asked about trainin& and its effectiveness. 
The question about training was turned into a scale from 0-2 with a DUBS or 
equivalent course as 1. There might be some correlation between the amount 
of training and the perceived effectiveness of the training. Iherefore a scale 
from one, not at all effective, to five, very effective was used to elicit the PBAs 
perception of their training on becoming a business advisor. 
Table 31 flow Effective was Your Training? 
Training Effectiveness Number 




Very effective (5) 21 
Generally, then advisors felt that their training was effective, although for some 
the training did disappoint. One would be hard put to make a case for 
widespread training ineffectiveness. 
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Table 32 Your Tratining 
Training Reported Number 
Less than Dubs 75 
Dubs 67 
Nforc than Dubs 28 
Total 170 
Cross tabulating these two sets of data Cin table 33) shows that there does seem 
to be a link between more training and the effectiveness of the training, though 
why this should be is not entirely clear. Why should effective training lead to 
more training for example? 
Table 33 Training and Effectiveness 
Total 
1 2 3 4 5 
0 3 13 21 34 4 75 
1 0 8 19 32 8 67 
2 0 2 2 15 9 28 
Total 3 23 42 81 21 170 
The crosstabs yields a chi-squared of 21.927 although 5 cells have a count 
under 5 and the training is rather arbitrary thus the weight of evidence this 
produces is rather shaky. Indeed, there is a case to suggest that the data 
produced in table 33 is nominal rather than ordinal. Though the responses to 
how effective was the training that you received would, I suggest come under 
the heading of ordinal data, 5 is greater than 4. The amount of training was set 
at the residential five-day DUBS course being equal to one with 2 higher and 0 
less. Ibis evidence, I suggest is exploratory. 
Having asked about training they respondents were asked about their jobs 
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4.10ýi your job 
Given the use of heuristics will be related to the nature of the task at hand, the 
questionnaire asked advisors about their jobs. Using a grid the respondents 
were asked to indicate where they thought their job lied on the scale. Table 34 
shows the responses. 
T2ble 34 WIxen advising small firms do you find 
the process ... Please tick one response. 
very somewhat neither somewhat very 
simple 3 28 72 62 7 complex 
intuitive 5 61 40 61 7 methodical 
subjective 2 26 42 78 24 objective 




4 13 39 71 42 uses experience 
can be scored 1 42 52 49 21 cannot be scored 
has a standard 
method 
4 56 35 59 19 has no standard 
method 
informal 12 76 60 24 2 formal 












needs no face-to- 
I 
face contact 
Some respondents did suggest that the neither should be both, so that some 
crossed out neither and put both, though it can be argued that for example 
something cannot be neither simple nor complex either it is one of the other. 
Ibus; if the questionnaire was represented this would be changed to 
neither/both. 'Me simplest type of analysis is merely to use the mode values as 
an indication of where respondents collectively saw the job as in table 35. 
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Table 35 The Process of Advising Small Firms 
very somewhat neither somewhat very 
simple X complex 
intuitive X X methodical 
subjective X objective 




X uses experience 
can be scored X cannot be scored 
has a standard 
method 
X has no standard 
method 
informal X formal 




X needs no face-to- 
face contact 
Indications are then that the PBAs see their job as both intuitive, and 
methodical, simple and complex, objective, not sector specific, using 
experience, with no standard method, in an informal setting, albeit everyone is 
different and it most definitely requires face-to-face contact.. No computer 
models then. 
4.10iv your views about small business 
We are interested in your views about, and experience of, small business 
success and failure. Please tick the response that is nearest to your views for the 
following questions. You should aim to answer the questions quickly and 
without too much reflection. 
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Table 36 Views about Small Business 
10. Good businesses have formal business plans. 
Strongly 41 63 47 22 2 Strongly 
agree disagree 
11. Successful small business managers know the strengths and weaknesses of 
their competitors. 
Strongly 62 74 19 17 3 Strongly 
agree disagree 
12. Even poorly organised firms often prosper. 
Strongly 13 69 40 41 12 Strongly 
agree disagree 
13. It is unnecessary to innovate to be successful as a small firm. 
Strongly 8 35 33 61 38 Strongly 
agree disagree 
15. A significant number of small businesses fail because management lack 
financial competence. 
Strongly 85 71 694 Strongly 
agree disagree 
16. Success in small business is largely a case of being in the right place at the 
right time. 
Strongly 2 38 61 53 21 Strongly 
agree disagree 
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17. Businesses with clear financial control systems are more likely to survive. 
Strongly 85 68 16 60 Strongly 
agree disagree 
18. Good management is good management; no matter what sector the 
company is in. 
Strongly 124 49 20 Strongly 
agree disagree 
19. Setting goals, planning and evaluating progress is the hallmark of a well- 
managed firm. 
Strongly 100 66 720 Strongly 
agree disagree 
20. Agreement between the firms' objectives and its operations indicate good 
management. 
Strongly 70 84 20 10 Strongly 
agree disagree 
21. Businesses control managers; managers do not control businesses. 
Strongly 0 16 26 56 75 Strongly 
agree disagree 
22. Success depends more upon the sector that the firm is in; rather than the 
quality of the management. 
Strongly 07 22 84 61 Strongly 
agree disagree 
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23. Finance is more readily available for well-managed firms. 
Strongly 72 68 15 16 4 Strongly 
agree disagree 
24. It is unnecessary to innovate to be successful as a small firm unless the firm 
is in a high tech sector. 
Strongly 2 32 27 57 57 Strongly 
agree disagree 
25. Successful companies appear well organised and tidy. 
Strongly 17 95 43 17 3 Strongly 
agree disagree 
26. You can tell a lot about a fmn by just walking round. 
Strongly 74 87 94 Strongly 
agree disagree 
27. Its all down to luck. 
Strongly 03 21 54 96 Strongly 
agree disagree 
One method to consider the agreement is to simply take the agrees and 
disagrees and take the one from the other. Strongly agreeing and disagreeing 
should be done separately. This nominal data is not conducive to combining 
those strongly agreeing or disagreeing with those just in agreement. The 
numbers strongly disagreeing are taken from those strongly agreeing and in a 
similar vein with the simple agreement and disagreement. 'Ibus an index is 
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constructed by simply adding those remaining strongly and not strongly 
agreeing. 
Table 37 Agreement to Small Business Views 
Question Index of PBA 
agreement 
Good management is good management; no matter 173 
what sector the company is in. 
Setting goals, planning and evaluating progress is the 164 
hallmark- of a well-managed firm. 
You can tell a lot about a firm by just walking round. 156 
Agreement between the firms' objectives and its 153 
operations indicate good management. 
Businesses with clear financial control systems are 147 
more likely to survive 
A significant number of small businesses fail because 143 
management lack financial competence 
Finance is more readily available for well-managed 120 
firms. 
Successful small business managers know the 116 
strengths and weaknesses of their competitors. 
Successful companies appear well organised and tidy. 92 
Good businesses have formal business plans. 80 
Even poorly organised firms often prosper. 29 
Success in small business is largely a case of being in -34 
the right place at the right time. 
It is unnecessary to innovate to be successful as a -56 
small firm. 
It is unnecessary to innovate to be successful as a -80 
small firm unless the firm is in a high tech sector. 
Businesses control managers; managers do not -115 
control businesses 
Success depends more upon the sector that the firm -138 is in; rather than the quality of the management. 
Its all down to luck. -147 
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T2ble 38 Causes of Business Failure 
28. From the list of factors below and your experiences please indicate to what 
extent they are important causes of business failure. 
Rank Mean Standard Deviation 
Poor debtor control/bad debts 1 4.3429 . 6407 Lack of management capability 2 4.3143 . 6330 Over-trading 3 4.2914 . 6786 Inadequate working capital 4 4.2743 . 6645 Lack of demand 5 4.2457 . 8110 Poor cost control 
Lack of managerial skills 
Lack of clear business objectives 
Poor management accounting 
Inadequate market research 
Supply chain 'squeezes' 
Lack of innovation 
6 4.0571 . 5110 7 4.04 . 7456 8 3.8286 . 8265 9 3.7543 . 7209 10 3.7086 . 8309 11 3.4971 . 7822 12 3.4743 . 7567 Low profit margins 13 3.44 . 8134 Unexpected changes in demand 14 3.4343 . 8129 Staying too long in mature markets 15 3.32 . 8168 Changes in technoloEX 16 3.25 . 7883 
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Table 39 Factors for Business Growth 
28. From the list of factors below and your experiences please indicate to what 
extent they are important causes of business growth. 
Rank Mean Standard Deviation 
Ability to develop new markets 1 4.5115 . 5013 Ability to spot new opportunities 2 4.5 . 5765 Increase in customer demand for 3 4.3103 . 5651 
the product or services 
Ability to bring new products to 4 4.2414 . 6263 
market 
Clear business objectives 5 4.1954 . 7267 Ability to anticipate demand changes 6 4.1494 . 6973 Long-term business planning 7 4.0632 . 6981 Good management skills 8 4.023 . 6796 Good market research 9 4.0172 . 6032 Ability to improve productivity 10 3.8786 . 7171 Adequate working capital 11 3.7110 . 6628 Ability to manage the margin 12 3.6207 . 7789 Good knowledge of cost structures 13 3.569 . 7159 High profit margins 14 3.4483 . 8965 Good debtor control 15 3.2069 . 7994 Ability to absorb cost increases 16 3.1724 . 7858 
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Your views about management functions. Management tasks tend to be 
associated with different functions in the management of a business. In small 
businesses, the same person may undertake these activities. Please map the 
following activities to the three functions. 
T2ble 40 Ihe Area you think the Following 
Management Activities Apply. 




  - -------- leadership --------------------------- - strategy -------------   control 
managing stock levels 1 7 159 
co-ordinating 101 25 39 
directing purpose 122 37 1 
researching the market 7 159 4 
managing cash 2 3 161 
raising finance 35 105 21 
developing vision 100 62 0 
setting clear targets 85 70 1 
setting prices 11 114 41 
knowledge of competition 14 132 22 
changing business direction 74 81 1 
chasing debts 1 4 165 
motivating staff 163 6 1 
producing manaEment accounts 0 4 165 
This findings chapter is based around a model developed from the responses 
of a wide variety of business advisors, that well-managed businesses 
demonstrate congruent objectives, strategies and control. 'Me discussion of the 
evidence for and against the model, presented in this chapter is part of the 
concluding chapter. 
In addition the results related to issues surrounding the nature and 
development of the PBA service. Issues such as recruitment and training of 
PBAs and their views of business growth and failure, and the way that they 
perceive the nature of their task, impact upon the way in which PBAs deliver a 
tailored service to individual businesses within their area. Yet for the purposes 
of this research the focus remains on the role of factors in assessments of a 
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well-managed fmn and the heuristics that demonstrate those factors, such as 





Ibis chapter presents the findings within their context. It discusses previous 
chapter's findings. Having presented the results; this chapter weighs the 
evidence to answer the question, what does all this mean? The chapter aims to 
make sense of what has gone before, and will argue that the results presented 
provide evidence to support the view, outlined, that business advisors try to 
find evidence for, and reinforce, good management within their SME clients. 
The chapter suggests that they do this by applying the heuristic model 
(developed in the previous chapter). The chapter also discusses the implications 
for the theories discussed in chapter 2. In essence the chapter discusses the 
outcomes of the research question and research problem contexts. The next 
section of the chapter presents the conclusions about the research question. 
5.2 Conclusions about research question 
The interviews were coded and these codes grouped into themes, presented in 
section 4.5 of the previous chapter. These themes differ from Storey's (1994) 
who conceptualised three themes in quantitative research of SNIEs: the 
manager, strategy and location, noted in section 2.2. Our codes contained 
categories, however, that would not fit these three themes, in particular the 
important issue of control - where advisors mentioned planning, having a 
conservative financial policy, the quality of financial data, and the layout of the 
production process. Although some factors might have fit into the strategy 
theme, many including debt collection did not fit into strategy. Control became 
a distinctive theme emphasised by the advisors interviewed for the qualitative 
part of the study. Moreover, the advisors concerned with survival, bank 
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managers, often mentioned that concept of control and, probably because of 
their background, financial control. Advisors from a less risk-averse 
background, such as a marketing executive at a university link to SMEs tended 
to emphasise the elements more associated with strategy, like for example new 
product development, adaptability and keeping pace with technology. Start-up 
counsellors referred to market research, to identify that there is room in the 
market, knowing competitors and barriers to entry. 71hus these two themes 
were conceptually different. Strategy looks outward- to new opportunities, 
technologies, and markets. Control looks inward - collecting debts, ensuring a 
smooth flow of materials through a factory. 
The research suggests two firm level concepts: strategy and control. Strategy 
involves the search for custom. Its theoretical base is within the domain of 
marketin& and marketing concepts are the key to understanding this area. For 
control, the search is for cash and financial stability. Its theoretical parent is 
finance and the programme most useful would be a crash course on the use of 
financial information for decision-makin& with particular emphasis on break- 
even points, and their reduction (Warnes, 1984). A second element to control 
concerns the production process - tidiness, shows control in the physical 
environment. Strategy and control may be in conflict, and good managers 
manage this conflict. 
The theme of the owner-manager completes the three themes. Advisors often 
mentioned such terms as vision, honesty, prior experience, marketing skills and 
determination. In addition, advisors noted that the firm behaved like an 
individual. A PBA recounted that the introductory course at Durham 
University focused on the peculiar nature of owner-managers. A technology 
adviser recounted that '.. tbere isn't trally, a stereoýpical coVag' The owner- 
manager$s role is particularly important in the smallest firms. One issue was to 
consider whether to separate culture from the theme of the owner-manager. 
Both culture and the owner-manager conflate because the inter-linkages were 
particularly strong. Within the small firm the owner-manager sets and maintains 
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the culture. An IIP assessor from a Training and Enterprise Council 
commented: 
... it affects the rbole culturr really. Tbatr wby, just for exaVle, if an 
gnised as oqanisafion basgot Investor in People and has recently been reco 
an Investor in People, if there's a huge structural chang at the to p, or the 
chief ewerufivegoes; it my be that the assessor who got their recognifion 
xant to go in againjust to check that it's not changed, because tbg have a 
bqe inAence reagv on the way thiqs work- 
Ibus the model developed contained three elements: owner-manager, strategy 
and control. 
The three elements differ from Storey (1994). One might argue that Storey 
conceptualised these three elements to organise a chapter on the growth of the 
firm, rather than posited that they captured the factors required for firm 
growth, nonetheless our three factors differ. The research corroborates the 
importance of the owner-manager and the strategy pursued by the owner. 
Additionally, there is a damping factor in our conception lacking in 
econometric studies. Obviously the researcher's methods make a difference in 
the way that researchers imagine small firms. Econometric studies measure 
observable numeric data. Afore qualitative methods make it easier to represent 
the firm as a system. 
The systems approach to the firm is advantageous. First, the systems approach 
models the firm as a single entity. The firm might emphasise different factors 
depending upon its growth-orientation or its available resources. 1hus, the firm 
that has a cash stockpile might emphasise a strategy to increase its customer 
base. The systems' approach demonstrates the knock-on effect on other 
factors. In fact, in the model the chain of causation might have run from the 
cash stockpile to a more growth-orientation of the owner-manager to the 
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change in strategy that in turn affects the control. The systems approach 
demonstrates that all-important balance of the firm referred to by one of the 
PBA managers. 
Secondly, the systems approach explains why a better-managed company has 
control. Since, management writers from F. W. Taylor onwards have 
emphasised manager's control it might be thought obvious that a controlled 
firm is managed better. The systems model demonstrates that the firm 
becomes self-regulating once the firm incorporates control within its internal 
management system. A control function incorporates a negative feedback 
element that damps oscillations. The controlled firm has immunity from the 
wild swings associated with a firm subject to undamped oscillations. Therefore, 
the control element functions like a thermostat that regulates the temperature 
to keep the engine running smoothly. Systems theories, long used in 
engineering, explain the order within the firm. Moreover, they do so in a 
dynamic rather than static model. 
Thus the research replaces Storey's three themes of owner-manager, strategy 
and location with a dynamic self-regulating system that incorporates the owner- 
manager, strategy and control. 
The model involves potential tension between the strategy and control. The 
owner-manager has to balance the conflicting demands within the internal 
management. Likewise, Hughes' (1998) conclusions matched this dual internal 
control and outward strategy processes in firms that sustained growth. 
Consistently growing firms developed their internal resources; yet expanded the 
capabilities of their workforce. Consistently growing firms monitored and 
managed closely internal operations; yet broadened their product and customer 
base. Consistently growing firms specified their markets: yet broadened their 
market opportunities. These two elements must be managed and harnessed 
toward the firm's objectives, which Hughes (1998) research on growth 
constraints in sustained and not sustained growth SMEs, and the research 
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presented here suggests. One can depict the owner-managers as driving a two- 
horse chariot ensuring the harness keeps the horses working together. 
Nonetheless, clearly business advisors believe that the management capability is the 
key to the development of the firm. 1hus, the research here built upon the research 
interviews to build a model incorporating feedback. The feedback model 
developed emphasised three key areas of a firm that make for good 
management the owner-manager's visions and leadership, the firm's strategy 
and the degree of control evident in the business. These three elements then 
were modelled in figure 13, reproduced here. 




Dashed lines indicate the 
(lack of )congruity 
that produce error signals 
The questionnaire attempts to confirm or refute the model presented of PBA's 
heuristics. As a fairly esoteric model one way to approach the problem is to 
consider the evidence for and against the model contained within the 
questionnaire. Miat is there are those questions where responses can falsify the 
heuristic model, and the evidence supporting the model must be weighed 
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against contrasting evidence. Given the responses fail to deliver a knock out 
blow to the heuristic model the evidence to support the model is then 
marshalled. One can suggest a hierarchy of three levels of the model. 
1. That business advisors seek to identify control within a business 
2. That business advisors seek managerial control as a feedback loop 
3. That business advisors seek congruence between objectives, strategy and 
control 
4. That the way advisors work is to identify error signals 
First, then the falsifying evidence. 
At the 15th national small firms policy and research conference held in 
Southampton (Chittenden et al., 1993) Storey (1993) called for a policy to 
target support on growth businesses. Smallbone et al. (1993) argued that a gap 
existed for consultancy within small firms. From these discussions one can 
identify the seeds of the remit of Business Links and the role. Indeed Storey 
even gave some advice regarding recruitment when he said: 'this expertise uill only 
be atdlable amongtJonver or cumnt business oivnen or senior managen aitb operafional 
aperience'(1993: 24). Business Links took this advice. PBAs prior experience is 
usually as a managing director or manager of a firm, with a number drawn from 
business planning. 1he PBAs certainly did have a wealth of experience; many 
had academic qualifications too. Out of the 175 PBAs responding 108 had 
degrees of one sort or another. 123 had professional qualifications. Among 
those with professional qualifications the 33 had financial qualifications such as 
the Institute of Bankers, or chartered accountants; 22 had institute of 
marketing qualifications and there were 20 chartered engineers. Ibis seems to 
fit quite well with the demand for Business Link services. 
Generally PBAs felt that their training was effective. There has been some 
discussion about the effectiveness of training for owner-managers with many 
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commentators and acaden-ks, including David Storey, being fairly sceptical 
about its usefulness. The chi-squared crosstabs test did suggest hat the more 
training a PBAs received the more effective they felt the training to be. Ibis 
does not suggest causality. The questionnaire covered the training issue 
superficially. PBAs were assigned to different groups by judgement. The 
standard of a DUBS course was set at one. There is, however, an interesting 
issue here about the relationship between the amount of training and its 
effectiveness. Is training for PBAs cumulative? Agar and Moran (1995) believed 
that training was enhanced by professional development over an extended 
period in peer groups. 
Trainines power to develop management within small business is hotly 
debated. Many assert the ability of training to develop managers (for example 
CBIJI 1993); whereas others fail to distinguish the link between training and 
small business management. More innovative methods to deliver training have 
been pioneered such as the Norfolk Small Business initiative supported by 
banks with some success in terms of response (Cushion, 1997). Perhaps 
researchers ought to distinguish between training and mentoring on an on 
going basis (as happened at PBA! s courses). 
In chapter 2 prior research concerned the process of decision-making under 
uncertain conditions. Kahnemann and Tversky (1974) suggested that people 
use sets of heuristic devices to short cut and simplify problems. Kruglanski 
suggested all decision-making involves some inference rules that are a 
consequence of human processing. 'Me questions about the PBA! s task 
uncovered their view of the task of providing business advice. Chapter 2 
suggested that the PBAs task required judgement. It is an example of decision- 
making under uncertainty. Certainly the PBAs response suggests they see their 
job as intuitive. 'Ibis supports Clarke et al's point that intuition, in combination 
with normative decision analysis delivers a powerful combination. PBAs also 
see the task as both intuitive and methodical, and neither simple nor complex. 
One explanation of this is that the methods used by PBAs simplified a complex 
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task - heuristically. Ibus the task is short cut through the heuristic devices 
suggested by Kahnemann and Tversky. Many though the job to be both 
intuitive and methodical, they applied their experience in an informal and non- 
routine way. All of these demonstrate the conditions for the necessary heuristic 
methodology adopted by advisors. 
Given that this is the case, are there biases inherent in the way PBAs operate? 
They key problem might be disregarding Kruglanski's known base-rate data: 
known fundamental data surrounding the survival and growth of SMEs. There 
may be some evidence for this is in the perception by PBAs about sectors. 
There is evidence for this, in part due to the generalist role of the PBAs. The 
PBAs believe that the sector is 'somewbat not i? Vortant. Base-rate evidence would 
suggest that the sector is crucially important to explain survival and growth of 
the firm. However, for our PBAs the sector is unimportant, whilst good 
management is all important. Of course this reflects their job. 
The questionnaire draws out falsifying evidence asking support for statements 
suggesting businesses control managers, that business is all down to luck, that 
poorly managed firms often prosper and that success in business is largely a 
case of being at the right place at the right time. The business advisors' views 
about small business presented following table 36 and were indexed in table 37. 
Now one can reasonably argue that no PBA is likely to agree to these set of 
statements, thus these statements do not falsify the model, however, they do 
not really give it much support either. From this table the index of agreements 
for statements falsifying the heuristic model shown in table 41. 
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Table 41 Agreement to Small Business Views 
Question Index of PBA 
2Eeement 
Even poorly organised firms often prosper. 29 
Success in small business is largely a case of being in -34 
the right place at the right time. 
Businesses control managers; managers do not -115 
control businesses 
Ies all down to luck. -147 
The first level of evidence demonstrates PBAs concern for control. If control 
is important then PBAs should agree that businesses with clear financial 
control systems are more likely to survive, and that a significant number of 
small businesses fail because management lack financial competence. I'lie 
results from table 37 support this view. Moreover in table 38, the top three 
causes of business failure were, poor debtor control or bad debts, a lack of 
management capability and over-trading all of which reinforce the need for 
control. 'Ibis view is in accord with research findings on reasons for business 
failure (Hall, 1995; Baldwin, et al., 1997) There is evidence that advisors look 
for control and therefore evidence for our weak heuristic model. 
Evidence for the second level of the heuristic model requires business advisors 
to agree to statements about the nature of a well-managed firm. In particular, 
two statements asked PBAs to agree that setting goals, planning and evaluating 
progress is the hallmark of a well-managed firm. Moreover, the business 
advisors were asked to concur with the statement: 'agreement between the 
firms' objectives and its operations indicate good management'. These two 
statements about the nature of good management go to the heart of the 
heuristic model. If PBAs disagree with these statements then that would refute 
the model. But PBAs overwhelmingly agreed with our conjecture about good 
management hat conforms to our model. Table 41 shows those statements 
most important to confirm the model and their index of agreement. The index 
of agreement shows compelling support for the indications of good 
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management setting goals, planning, and evaluation, and coherence between 
objectives and operations. 
The index over 100 indicates that a net 57% of respondents agreed. The 
support for formal business plans is an example, where the net score is 80, that 
shows a net 46% in agreement. 'Ibis translates into raw data where out of 175 
responses 41 (23.4%) strongly agreed, 63 (369/6) agreed, 47 (26.8%) neither 
agreed nor disagreed, 22 (12.6%) disagreed, and 2 (1.1%) strongly disagreed, 
indicating a high level of support. Given no a priori comparison between two 
groups we cannot statistically crunch the data and report these as the index. 
Nevertheless, it does provide support for the heuristic model of business. The 
apparent conflict between a score of 164 for setting goals, planning and 
evaluating progress and the score of 80 for good businesses having formal 
business plans reflects a view of planning as an active process. Yet caution 
about formal plans is reflected in the statement by a PBA manager: Y mean a lot 
of small cotVanies migbt bamproduced a business plan thrreyean a lle dust , go and 
it's co ain ,g 
in the corner of the ofice somewherr. 
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Table 42 Altemative Hypothesis aad PBA! s Views 
Question Index of PBA 
agreement 
Setting goals, planning and evaluating progress is the 164 
hallmark of a well-managed firm. 
Agreement between the firms' objectives and its 153 
operations indicate good management. 
Businesses with clear financial control systems are 147 
more likely to survive 
A significant number of small businesses fail because 143 
management lack financial competence 
Finance is more readily available for well-managed 120 
firms. 
Successful small business managers know the 116 
strengths and weaknesses of their competitors. 
Good businesses have formal business plans. 80 
The evidence from table 42 suggests that: 
1. a feedback process whereby goals, planning and evaluation are thought to 
be the haRmark of good management 
congruence between the fmn's objectives and its operations indicates good 
managemmt 
financial control and competence are necessary for survival. 
All these statements are not inconsistent with the model of internal firm 
management presented in figure 7. The survey did enable PBAs to falsify the 
control feedback model and they did not. 
Ihe response to business fAure accords with the research of business failure in 
Canada (Baldwin et al., 1997) and generally in Storey (1994). Businesses fail 
because they run out of cash, or bank credit. 'Ibis is largely due to the lack of 
control and particularly fmancial control within the business. 1hus the ranking 
of answers about the causes of business failure accords with the research on 
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the topic. It may also suggest therefore, that PBAs are well aware of the base- 
rate evidence. 1hus PBAs concern about control issues reflects their concerns 
to prevent business fAure. It may also reflect their experience. How many of 
the PBAs were involved in a business failure was a question deemed too 
sensitive to ask on the questionnaire. Also noted is the strong emphasis PBAs 
place on reducing risk. PBAs with, perhaps, experiences of business failure are 
not therefore going to be heavy promoters of increased risk-taking behaviour. 
Thus there would seem to be a question mark here about the policy to target 
essentially risk reducing advice, at potentially fast growing firms. 
Table 39 ranks the factors that PBAs considered best explained SME growth. 
PBA respondents rated the ability to develop new markets and spot new 
opportunities as the key factors for business growth. These abilities to exploit 
new opportunities and markets are skills often attributed to entrepreneurs 
(Chell et al., 1991). Moreover, PBAs growth factors seem opportunistic rather 
than a result of long-term business planning, ranked seven, and good market 
research, ranked ninth. Thus the tasks that PBAs deem important for their 
diagnosis may indeed be inappropriate to promote growth. It may be that 
PBAs see growth -orientated entrepreneurs as 'begotten not made' one 
inference included in the personality trait approach. Ibis suggests that growing 
firms are different to surviving firms. Their emphasis is much more evident on 
the leadership and competitive strategy rather than control. Yet we have seen 
that many firms fold in a growth phase when they experience the 'Death Valley 
curve' (Warnes, 1984). The ability to improve productivity comes in tenth in 
the list. 'Ibis contradicts the usual competitive microeconomic result whereby 
more efficient firms out-compete the others (see any economics text from 
Smith, 1774). In addition, high profit margins another factor economists 
usually associate with growth is fourteenth on the Est. Thus the improvements 
in efficiency, debtor control and profitability appear relatively low on the list of 
factors for growing firms. Moves into new opportunities, suggesting fleetness 
of foot, is seen as key. 'Ibis control assures small firm survival; growth is 
entrepreneurial. PBAs have swallowed the trait approach to growth. The 
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difficulty with this is that traits are immutable. Ihere is nothing for the PBA to 
do, the owner is either an 'entrepreneu? or he or she is not. Again the message 
is that PBAs arc unlikely to champion growth in their clients. 
The management functions calls again into question the appropriateness of 
Storey's themes of location, owner-manager and strategy as the explanation of 
SME growth. The unit of analysis is slightly different. Storey attempted to 
explain the growth of firms across different sectors including locations, 
whereas this research takes the unit as the management of the firm. Business 
advisors seek to improve this management. 
Moreover, business advisors appeared able to identify tasks with managerial 
facets. Table 40 reported the responses to the question about which area 
managerial tasks such as debt collection belonged. The responses were again 
overwhelming, except for the case of changing business direction that made it 
into function of both leadership and strategy. 
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T2ble 43 Management Activities and Functions 
Function Leadershi2 Strategy Control 
Activity Co-ordinating Researching the Managing stock levels 
market 
Directing purpose Raising finance Managing cash 
Developing vision Setting clear targets Chasing debts 
Setting clear Setting prices Producing 
targets management 
accounts 
Changing business Knowledge of 
direction competition 
Motivating staff Changing business 
direction 
Ibis table gave me a shock of recognition that Dukes (1984) calls a "eureka 
factor". Ibe table does seem to explain the questions that bank managers ask 
of their clients. Although some of the functions such as setting clear targets do 
crossover two functions the process appeared to have an at times remarkable 
degree of unanimity, for example 165 responded that producing management 
accounts was an element of control. Now if you are looking to examine 
whether a firm is under control you have a clear message here look for debt 
levels, the speed and frequency of management accounts, level of cash and 
stocks. Again looking for leadership in a company the most important thing is 
to look for is staff motivation. Ihis is why when the advisors responded to the 
research interview prompts they said they looked for how motivated the staff 
look. This is not only important for its own sake, it is a proxy measure for the 
leadership shown by management in the company. Similarly, for strategy does 
the management know the market? These are the questions that the research 
interviewees posed to the management's that they talked to, what they are 
doing then fits in with the model. Or rather the model of heuristics' fits nicely 
as an explanation of what it is that advisors do when they assess the problems 
facing a company. This may be a powerful piece of positive evidence for the 
control feedback model of SME performance. 
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What the responses to this question do not do, however, is to show whether 
the fimctions of leadership, strategy and control are congruent. For that the 
responses to views on management research have to suffice. 1hus the views 
about management function do provide more evidence for the different 
management triad uncovered by our research when compared to the research 
summarised in Storey, for example. 
The allocation of management functions to activities yields a rather different 
set of factors for 'good managemene than that accepted by Storey (1994). In 
particular, control within businesses demonstrates a concern for the processes 
within business. The methodology enables themes to be revealed that would 
not ordinarily be mentioned in the literature. These factors are different from 
the factors mentioned by Storey (1994). 
5.3 Conclusions about the research problem 
The research focused on business advice to small firms. Although there is 
much research on the characteristics of more 'successful' firms, there is with 
some exceptions much less of a body of knowledge concerning how less 
successful firms become more successful, however you define success. Calls for 
advisors to concentrate on advising firms with the potential for fast growth 
implicitly assume that (a) this can be done and that (b) there is a body of 
knowledge which to refer. Ibis study aimed to add to this body of knowledge 
but did so by engagement with practitioners. 'Ibus the research focused on the 
ways in which the business advisors can attempt to help facilitate the move of a 
firm from a less successful' to a cmore successful' entity. Moreover, those who 
are attempting to regulate organisations need a model of that organisation 
(Beer, 1979). Given the unsuitability of much academic research as an 
explanation of the way in which advisors can assist firms to improve their 
performance, then advisors will fall back on experience. And experience will 
simplify a complex task through heuristics. What the research focussed on was 
this model. Ihis research suggests that the approach taken by business advice 
practitioners is based upon heuristic devices. 'Ibis means that there is a clash 
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between this type of learning and the academic literature in the area. Models 
were treated with something approaching disdain: There is no model that I see and 
, grow, 
bnn con rm the &passjou out all these tbings uitb modelsfor successful tad o-one 7fo s to 
that model Consequently, advisors dismiss small business models or see them as 
for the inexperienced: 
We work to a structure and the structurr we use a mnemonic, whicb is omr 
tbejearTbecomes embedded 6ke a siRcon cbO in-Your brain sort of thiýg 
The mnemonic ae use is called PARSERS [spelt it out] and eacb of those 
letters rrlates to a section, and I tbink xbat it vould be best to do is if I 
drrv itforjou because I tbink this takes me back to this trdniýg I was 
,g about. 
(Bank Afana ger) talkin 
The models might in themselves be useful, but they are at a level of 
generalisation, whereas advisers are dealing with individual instances. For 
example, firms that export are faster growing companies but translating that 
back into advice for a specific firm is more difficult. Can you advise all firms to 
export or die? 'Mus business advice is based upon advisors experience in the 
small firm sector, reflected in heuristics. 
The heuristic approach to business advice then uses signals of well being and 
good management to indicate not so much business health but that the 
business is well managed. It is important for the advisors that the management 
is good; the health of the sector is considered less important. 
Advisors are sector-blind. The -agreement index showed 173 for the statement: 
good management is good management; no matter what sector the company is 
in, and -138 for the statement success depends more upon the sector that the 
firm is in; rather than the quality of the management. Although advisers' clients 
might be not so sector-blind, this sector-blindness gives a fiwther impetus to 
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the heuristic search for generic indicators of good management within bespoke 
businesses. 
The indications of good management come down to the presence of a self- 
regulating control feedback model and congruent relationship between 
objectives, strategy and control within the business. Thus PBAs felt that the 
most important cause of business failure was poor debtor control, followed by 
a lack of management capability ranking higher even than lack of demand. 'Ibis 
concentrates on internal failure, which is understandable given the PBAs role. 
Business growth on the other hand came down to the ability to develop new 
markets, to spot new opportunities, increase demand and bring new products 
to market. The latter is interesting. Advisors believe that new products are 
important for business growth but not for survival. They also believe the ability 
to develop new markets is crucial but market research is not. Views regarding 
survival and growth do not correspond despite evidence that growing firms are 
more likely to survive. 
Views surrounding survival and growth are yet not the whole story. Heuristics 
such as tidiness, seen as evidence of good housekeeping were not asked in the 
questionnaire and perhaps should have been. Nevertheless the control 
feedback model does appear to explain the research issue. 
Now consider the methodology of management assessment using error signals. 
The use of error signals is 'one step back% it describes the way in which PBAs 
make assessments. The idea that business advisors use error signals in their 
assessments of the presence of self-regulation within the firm, was investigated 
by re-coding the interviews with PBAs. The results of this can be seen in table 
26. Ibis does seem to show that the idea has merit. Business planning might 
indicate congruence between strategy and control. Advisors complaints about 
the lack of business planning were very evident throughout the research. 
Moreover, the qualifies associated with vision pointed out by advisors can be 
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seen most clearly as a positive signal that the owner-manager has objectives 
that they pursue congruently. 
Moreover, the model represents capable internal management. As such the 
business advisors, from whom the model derives, agreed with Penrose and the 
resource-based theory of the firm that capable management was key; in doing 
so. they took account of the evidence of new firm failure (Hall, 1995; Baldwin 
et al, 1997) It is debatable whether the business advisors had ever heard of the 
resource-based theory of the firm, although I would expect that they had heard 
of Edith Penrose; that they have come to similar conclusions, that management 
capability and development is the key to small firm success is perhaps all the 
more remarkable. The business advisors tended to describe themselves as 
practical rather than theoretical. Indeed the ten PBAs interviewed dismissed 
theory as 'qf&t1epra&ca1 use. Nonetheless, they may be theoretical; just not 
exposed to the most relevant theory. The business advisors certainly saw 
capable management as the key to growth, which accords with resource-based 
theories of the firm. 
Resource-based theories of the firm argue that the challenges faced by the firm 
and its management develop competence (Gamsey, 1996). Thus, Garnsey 
believes that the start-up firm meets the first challenge to raise finance before 
any other challenge. Competent management enables the firm to grow, where 
it meets fin-ther challenges. The results of the research establish business 
advisors' preoccupation to verify that the firm's management is competent. 
The responses of the interviewees and the questionnaire responses all lead to 
the conclusion that the major emphasis of business advisors is to enhance or 
ensure management capability. To re-iterate the words of an interviewee 
employed by a bank 'if you go and took at tbegood, sucresýful small and me&um shZed 
enterprises, and ana#sed all the trally, the &fferrnt a0ects, I tbinkyou rouldprobabyl bave 
to pin point to the fact that the Ming in common mas good management. ' The 
questionnaire responses confirmed these sentiments. The index of agreement 
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totalled 143 with the statement- A significant number of small businesses fail 
because management lack financial competence. Respondents overwhelmingly 
disagreed with the statement equating success 'With sector rather than 
management quality. The index of agreement tallied -138 with the statement: 
Success depends more upon the sector that the firm is in; rather than the 
quality of the management. Now the advisors could, in the latter case, have 
expressed views about the sector rather than management quality. After all, 
evidence suggests that rapidly growing sectors also exhibit high death rates for 
small firms (Birley, 1986). The index of agreement reached 173, however, for 
the statement: good management is good management; no matter what sector 
the company is in. The lack of management capability ranked second as a cause 
of business fAure, a factor other researchers recognise (Hall, 1995, Baldwin et 
al., 1997). In addition, the seventh ranked cause of business failure was lack of 
managerial skills according to personal business advisors. Personal business 
advisors credit management capability with at least reducing the risk of a failing 
business. 
The emphasis on management capability from these responses does seem to be 
associated less with the growth of the firm and more with firm survival. 'Ibis is 
interesting. Penrose (1959) developed a theory of thegrowtb of the firm (my 
italics). Resource-based theories often examine the growth of the small firm 
(for example Garnsey, 1996). Personal business advisors seem to associate 
management competence and capability with firm survival; not growth. 
Why would personal business advisors associate management capability with 
firm survival, rather than growth? It may be that their focus is on firm survival 
rather than growth. Certainly, with the high number of failing firms bank 
managers hould be more concerned with failure than growth, despite evidence 
that associates growth with survival (Smallbone et aL 1993). And the high 
numbers of failing urban firms (Keeble, Walker and Robson, 1993) might 
concentrate advisors' attention on firm survival. Business Links Personal 
Business Advisors remit requires them to help fwms to grow, however. The 
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unanimity between interview responses and questionnaire responses suggested 
that either PBAs are not concerned with growth, or management capability had 
more to do with survival, than growth. The thesis explores the first reason 
later. The second reason that management capability is associated with survival 
not growth seems interesting. 
It might be that PBAs believe that the size of the market dictates the firm's 
ability to grow, in the short-term at least that is given. Management capability 
would dictate; therefore, small firm success subject to the growth and size of 
their market. Some commentators argue that survival in small businesses that 
are in inhospitable environments such as businesses serving the black 
community take every bit as capable a management as growth in a favoured 
climate (Ram, 1993). 71hen again, Birley's (1986) research suggests even fair 
weather sectors display high firm 'chumine- many firms are born but many 
die. The PBA questionnaire respondents ranked lack of demand fifth as a 
cause of business failure and ranked increases in demand for the product or 
services third as a cause of business growth (tables 38,39). 'Ibus market 
conditions may explain some of the difference between growth and survival. 
But the firm's management can make a difference to their markets. They do 
not need to passively accept the changes to demand. If the firm is to do this, 
however, it must change its opportunities. Table 39 highlights the key strategy 
and marketing roles in growing small firms: the ability to develop new markets, 
the ability to spot new opportunities, and the ability to bring new products to 
market ranked 1.2 and 4 respectively as important causes of business growth. 
Firms and their management can expand their opportunities. 
The expansion of firms' opportunities brings the argument back to the dual 
'schizophrenic' nature of small firms whereby firms both pursue expanded 
opportunities and tightly control internal operations and fmance (Hughes, 
1998). Certainly, PBAs are aware of the need to develop new markets, products 
and opportunities; yet. seem to on-& the connection between these outward- 
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looking activities and management capability. Advisors may distinguish between 
capable management and what they might consider opportunism. Advisors 
distinguish, perhaps, between capability and entrepreneurship. 
Researchers have distinguished between entrepreneurs and caretakers as types 
of managers. Stokes (1995) suggests a range of entrepreneurial personalities 
ranging from passivc, low growth 'isolationists' to opportunistic 'classical 
entrepreneurs'. Indeed our interviewecs suggested the need for different kinds 
of management as the number of employees increased. And this has influenced 
those training PBAs. Agar (1994) suggested that those firms with ten to thirty 
employees must develop a balanced management team. The popular image of 
the entrepreneur, however, is much more about an opportunistic approach to 
business. The entreneur is a buccaneering hero providing the right product at 
the right time but with little back up or organisation. Some have seen this 
character as a visionary who persuades others to follow- with the money 
(Schumpeter, 1976; Chell, 1991). 
The personality trait approach to small business research abates any attempt to 
teach the outward-lookin& opportunistic, entrepreneurial elements, which 
many associate with growing businesses. Ibe trait idea posits the implication 
that personality is unchanging. Although researchers have impugned the trait 
approach both in psychology (Hampson, 1988) and within small business 
research (Cooper, 1995) the approach lives on in courses. Even if the courses 
suggest that small business people's personalities are found 'at both tails of 
distribution' our interviewees mentioned personality and the trait approach. 
'Ibc implication is that the outward-orientated approach requires an outward- 
oriented personality- something immune to teaching. 'Ibus, like the erstwhile 
British view of footballers, entrepreneurs are begotten; not made. 
Business advisors concentrate on overtrading problems because Garnsey's 
(1996) growth reversals cause difficulties. Gamsey argues that the growth of the 
firm depends upon the differences in the growth-enhancing system dynamics 
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and the growth -constraining system dynamics. PBAs might concentrate on 
mitigating growth reversal dynamics. 'Ibus, the emphasis on control and 
internal monitoring not only reflects the prior knowledge of business failure 
but reflects the experience of growth reversals. 
Fluctuations, bottlenecks and shortages characterise growth reversals (Gamsey, 
1996). At the growth plateau, employee motivation declines when individuals direct 
influence on outcomes wanes or staff 'bum-oue (Kotter and Sathe, 1978). With the 
increased firm size, firms become complex. Firms consolidate, after they employ, 
say, fifty people (Churchill and Lewis, 1983; Agar, 1994) and managing a complex 
organisation slows decision-making. Penrose (1959) believed that the key growth 
constraint is the managers' difficulty in managing a complex organization. Rapid 
growth constraints can build steadily as a niche market is saturated and the growth 
in orders slows. Uncertainty favours firms that enthusiastically adopt best practice 
and survey markets and technologies (reece and Pisano, 1994). On other occasions 
the reversals can occur suddenly. Writing from a financial perspective, Warnes 
(1984) characterises rapidly growing firrris going through the 'Death Valley curve' 
where cash haemorrhages from the company. 'Ibus, growth reversals result from 
growth. 
Paradoxically, then PBAs by reducing the firms emphasis on fast growth might 
reduce the likelihood of growth reversals. When the PBA concentrates on the lack 
of control within a business she or he attends to the factors that can cause a growth 
reversal. Vben the PBA counsels against growing too fast they echo Penrose and 
the resource based theory of the firm: And the one tbgfall domm on most isn't the Mong. 
It isn't the men. It isn ý the marka It's the mana , gement that 
Mgfill on sofrequený, Iy' (PBA). 
Of course, one might take this too far and throw away growth for fear of growth 
reversals. Yet one of the implications of the resource-based theories is that growth 
challenges management Only through growing the firm can the management 
develop the competence and capabilities to deal with the issues surrounding 
growth. 
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moreover, this anti-growth reversal view would not condone PBA! s reluctance to 
help firms to attack new markets, adopt new practices and technologies that augurs 
badly for their impact on growth. Perhaps, the generic nature of the PBA service 
mitigates against specific marketing advice. The firm, aware of developments in 
their marketý might have much more information than the PBA. Ny""hereas for a 
generic PBA switching from one set of financial figures to another, or switching 
from the one floor layout to another, may involve relatively light information 
requirements, witching from one sub-mark-et to another requires a gamut of prior 
knowledge. So much so that it is the highest ranked requirement for banks to assess 
a lending proposition (Fletcher, 1996). Banks understand the sector-specific nature 
of firm knowledge. The expense of the PBA service, however, precludes it being 
sector-specific thus commentators have favoured generalists (Agar, 1994). 
1herefore, the institutional nature of the PBA service, and its expense constrains 
their ability to promote growth to small businesses. 
The PBA service is expensive (Bennett, 1995). Although many small and 
medium sized businesses want sector-specific advice the PBAs are generalists. 
Agar (1994) argued that generalists avoid doling out the sector received 
wisdom. Yet in routinized sectors that have accepted ways of doing things 
(Audretsch, 1995) this might be just what small businesses need. The real 
problem with sector specific PBAs is that of cost. Business Links would have 
to specialise into sectors, where they believed the returns to advice would yield 
the most benefits. Local business cliques (involved in Business Link boards) 
lack the knowledge to make such a decision (Peck, 1995). Moreover, the 
decision would fragment the representatives of local capital because a favoured 
sector would result (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1998). The structural context 
limits the policy options. 
The client group that PBAs see may require survivalist advice. More successful 
entrepreneurs might reason that they had little to gain from Business Link. 
Indeed, it is not always clear that managers of rapidly growing companies need 
advice (Bryson, Churchward and Daniels, 1997). Government sent mixed 
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messages whereby they wanted PBAs to concentrate on growing firms, yet 
introduced quantitative performance indicators; moreover, few Business Links 
target (Deakins, 1996). The group of ten PBAs explained the process through 
which they met clients thus: 
It depends on a-bether it isfrom the tele-sales team or not. if a co)jag 
calls in herr aitb a spedficpmblem then the customer senice team mg or 
mg not. It depends ... You see a lot of c§ents that don't vant to e. %pand. 
It's a kfe4le business. The coVaniesprvbabylgot aperrdtedproblem or 
apenvived ky issue ... once the conivnadon and baivgot the work it often 
jpaxns sometbing. You btdId a pidurr of ahat is ad=4 bappening, and 
ahat the actual ky issues arr. and tbenjou take itfram tberr. (PRA 
GMIP) 
1bus, PBAs often saw whoever came to them or tele-sales leads. And 
researchers noted the scepticism of the targeting policy among PBAs (Agar, 
1994; Agar and Witzel, 1994; Bryson, Churchward and Daniels, 1997). Finns 
experiencing growth reversals or declines may require risk-averse advice. 
Indeed the emphasis on control rather than growth might reflect the PBA! s 
client list. 
However researchers explain it, because advisors reduce the risk of growth 
reversals, because advisors know the risk of bankruptcy, because the 
institutional nature of their position hampers growth, PBAs advocate growth 
measures reluctantly. 
PBAs risk-averse policies may enhance development locally. Keeble, XWalker 
and Robson (1993) suggested that urban areas suffered from high firm deaths. 
Human population rises result from improved homes and factories that caused 
lower death rates rather than increasing births. Similarly, lower firm mortality 
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would increase their number, moreover, enterprise agencies effect such a lower 
firm mortality (Keeble, Walker and Robson, 1993). 'Ibus PBAs risk-averse 
policies may augment firm numbers within their areas. 
Increased firms numbers tends to swell territorial riches. First, the enlarged 
pool of firms upon which Hannan and Freeman's (1989) selection processes 
would operate will select more adapted firms. Second, some debate that the 
smallest firms create more jobs and growth fastest (Daly, 1995; Hart and 
Oulton, 1996). 'Ibird, the richest area of the UK is characterised by a very high 
number of firms and a high percentage of the firms with less than five 
employees. Fourth, international research associates firm numbers and 
economic growth: 
#namism and Vid economic the conjimcdon f intense ntnpreneurial q 
, gly , grortb - coupled mitb 
low uneVlojment and low iqy7afion - seemin 
points to on# one conckision. - entirptrneunbo fuels economic gmwtb, 
arafing eVýymemt andprv4)erity (Rynolds, Hay and CaV, 1999: 7). 
Although, Reynolds, Hay and Camp (1999) correlate business start-ups with 
economic growth, rather than the number of firms., they claim that the levels 
of entrepreneurial activity determine economic success. 
Chapter five presented the conclusions about the research question. It 
furnished evidence in support of the heuristically derived model of business 
support, presented in chapter four. In particular, the results show evidence for 
the model of internal management, based on the owner-manager, their strategy 
and the degree of control exercised within the firm. In addition, some evidence 
for the idea that advisors seek congruence within a business was presented. The 
next chapter discusses the implications for practice and theory. 
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Cbapter Six 
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
6.1 Introduction 
The final chapter in the thesis is a re-statement of the previous chapters, to 
help clarify the thesis, to clarify the argument, and surnmarise the last five 
chapters. The thesis has considered the area of business support to small 
business in the UK, an important area of public policy, and one that has 
undergone a change of emphasis in the last ten years, from blanketed support 
to all small businesses, to targeted support for those with growth potential. 
Switching support recognised that small businesses create jobs unevenly. Few 
firms create many jobs. The recognition that a few fast growing firms create 
the lions share of jobs, however, does not simply suggests that switching 
resources will maximise the efficiency of business support in terms of jobs 
created. The new policy has to engage with the conditions within these fast 
growing firms and the policy has to facilitate their growth and job creation. The 
thesis reveals that business advisors derive their own theory from their 
experience, and that this theory is concerned with the internal management of 
the firm, which reflects the factors that cause business failure rather than the 
factors that accelerate growth. 
The sections that follow answer several crucial questions for a piece of research. In 
turn, the final chapter responds to the following. what was the research question? 
XXby is the research question important? Wiat have I found? My are the findings 
important) NXIiat claim has the research to validity, why so? And finally, why now? 
In response, to these questions it is hoped that the chapter clarifies the contribution 
to knowledge within the thesis. Firstý the research question. 
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The broad arm of the researdi is UK business support to small businesses. The 
research recognisý that small businesses make a vital and increasing contribution 
to advanced industrialised economies, but that not all SNIEs make this contribution. 
Some STNIEs contribute more than others. The consequence of this stylised fact is 
that some influential academics, Eke David Storey and David Smallbone argued for 
a switch in business support to a tarýted approach. If 1-in-10 businesses are those 
that create prosperity, then let the government support the 1-in-10. The other side 
of the existing policy was that 90% of existing business support was wasted. The 
argument may have looked like a return to the picking winners approach but in 
essence itwas not. Storey's and Smallbon6s advice was to ignore start-ups because 
within three years 7-in-10 would have become bankrupt. 1hus, if the government 
merely withdrew from support to start-up businesses that would improve the 
efficiency of business support. But how to put the targeted policy into practice? 
6.2 Targeted Support 
The targeted policy came along at the right time. Michael Heseltine rationalised the 
conhised myriad of UK business support into one-stop-shops, later re-branded as 
Business Links. Thus, a fresh policy start was taking place and the new idea to target 
support could be built into the new edifice of business support. In public policy 
terms this reflects the policy streams approach to policy making, a variant of the 
general muddling through policy making style (Lindbloom, 1960) 1hus, Business 
Links needed a policy, fi-esh institutions can operate Vvith new policies, and the 
targeted approach came together with the PBA service. The PBA service was a 
development from academic discussion too. 
The perceived individuality of small businesses, Eke unhappy families, each in a 
different way, and the idea to target growing companies, gave birth to the nofion of 
a bespoke service that helps the growth business in the best way it can shorn of the 
one size fits all business support progranunes. 1hus was born the PBA. 'Ihe PBAs 
role was as a generalist to signpost he growing company to helpful advice provided 
by gDvemment programmes or to consultants, within Business Link. 
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The switch of policy amounted to a new theory of business support. The old 
theory said support all businesses and encourage start-ups. The new theory ignored 
start-ups and concentrated on established businesses -, vith the potential to grow. 
The old theory provided programmes of help to businesses. The new theory 
provides a diagnostic of your particular business by a generalist The old theory 
concentrated on provision of courses. The new theory concentrates on the 
business improvement of client businesses over time. N"ereas the old theory 
provided a little support for A businesses that wanted it, the new theory aims to 
improve a targted number of growing firrns, with a bespoke resource-intensive 
relationship. In terms of biological parenting behaviour, the old theory is akin to 
the mosquito's parenting behaviour, the new theory akin to the elephanfs parenting 
behaviour. 
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The new theory demands much more parenting by the business support agencies 
but spread over a much smaller number of offspring. The thesis concerned this 
parenting. How do the newly blessed business advisors cope with their new bundle 
of joy) just as little existing courses help new parents and they fall back on their 
experiences, good or bad; Business Links recruited PBAs with small business 
experience to fall back on. Although courses for the new PBAs were set up, 
notably at Durhxn University, much of their knowledge was gained from 
experience. The research set out to explore and make explicit this knowledge. As 
such this research can be seen within studies of problems implementing policy. The 
research set out to explore aspects of how the new policy toward business support 
was being implemented. 
The question is important due to the contribution small firms in the economy and 
society. Small firms may make more difference to the economic growth rate than 
Large firms, one implication of Hannah's (1996) work. Small firms contribute to the 
growth of new innovative technology based industries. The technology developed 
in smaller firnas is often finally adopted by many large firrns in diverse industries 
(Pavittý 1993) which makes its impact pervasive. In the last twenty years, although 
researchers argue about specific numbers and methods, it is clear that small fin-ns; 
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have created many jobs, in an era of relatively high unemployment Small firms 
matter. Hence, the effectiveness of business support to smaU firms can add 
significandy to the dynamism of the economy. 
6.3 Management Capability 
The research found that business advisors of all persuasions use knowledge gained 
from experience, sometimes painfiffly, to supplement any theoretical knowledge 
available. In particular, the PBA attempts to ascertain the capability of the 
management of the business. PBAs believe that business success is largely a matter 
of capable management. Thus, although luck may play a part in the capricious 
nature of competition for the small firm, capable management can steer the firm 
through any choppy waters. Capable managementý however, is not easily assessed. 
In this assessment of management PBAs follow two logical arguments. First, 
empirical evidence from the SME sector across different nations ranks inadequate 
internal management as the most important contributor to the fAure of the firm, 
(Hall, 1995, Baldwin et al. 1997). 'Ibus, small business advisors are using e3dsting 
known data as the basis for policy, what Kruglanski (1992) calls base-rate data. But 
the implications of this for the new targeted theory are important. Secondly, PBAs 
concentrate on the areas where they can have some effect 1hus although the cost 
of capital, levels of aggregate econon-dc demand, or population shifts within the 
local market may significantly affect the growth rates and death rates of small 
businesses in their area (Keeble and Walker, 1993) the PBA concentrates on the 
internal workings of the firm to improve their chances within an environment 
where neither have much control. 
To assess the management smaU firm advisors turn to proxy indicators. The first, 
and most important, of these proxy indicators is control, both financial and 
physical. Financial control follows the prescriptions contained in Warnes (1984). In 
the Gengýý Klian Guide, Brian Warnes argues that business people must 
understand the rudiments of accounting to make usefiA decisions. Warnes argues 
that the 'barrow-boy' understands the need to turn cash over and make cash eam. 
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its keep. As Warnes puts it 'Veg uv& mn co)wpanies produce kg 'coxtrol' informa6on 
a, eek#. '(1984: 4). Yet although the prescriptions contained within the Genghis Khan 
Guide, to concentrate on break-even, gross profit margins and cash, can free cash 
to improve business health, Warnes; suggests urvival is its primary motive: ! abir 
book is dejined to beo; to heoyou, at the most basic km4 to surdm, more or less re , gardless of the 
economic ckmate" (1984: 11). XNames; suggests [manufacturing] companies should aim 
for a breakeven below 70% of capacity and gross profit margins in excess of 40%. 
He suggests that companies earning less than 25% gross profit margins are likely to 
fail, and Yhe Im-er the maTFn, the sooner it ui&fdP (1984: 32). 1hus, financial control 
manages costs, shown in sets of accounts. 
Factory visits determine physical control. A participant in the research interviews 
reappraised a business client as lacking in control, after he visited a financially 
successftil but messy premises. The layout and materials flow through premises 
indicates that management has thought about efficient production. Indeed, Warnes 
(1984) suggests mall business management underestimate the financial gains from 
productivity gains. Secondly, the advisors consider fidy premises to indicate 'good 
housekeeping. Good housekeeping, neatness and tidiness indicate a well-organised 
premises. Tidiness indicates good management; good management translates into 
business success. The most important element of management for business 
advisors was control. 1[hey wanted to identify control within their chenes business. 
In addition, whilst advisors seemed sceptical about the degree of strategic 
management within small firms, they questioned the managers strategy. Questions 
that bank managers and other advisors asked their clients probed their knowledge 
about competitors and the marketplace. Moreover, they wanted evidence that the 
firrn's objectives, strategy and control cohered. 
Business advisors examined the degree to which businesses cohered and controUed. 
They wanted evidence from accounts and from the premises of capable 
management Capable management controlled their businesses. They also wanted 
to know that the objectives, the owners vision, and the strategy, what the company 
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did, fitted. For cmnple, advisors told 'horro? stories where the proprietor did not 
know the product costs. Management should emphasise the bottom line, rather 
than top line. 
The role of business advisors within the small firm sector, particularly PBAs is 
important The policy, recommended by Smallbone and Storey, to target help for 
fast growing companies depends on business advisors' advice. The advisors are 
there to signpost he advice that they negotiate with the company. If the adviso? s
concerns concentrate on the those areas likely to ensure firm survival, then there is 
at the very least some question about how Business Links deliver the new policy. 
Apart from the question of how Business Links target growth companies, the 
advice firms receive appears to reinforce survival rather than growth. 1his might be 
best advice. The survival promoting advice may result from a failure by the parent 
organisation to target growth firms. It might reflect a public sector view that to only 
advise a minority of firms is unfair (Hutchinson et al., 1997). The advice might 
reflect the business advisors! experience. It certainly reflects the known vicissitudes 
within the SME territory. And the governmenes emphasis on the quantity of 
businesses PBAs advise as a measure of performance, a measure of quantity not 
quality, contributes to the lack of targeted business advice, and sends a mixed 
message to Business Links. Nonetheless, PBAs concentrate their best advice on 
firm survival. PBAs, Eke civil swmts, have discretionary power within the policy, 
they diagnose companies, they can choose to some extent what to believe about 
good management and this enables the PBA service to alter the policy at its 
implementation stage (Upsky, 1980). 
In doing so, PBAs change policy. The policy aimed to encourage growth firms. In 
practice, the policy might be ensuring that more firrns; survive, precisely the policies 
criticised by Story and Smallbone, with one proviso only established firms over five 
employees can access the PBAs. 1hus the policy tarBets not growth firms but 
established firms. Indeed, the policy might tat-get hose firms that grow from 5 to 
10 employees identified by Daly (1992); therefore Business Links may reduce small 
firm death rates. Keeble and Walker (1993) found that enterprise agencies reduced 
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death rates. All this is not to blame Business Links for not implementing the new 
policy-, the implemented policy might be excellent, just not what government 
intended. 
XX'hat evidence does the research present to reinforce these claims? First, the thirty 
serrii-structured research interviews with thirty-nine business advisors (one 
interview was of a group of ten PBAs) yielded qualitative data reflecting advisor's 
views about small business growth. These analysed interviews, within a 
phenomenological fi-amework based on Hymer (1985), formed the basis of a 
model of the internal STNIE management 'Mereafter, a self-administered 
questionnaire to all personal business advisors in England and Wales confirmed the 
findings. PBAs agreed that businesses with clear financial control systems are 
more likely to survive, and that a significant number of small businesses fail 
because management lack financial competence. Moreover, PBAs believed that 
the top three causes of business failure were, poor debtor control or bad debts, 
a lack of management capability and over-trading all of which reinforce the 
need for control. Ibis view is in accord with research ffidings on reasons for 
business fAure (Hall, 1995; Baldwin, et al., 1997) There is evidence that 
advisors look for control. Secondly, the model of internal SME management 
argued for a feedback process where the manager's objectives, his strategy and 
his control cohere. The model argues that this is the hallmark of a well- 
managed firm. In particular, two statements asked PBAs to agree that setting 
goals, planning and evaluating progress is the hallmark of a well-managed firm. 
Moreover, the business advisors were asked to concur with the statement: 
'agreement between the firms' objectives and its operations indicate good 
managernene. These two statements about the nature of good management go 
to the heart of the heuristic model. If PBAs disagree with these statements 
then that would refute the model. But PBAs overwhelmingly agreed with our 
conjecture about good management that conforms to our model. 
The evidence from table 42 suggests that. 
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a feedback process involving goals, planning and evaluation is thought to 
indicate good management 
congruence between the firm's objectives and its operations indicates good 
management 
9 financial control and competence are necessary for survival. 
All these statements are consistent with the model of internal firm 
management presented in figure 7. The survey enabled PBAs to falsify the 
control feedback model and they did not. 
6.4 ImpEcations for theory 
Ibis research approaches the problem of small business performance from the 
angle of those given to making interventions - business advisors. As such the 
model derived from the research interviews and, subsequently bome out in the 
questionnaire results, is a heuristic control feedback model of good 
management in small firms. 71be model then draws upon the insights into 
decision-making of Kahnemann and Tversky, that human information 
processing uses short cuts, to the task of intervening in SME performance. 
Consequently this is a rather different model of SME perfort-nance than that 
collected in Storey (1994) or indeed the logical positivist approach of Casson 
(1992). Instead the approach contributes a heuristic model of SME 
performance consistent with the interventions by PBAs - practitioner based 
model. It therefore derives from a more qualitative approach and incorporated 
experiential learning. There are drawbacks from this to be discussed in section 
5.6, but on the whole it provides a fresh method to consider SME 
performance. The theory presented here incorporates human processing and 
practitionees experiential learning within a model of SME performance. 
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Whilst the importance of both control and strategy is not news to researchers 
in the area or indeed small business owners,, the model shows how control 
feedback loops can enable SMEs to self-regulate themselves. 
SME performance as far as business advisors are concerned depends upon 
sector-blind, good management indicated by control and congruence between 
objectives, strategy and control. This model contributes to our understanding 
of how business advisors intervene in small businesses. It contributes to the 
debates about small business growth and failure. The model found here differs 
from that espoused in Storey by amending the three areas of individual, 
strategy and firm. Instead of the firm, control becomes the third part of the 
tripod holding up good management within the SME. In addition, the process 
depicted is dynamic and interdependent. 
Moreover, figure 11 is amended by considering the links between the two not 
merely as intersections but as circular feedback and congruent components of 
good management. 
The model presented here shows the'split-personality' within the growing firm; 
where an extrovert strategy makes links with the environment, explores new 
markets, and develops new products; yet an introvert control monitors 
intemally, orders the workspace, and manages cash flow. The systems approach 
to the model explains that the control function both provides control and 
creates a negative link in the system. The negative link makes the system a self- 
regulating one rather than subject to instability. In this dual respect the findings 
support those by Hughes (1998), who found that firms who grew consistently 
monitored their progress with strong internal controls and management 
information, yet sought new opportunities through empowered staff. The need 
for successful firms to control overrides the tactic of delaying payments to 
creditors to maximise returns from holding cash, something that the successful 
firms do but economists sometime question. Companies resort to creditor 
strain (as Warnes 1984 calls it) only in difficulty because relationships with 
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suppliers are extremely important for the growing company. Indeed, many of 
the findings vindicate Wames (1984) 
Warnes in the Genghis Khan Guide to Business argues that companies failed 
Yor one ot em beLming reason rim botb senses of the word): mana , gement 
&d 
not seem to bave a sifAdent undmtan&ng of casbfioiv; nor Sf the detdled 
ni . tty-.; gn . tt y tbatgoes to the bead Sf makin ,ga 
business- ag business- work: 
undentan&q the rrladonsbo between birak-evenpoint and magins for 
instance' (1984. ii). 
Mentioned by a PBA in a research interview, the book concentrates on 
methods to reduce risks and increase profits in companies by internally 
generated funds. The views of our business advisors complement the book. 
71be business advisors saw internal management control very much in the same 
way that Warnes does: it is about producing timely management accounts, 
making cash and profit more important than turnover, and planning 
production. The argument dovetails into the idea that PBAs are survivalists. 
Warnes's argument that improving profits is better through reducing break- 
even rather than adding extra sales is survivalist. Warnes (1984) wrote a 
survivalist tract. The ideas within his book influenced advisors immensely, 
though they may be standard practice for accountants. 
And yet Warnes (1984) for many years ran a venture capital company. The 
thrust of 'Gengbis Kban'is to reduce risks within the business; not something 
that many immediately associate with venture capital. Warnes points out that 
successful companies are controlled financially - through strong internal 
management information, as do our interviewees and other researchers 
(Hughes, 1998). Tension between the controlled company and the outward 
more cliched entrepreneurial management exists but it is a healthy tension. 
Indeed, improving gross profit margins enables the growing company to 
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finance high research and development costs and higher overheads than a firm 
that slashes overheads in an effort to withstand a reverse in profits and growth. 
His section on company doctoring suggests rescued companies should 
introduce new product lines. Ibus, the survivalist and the growth emphases are 
two parts of the successful firm's personality. 
Business advisors' emphasis on capable management supports Penrose's (1959) 
theory of the firm. The support extends to the resource-based theory of the 
firm: advisors believe capable managers can access finance; advisors believe 
capable managers can survive inhospitable climes; and advisors believe capable 
managers can achieve success, no matter what sectors they supply. The key to 
small firm success for advisors, whether bank managers or PBAs, lies in the 
capability of the management. Inadvertently or not, PBAs seem to use the 
resourcc-based theory of the firm. Indeed, it seems that the criticisms of 
resourcc-based theories, that they ignore the market, could apply equally to 
PBAsl 
The risk-averse attitude seems to apply to PBAs, bank mangers, accountants, 
and advisors such as co-ordinators for the Princes Youth Business Trust. All 
these groups share the survivalist fervour. At this stage I would suggest, Warnes 
notwithstandin& that venture capitalists are different. They need growth to 
make their return. Their rewards are based on picking one-in-four winners. If 
the other three plateaux to a modest size that would make its bank manager 
content, it is not enough for the venture capitalist, they need two-out-of-five, 
say to take to the stock-market to provide their returns. The incentives for the 
venture capitalists are significantly different. 'Mus, whilst I would suggest the 
model applies to small firms; the emphasis put on the model by venture- 
capitalists differs. In particular venture capitalists seem much more influenced 
by leadership (Muzyka and Birley, 1997) than the accountants, bank managers 
and PBAs. 7hus figure 10 must be altered to put business advisors on the same 
side of the triangle of interest with accountants and bank managers. Given that 
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all three provide business advice to SNIE their advice might be consistent, which 
one might expect to reinforce its effect. 
6.5 Implications for policy and practice 
The implications for policy and practice, given that the research investigated 
the practice, mainly concern the policy to target growth firms. Given that 
PBAs are concernedwith the identification of good management he emphasis 
on growth-orientated firms needs to be clarified. The key to SME support by 
PBAs is to enable growth-oriented firms achieve their growth whilst 
circumventing the pitfalls such as over-trading. PBAs are not, however, likely to 
sell growth to the firms because of the associated problems. Moreover, the 
PBA is in the position of attempting to establish credibility. Consequently, 
PBAs shy away from any attempt to 'sell' fast growth or a growth-orientation 
to their clients. Whether, the capability for growth will increase as a result of a 
longer, successful relationship remains to be seen. For example if the firm finds 
success in a quality-improvement, or productivity improvement exercises and 
finds itself more competitive, it might lean more towards growth. However, the 
policy implication is that PBAs perhaps reduce the failure rate amongst firms 
rather than increase the 'flyers' or 'gazelles'. Indeed, given the preoccupation 
with the problems associated with fast growth the average PBA is likely to 
persuade an entrepreneur to constrain growth, in order to preserve cash flow. 
It maybe therefore that the presence of PBAs reduce the growth of client's 
turnovers, from what they would otherwise have been, whilst increasing the 
survival rate of firms. PBAs then reduce riskiness of SME growth firms, rather 
than increase growth. 1hus the effectiveness of the PBAs and Business Links is 
not seen by the rate of growth of business nor the number of new business, 
rather PBAs act to reduce the death rates of firms and thereby increase firm 
survival rates, their longevity, and life expectancy. Ibis would concur with 
findings about enterprise agencies (Keeble and Walker, 1993) 
The advisors views are heavily weighted toward the problems associated with 
fast growth, despite research evidence that suggests growing companies have a 
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higher rate of survival too. There may be several reasons for this. First, though 
it seems unlikely to promote growth amongst small firms, the emphasis on 
constraints might be a perfectly feasible method to assess the potential for 
growth of an SME. Second, the relationship between advisors and firm owners 
is akin to a customer. The PBAs is in many cases attempting to establish 
rapport and credibility with the business owner. Under these circumstances the 
advisor may tread very careftilly, although other advisors face no such 
pressures. Moreover, the quantitative targets given to Business Links by central 
government are another burden on the PBA! s relationship with the business 
owner. Ibird, many PBAs are recruited from ex-small business owners and 
their experience might well be of struggling against survival, which most small 
businesses do. Indeed, experience of fast growth in a small firm over the long- 
term is exceptional. Fourth, following on from three, the experiences of PBAs 
in the small firm sector might lead them to believe that the key to small firm 
support is survival rather than growth. For whatever reason it appears that 
advisors react to fast growth in a manner that emphasises the difficulties 
associated with it. 
Further, remarkable by their absence in these responses is any mention of the 
ability to seek out new markets, ability to export or alertness to opportunities. 
Market research is mentioned once. Out of the top five responses all but one 
mentioned the problems of fast growth. Four times as many advisors 
mentioned that the business owner needed to make sure that there was room 
in the market-, as those that mentioned developing the market. Marketing, 
seeking the customers for growth was mentioned by only three advisors. Table 
44 takes these codes and places them in themes concerned with expansive 
strategies to achieve growth versus obstacles to fast growth. 
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Table 44: Expaasion versus Control 
Expansive strategies to No Control No 
achieve growth mentioned of/Obstacles to mentioned 
owth 
Marketing 3 Properly 9 
financed/overtrade 
Plough back profits 3 Room in the market 4 
Vision 2 Good management 4 
Seek help 2 Manager wants to 3 
grow 
Recognise a niche Production capacity 2 
I lard work- Business Planning 2 
Lean manufacturing I Enough employees 2 
Culture to adapt Local competition 2 
Innovation Factory space 1 
Unachicvable targets I Control overheads I 
Owner's Attitude I Under control 1 
Developing his/her I Prior sector 1 
market experience 





Product which is I 
needed 
Total 19 35 
Miat is demonstrated is an emphasis on the barriers to growth and the need 
for control rather than an expansive type of advice. Advisors cautioned against 
overtrading and would prefer a planned expansion rather than a dash for growth. 
PBAs echoed their view of the difficulty in impressing fast growth upon firms or 
approaching the subject with the bias towards fast growth. 
Umjou've, got to be so carrfuL Youvegot to addirss ad the issues. It's no 
)ilg that ae munt to go for sales or ae want togoforpmfit. You good xa 
can goforpmfit and mn out of cash. You a vuld need to get topips mitb a 
lot of issues. Veg &f=4 yourould nevergo inkke tbat. (PBA) 
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Vell I nvuldn't a& ise lbem togo toofast to start uitb... (Accountant) 
"In the ansm -er tojour quesfion furtber back was. You're workingfmm a 
,g to grvu, and 
demkp. And that isn't prrsumpfion f companies munfin 
.y 
the care is it. neceisaril 
"tryou kave That out ofit tbenjour quesfions cbange. 
Me kg quesfion is a-bat does the coVany want to do? "
'13emse otbery ise u -e go in prvsaibing wbm tbg do and wbat tbg do. 
U7e bave togo in v itb a blank sbeet ofpaper and Rsten to rbat tbg want. 
, gfmm 
I aant to rrfirv to I want to be a ), tbij You knor, and it can be an 
,g 
in betreen. " (PBA mu&-, vji&on POUnd mcket rdenfist And agtbin 
GMI! P) 
Yet given the, perhaps healthy, scepticism of business advisors to encouraging 
fast growth within firms; is the practice of Business Links and the policy to 
target fast growth companies consistent? 'Me policy to target fast growing 
firn-is can take place at a stage removed from the PBA. Advisors mentioned 
finance more than any other factor when they responded to the fast growth 
question. Fast growing firms require cash. 'Mis requirement put many advisors 
into a cautious standpoint because in going for growth the small firm needs to 
deal with many inter-linked issues. So, advisors stress business planning and 
cash control in the face of a fast rate of growth. Advisors suggested having the 
right production facili6es, markets., championing of the product, 
competitiveness and flexibility. Many of our advisors approached the task of 
advising fast growing companies with a great degree of scepticism. On the 
ground, they wished to help, support and guide the SNIE manager in all aspects 
of the business not just to promote growth. 
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This research suggests that small business advisors tend to offer support to firms in 
all categories of development but focus attention on survival rather than growth. 
Thus advisors wish to 'control growth', and stress the inherent risks involved in fast 
growing firnis. Yet, in doing so how are PBAs are ffilfilling their remit from the dti? 
Ibis research suggests that there is policy dissonance within support to small fin-ns. 
Government policy has developed from blanket support to new firms, to targted 
support at growth firms. Business advisors, however, are apparently reluctant to 
target and promote growth. PBAs act to reduce insolvency rather than enhance 
growth and job creation? 
The implications of this policy dissonance between the expressed policy from the 
dti and the implementation of the policy link this research into another field, that of 
policy process research (see Hill, 1997). The study of how policy, particularly public 
policy is a field more the concern of political scientists. Writers such as Upsky 
(1980) have explored the implementation of policy at lower levels in an 
organisation. It is in organisation where organisations require people to make 
judgements about others, just as PBAs are required to make assessments about 
small firms. Upsky argues that such employees have a great deal of discretion. He 
calls those charged with implementing policy "street-level bureaucrats", and argues 
that they make policy. In this research the PBAs are the small firm policy-makers 
"street-level bureaucrats", and their policy seems to be not to target growth fin-ns, 
not to provide assistance to growth but to support all the firms that they can and to 
reduce the likelihood of fAure amongst them. They may be right. Nonetheless, this 
research does indicate differences between the expressed Business link policy and 
policy as implemented by Business Link. 
Vbere does this leave UK small business support policy? The government 
issued a consultation paper on a proposed small business service in June 1999. 
The Small Business Service is designed as a British version of the highly 
reputed United States Small Business Administration (SBA)(Reynolds, Hay and 
Camp, 1999). It will act- as a voice for small business at the heart of 
government, to simplify and improve the quality and coherence of 
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Government support for small businesses, and help small firms deal with 
regulation (dtý 1999) Q-- 
The research presented here is most relevant to YVmdng the coberence and qua§Dl 
of Got rmmentstportfor smaff bujinesses(1 999: 5). The Small Business Service is to 
take over the Business Link network and provide the single gateway to small 
business services - similar to that envisaged the Alichael Hesletine's one-stop- 
shops (dti, 1994). The service will be a Next Steps Agency at arm's length from 
government but with access to ministers. The Chief Executive will be 
supported by a council of between 9 and 12 independent members, 
representatives of small firms and entrepreneurs- the Enterprise Council. 
The Small Business Service's aims are slightly different from Business Link's 
present airns. Ibc consultation paper states: 
. 
fer beo to a uide ral , ge of customen - the 
Small Business Senice sill qq 
,; gm, u, 
tb fims and those , 
ýb- fmm start-ips and micm-businesses to bi, 
ei*lDing up to 250 e)Vý? ), ees ... tbefocus of support mid be dmed at 
ge of tbefirm's rrmoting hai7ien orpmOng assistance at eacb kg sta 
detrkpment (1999: 5). 
The Small Business Service (SBS) is to be comprehensive. The government 
seems to have rejected the Storey and Smallbone thesis that the support for 
start-up firms wastes resources and that firms that survive three years have 
earned the right of support. Nor does the green paper suggest support for fast- 
growth firms. On the other hand, the comprehensiveness suggests support be 
available to all firms including older firms and is not aimed merely to increase 
the proportion of start-ups. The Government does buy into the arguments put 
forward from Birch (1979) to Reynolds, Hay and Camp (1999) that 
entrepreneurship matters. From a theoretical view one might suggest that the 
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new Labour government has "gone Austrian", supporting the views of 
Schumpctcr (1948) and Casson (1990). 
The SBSs business support side mainly applies to England. Scotland, NWales 
and the North of Ireland have different arrangements and a Parliament and 
assemblies respectively. In Scotland, Scottish Enterprise and the Highlands and 
Islands Enterprise have their own support delivery networks. The Business 
Connect network- works in NWes. Northern Ireland boasts the Local 
Enterprise Development Unit (LEDU). A major review of the Northern Irish 
development scene was published called Strategy 2010.1hus; the SBS' 
operational side will only operate in England. 
The consultation paper recognises Business LinVs clutter reducing role 
(Hutchinson, Foley and Oztel , 1996; Bryson Churchward and Daniels, 1997). 
The government argues that the service must improve, however. 23ut ipýprvting 
the stý, gflposfiq OfPMSrummes does not ansaer the aifidsm that sigortpqgrammes are 
frqgmente4 of twiable quaý. ty and dficultfor smaLl business to access' (1999, sec 5.3, 
p18). The consultation paper proposes that the Chief Executive take an early 
view regarding small business support scheme's effectiveness and coherence. 
Changes to improve these schemes are a key task for the SBS. 
The Chief Executive's task is to assess business support while: putting small 
businesses' needs first, looking to the future, linking to social policies, working 
in partnership outside Government, establishing a single Gateway, providing 
new support for n-ýicro-business, and developing small-scale equity finance. 
Given these tasks what can this research tell the new Chief Executive about 
business support? Ibe next section attempts to reply. 
The first message welcomes the emphasis put on access for all SNIEs to 
Business Link ser-6ces. The change recognises; that Business Links have found 
it difficult to target growth firms with any degree of confidence. 
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Indeed this is the nub of the problem. The success of policy towards small 
business depends to a great extent on those who deliver it. Policy is not top- 
down. Policy fails when the policy-makers ignore the difficulty agencies have to 
implement policy. Thus, in the case of targeted policies Business links have 
simply Wed to implement the policy as set out. Sin-dlarly councils find it 
difficult to evaluate local economic policies intended to change their area's 
image (German and Worthington, 1998). Agencies including TECs, Business 
links and local authorities seem to simply ignore difficult policies such as 
policies to foster inter-firm working. 
Effective policies have to either be very proscriptive, or be simple enough to 
implement (Bowen, 1982). NT-Iiat is clear from this research is that the PBA 
service wants to implement a policy where they provide comprehensive 
coverage to the gamut of small firms, with a role that reduces death rates rather 
than increase growth. PBAs are survivalists (Ritchie, 1991). They have direct 
involvement with the owner-managers of small and medium sized businesses; 
moreover, the policy required this of them. PBAs were recruited from the 
ranks of those who have run their own business (Storey, 1993; Agar, 1994). 
The consultation paper has in a sense made explicit what this research found. 
PBAs offer risk-averse advice to companies that have some difficulty, that 
might wish to grow but are not rapid growth firms. 
The research supports the distinction made by the consultation paper between 
fast growth and other businesses. The consultation paper suggests that fast 
growth businesses will welcome smaller equity finance in the Regional Venture 
Capital Funds. Many arguments surround supposed funding gap controversies 
where often venture capitalists argue that the funds are available to the right 
proposition. Business angels make the same claim (Stevenson and Coveney, 
1996), as do researchers for debt finance (Cressy, 1996). It has never been fully 
explained to this researcher exactly why rapidly growing businesses that 
successfully negotiated the hurdles of mobilizing resources, deploying 
resources, and growth reversals needed ad-6ce from a local Business Link. The 
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new policy seems to lay that particular ghost to rest. Fast growth firms might 
need equity to start near to their minimum efficient scale (Audretsch, 1995) and 
certainly the existence of outside equity is a strong signal of capability for 
bankers ( Metcher, 1996) and is associated with growth (reported in Storey, 
1994). Growing firms are different. 
The research reported here suggests that growing firms are not targeted by the 
PBA service. 'Ibis appears to contradict findings from Lean, Down and Sadler- 
Smith (1999); yet their findings suggested that most growth firms were 
identified after the PBA met the client. Thus, growth firms were firms that 
expressed a desire to grow-, whereas for Storey growth firms are those that 
make a substantial contribution to employment - the flyers. Mere the service 
scores is by signposting bespoke tailored help for small businesses. 'Me help it 
suggests is jointly targeted on the needs of that particular business. And, as 
intervimvees pointed out: 
Yjou look at tm v hundird cUentryou'd bave ajob to sy that any two of 
,g mitb those a-err tirfualý the same. 
Agdn on the wbolejou air dea, ýn 
in&zi&ials. Tbm's as mag &fferrnt Opes of business and the mg 
businesses arr nin as their air in&ti&ials trally. 
The PBA service panders to the individuality of the SME owner-manager. 
Indeed STME owners are individual. The owners-managers encounter different 
markets. Each firm has different technologies. And, firrns have different costs, 
which may result from different routines (Teece and Pisano, 1994). 1hus, firms 
face bespoke obstacles to success. 
The question then becomes is there ways to target an expensive, yet welcome, 
service on those firms where the advisor service would produce most benefits 
for the economy? The research finds more evidence of PBA! s reluctance to 
target firms, as have other studies (Agar, 1994; Bryson, Churchward and 
Daniels, 1997). The study did not find technology counsellors attempting to 
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market the firrn's products, although one did talk about raising prices, and 
another talked about stock levels. Perhaps then, the problem is one of name. 
To call someone a business advisor and suggest that they target growth firms 
may provoke resistance but if one called an advisor an export advisor would 
they be comfortable only advising companies which exported, or expressed a 
desire to export? 
A targeting policy on the basis of exporting firms would make sense 
economically. Regional development theories such as cumulative causation 
demonstrate the key role played by exporters in open economies (Thirlwall, 
1989). And within the single market area of the European Union, regions are 
very open economies. Moreover, the economic success of a country depends 
on a few internationally competitive sectors. Japan's post-war success 
contrasted with Britain in the same period despite similar overall productivity: 
pan that avs so stunningý coVefifitr, but only a baný'ul of induj*ies thi 'it was notja mi n 
Japan, an4 morr to the point, only a haný'ul of coVanies led bj stmq in&tiduals Mithin 
those industries'(Ohmae, 1996: 65). Targeting exporters, who are more likely to be 
fast growing firms, matches policies to boost regional competitiveness. 
Moreover, for the internationally competitive small firm productivity is crucial. 
Besides the emphasis that the policy would put on firms reaching new markets 
- which PBAs believe is important for growth - the policy would emphasise 
competitiveness based on unit labour costs. Why? Because the exporting 
companies are classically more productive companies within the domestic 
economy and international trade extends markets to enable greater 
specialisation and therefore economic efficiency (Smith, 1904: Riedel, 1988). 
Thus, classically more productive firms gain from exports. In order to enhance 
exporters policies might require productivity counsellors to enhance 
productivity in the most productive sector. Again, like Storey's arguments 
policies target help at the more successful firms. It helps those who have 
already helped themselves. Targeting policies reward success; and ignore failure. 
Thus, policies are not intended to help what many have suggested is Britain's 
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long tail of under-performing firms (see Commission on Public Policy and 
British Business. 1997) because as Japan's post-war success hows; the long tail 
does not matter. Targeting exporters might raise the profile of productivity 
counsellors, such as the Centre for Competitive Manufacturing in Dudley who 
argued that they could increase productivity by 30-40 % in many casesl 
The emphasis on internal improvements also accords with the routines found 
within the resource-based theories of firm competitiveness. Thus the policy 
accords with theories of economic development and firm competitiveness. 
Finally, such a policy Nvill emphasise the markets for products and innovation. 
Research in the West Midlands reveals the link between introducing new 
products and export performance (Niole and Worrall, 1997). The PBAs 
questionnaire responses indicate that the ability to exploit new opportunities, 
find new markets, and innovate all promote firm growth. Asking PBAs to 
target successful firms with a remit to develop exporters might enable them to 
take the risks involved in advice to expand the markets. 
Although the targeting policy has often been neglected by Business Links in 
favour of a policy of help for all, targeting might not be needless. PBAs might 
target exporters. First you would have to change their titles to export business 
advisor (EBA) which might relieve them of any guilt towards non-exporting 
companies. The policy would accord with economic development theories and 
Japan's post-war experience. It would enable advisors to su pport productivity 
improvements and improve routines, as suggested by the resource-based 
theories of the firm. 'Me policy could also enable advisors to help develop new 
opportunities within the firm in an outward manner - which critics argue the 
resource-based theories ignore (Porter, 1991). The advisors might come to 
grips with evidence that successful firms have strict controls, yet let their 
employees pursue opportunities (Hughes, 1998). As such the policy might 
promote theories that help us to understand what appears as a split-personality 
in successful firms. 
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6.6 Limitations 
Mirstly, the intent here has been to examine the model and methods used by 
the practitioners of business advice. 1hough we can compare these models to 
the findings of the more quantitatively orientated data, the question of whether 
the model is an accurate rcflection of the factors important for the propagation 
of good business practice is moot. The other limitation is that the study has 
not considered a series of cases of actual business advice. Indeed, it would be 
nice to have taken a number of reports from PBAs and subjected these to a 
discourse analysis, to further document the use of error messages and the 
model of congruency in good management. Moreover, the advisors interviewed 
ranged from start-up counsellors, through to bank managers as well as 
accountants -a heterogenous group 
lbough the heuristic model has been derived the other part of the relationship 
between the business advisors is another area that has been left to one side. 
The research has not examined the process from the point of view of the small 
businesses whom are being advised. In particular, there is some question of 
whether sector specific advice is deemed more important by the clients of 
PBAs than the low significance given to it by the advisors. Anecdotal 
conversations have shown that the quality of advice given by some business 
advisors is not deemed to be high. It would be interesting to take the model of 
heuristic good management to the owners of SNIEs for their reaction. Do the 
owners recognise the models and if so do they concur with the view of good 
management implied by the heuristic approach here. Indeed one might expect 
that the experiences gained by owner-managers would inform their heuristics 
but that these may be much more sector-specific than the business advisors. A 
comparison with the SME would enable the model to be generalised. At the 
present time though there is support for the model by business advisors the 
use of, or recognition of, this heuristic model by owner-managers is not 
known. Finally, the control feedback model has been validated indirectly, the 
research did not go to advisors suggesting this as a model. 
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6.7 Implications for fin-ther research 
The further research from this could be to look at extending the generalisability 
of the good management model. First, does it apply to the owner-managers of 
SINtEs? Despite the fact that the model derived from interviews with bank 
managers and accountants do they also recognise, the model. Consequently, the 
extent to which the research model is generalisable outside of the Business 
Link advisor context is not known. Ibus research to generalise the model apart 
from the Business link context is one way forward. 
A second way forward is to apply the methodology of heuristic modefling to 
the views of owner-managers and other business advisors and compare these 
results with those presented here. Again the idea to generalise these results to 
different business advisors and business practitioners. 'Ibus research could 
generalise results in two ways. 
Another tack is to confirm these results with the existing participants, e. g. 
Business Advisors from Business Link. A discourse analysis applied to the 
reports generated by PBAs could fivitffilly (dis)confirm the model. The error 
signals approach might be confirmed through this. 
A fin-ther question is to evaluate the heuristic model of good management. The 
intent underlying the model for PBAs is to pilot a firm through the choppy 
waters of rapid growth. There is evidence that enterprise agencies affect death 
rates. Keeble at al (1993) saT. 
ýbe analyses do sbow tbatgrvu-tb in numben Sf smad manufacturing 
businesses, and trduced deatb rates of businesses genera4, an botb 
Sýgnfiicamt4 assodated spafia4 uitb the aefiddes of local entetprise 
agendes' (1993: 114). 
Enterprise agencies' significant role has been to prolong small firm life 
expectancy. Contrary to the stated remit of Business Link this is precisely ývhat 
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the model of good management and the views of PBAS towards their clients 
are intended to produce. Population studies of firms n-dght pick this up, after 
all the greatest increases in human populations have come as a result of firstly, 
reduced death rates at the same time as the birth rates have remained the same. 
Given that PBAs act to reduce death rates rather than increase growth rates, 
the fairest way to test the value of the heuristic model would be to compare 
PBA-ad,, ised firms with a matched set of unadvised firms. Further than that, 
there may be a way to test the agreement of the PBA with the heuristic model 
of good management by asking them to agree with the'statements regarding 
good management. 'Mose agreeing with the statements might be deemed to be 
using the model of good management, consciously or not, after all a molecule 
does not have to do maths to be described by a mathematical formula! Thus 
we might find three groups of firms to compare: those using PBA advice; those 
using heuristic modelled PBA-advice; and those using no advice. '11iis would 
get around the problem that those firms that seek advice are more open, 
forward-looking and that any difference in performance captures this attribute 
of the firm's management, rather than the effect of any advice. 71hus an 
evaluation of the heuristic model may be taken against those not using it, 
however, since our responses favour overwhelmingly those consistent with this 
heuristic model it might be difficult to find any not using some version of a 
heuristic model. A second method maybe to use a temporal analysis, but here 
the independent variable would have to be something associated with growth, 
like employment, where a dummy variable might be set at one when the advice 
is sought. The significance, or lack of it would then indicate the effect of 
business advice, on the same firm. Of course, it may be that firms only seek 
advice when they have a problem and so this might muddy the waters. The 
heuristic model of business advice thus can be used to evaluate business advice. 
The heuristic model in turn shows that the PBA's role is not always what those 
who designed the programme might believe it to be! 
The TECs, Business Links masters, are to be abolished. A reappraisal of the role of 
business support is under way. New regional institutions responsible for econorrýc 
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development have arrived. Understandably, the UK Government desires an 
efficient smice to support snull businesses. Change in the institutions involved in 
business support means that this research contributes to the debate surrounding 
Business Link and business support in a timely way. Present research projects air-ri 
to evaluate the contribution of the PBA service. Yet there may be a danger that the 
reports evaluate against the criteria set by policy, rather than more practical criteria 
derived from the PBjVs experience. 
The research demonstrates that Business Links operate a quasi-targeted approach, 
aimed to improve their clicnes longevity as much as grovirth. Government 
recognises STNIE-s vital economic contribution to the economy is unevenly spread 
and targeted policy towards those fast growing firms. In practice, policy is more 
likely to help firrns to survive rather than grow, however, because PBAs react to 
events and their exTerience. Thus, PBAs implement a quasi-targeted policy aimed at 
firms with five employees or over, aimed to reinforce their internal management to 
strengthen the firm! s management. The policy is not that suggested by Storey and 
Smallbone but it is a policy that takes account of small business turbulence. 
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Appendix I 
INTE RVIEW PROMPTS 
I'm doing a study into business advice and professional business advisors. And 
there's two parts to it really and the first part we're looking at what professional 
business advisors see as important for looking at small firms. But instead of 
going from, initially, the theorT, and then saying, you know this is what people 
have found out, urn, in academic studies we'd rather go from this is what 
people are actually doing. 
So can I ask you how long you've been in the position of advising small fwms? 
So if you look at how you assess a company what, how do you go about doing 
that? 
Do you visit premises? 
Are you interested in the personality of any of the owners? 
What about innovation do you, think, see innovation as important for existing 
businesses? 
Do you look at the formality of the firm's processes? Do you look at whether 
fmns are having structured business meetings hu-uh with minutes and that sort 
of diing? 
Miat about business planning? 
Are there organisational issues, then what some people might call culture? 
Issues about perhaps the layers of management 
Is marketing important for them 
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Is technology important? 
Do you think companies need to know their strengths and weaknesses? 
If you could advise a fast growing firm, and if you had a magic wand and could 
say right okay well if this is what I would consider makes for a fast growing 
firm what would you advise? Fast growing in terms of turnover. 
In the academic world, there seems to be two ways to look at businesses, 
particularly say small businesses. On the one hand people talk about 
entrepreneurship. So you can be a professor of entrepreneurship and you have 
big names Re Schumpeter. I was going to say Schumacher then for a minute. 
And Hayek and people like that on the one hand. And on the other hand you 
have people who stress strategy. They tend to tend to come from the big firm 
people like Porter or Nffitzbcrg. And they keep coming from different sides 
like a pincer movement really. And some people would say that if you! ve got an 
individual who's entrepreneurial knows what they're doing then they're likely to 
be successful. So, the individual o,, vner-manager is the key person. And other 
people will say you know these strategies are associated with success, whether 
you export, whether you get new markets 
Do you categorise firms when you go and see them? 
I worked on a fork-lift truck and people used to walk around, it was a 
warehouse rather than a factory, and the supervisor always used to come up to 
me before. You knew when people were walking round and say "quick do a bit 
of a tidy-up" and that sort of thing. Do you think that makes any difference? 
Do you look for things like how tidy a place is? 
And when you look round a factory what are the things you are looking for? 
I was at a meeting in Stafford and I heard a manager of a small company say oh 
we make. I can't remember what he makes and we've been relatively stable. 
I And then two years ago something happened and now we're growing really 
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quickly How rare is a story like that? Do you quite often, often or rarely, find a 
company that progress very slowly and then suddenly something happens and 
they sort of take-ofP 




How do small busincss advisors cvaluate small firms? 
Report of Research carried out by Kevin Mole at the University of 
Molverhamplon. I 
Professional business advisors (PBAs) operate in uncertain conditions. Asked 
to make judgements in uncertain conditions, it is generally believed that people 
use a small number of heuristic principles to reduce complexity. 
These heuristics are simple, often unspoken "rules of thumb". , Practitioners, learning on the job, supplement their existing knowledge, -and create practical 
rules to guide them. With this in mind, the study has attempted to identify 
important "PBA heuristics" following interviews with 30 business advisors and 
an analysis of responses to suitably open questions. - 7he research so far suggests that: 
1. Advisors are concerned \vith the degree to which the business is "under 
control" and tend to use a number of indicators such as tidiness to infer good 
management of a firm. 
2. An implicit model suggested for advisors is as a circular feedback model 
consisting ofi 
" (a) owner/manager objectives, 
" (b) strategies to achieve these objectives (including growth) and, 
" (c) control (including control of profitability). 
3. Advisors seek- evidence that objectives can be identified and that strategies -are in 
place to meet these objectives. Objectives and strategies "fif. 
4. Further, advisors seek to find that an attempt is being made to control the 
relationship between objectives and strategies, that is that some tuning or "goal 
seeking' is taking place. 
The purpose of the brief questionnaire below is to present some of the conclusions 
of the research so far and gather opinions, responses and feedback. A five point 
scale is used in much of the questionnaire. For example, in response to 
question seven, if you think the organisation prescribes a little of your interview 
tick box 2. If you thought it was not prescribed at all tick box 1. If you 
thought it was very prescribed tick box 5. 
7. How far does your organisation prescribe the way you interview your small 
business clients? 
Not at A1 El 
2Ej 3 4E] 5 
El Very much 
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About You 
1. XVhat is your current job title? 
2. flow long have you been advising small firms? - years 3. Have you 'managed/worked in' a small firm (under 100 employees) in your 
business career? 
Yes/No (please delete as appropriate) 
3a. If you answered yes to question 3; in what capacity? Please tick all that 
apply. 
l. Nfanaging director 0 
2. Finance director 0 
Males /marketing director 0 
4. Other director 0 
5. Business planning 0 
6. Nfanager 0 
7. Supervisor 0 
8. None of the above 0 
4. What educational qualifications do vou have? (olease tick all that applv) 
1. None of these 0 
2. '0' levels 0 
IW levels 0 
4. Degree 0 
5. Professional Qualification 0 
6. Masters degree or above 
1  
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4a. If you ticked the professional qualification is your qualification from one of 
these ormnisations? Please tick one 
I. ACCA/FCA 0 
2. Other accounting such as CITNU 0 
3. lnstitute of Bankers 0 
4. Chartered Engmeer 0 
5. lnsbtute of Marketing 0 
6. None of the above 0 
5. Can you list below brief details of your direct experience in the small firms 
sector? 
Your organisation 
6. Which organisation do you currently work for? 
7. How far does your organisation prescribe the way you interview your small 
business clients? 
Not at all 10 20 30 40 50 Very 
much 
8. What training did you receive on becoming a business advisor? 
9. How effective was this training) 




We wish to elicit your ideas about the nature of the job of a business advisor 
and obtain your opinions about the process you go through when advising 
small firms. 
10. When advising small firms do you find the process ... Please tick one 
response. 
very somewhat neither somewhat very 
simple 10 20 30 40 50 Complex 
intuitive 10 20 30 40 50 methodical 
subjective 10 20 30 40 50 objective 




10 20 30 40 50 uses experience 
can be scored 10 20 30 40 50 cannot be scored 




30 40 50 has no standard 
method 
informal 10 120 30 40 50 formal 








50 needs no face-to- 
face contact 
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Your views about smaU business 
We are interested in your views about, and experience of, small business 
success and failure. Please tick the response that is nearest to your views for the 
following questions. You should aim to answer the questions quickly and 
without too much reflection. 
11. Good businesses have fortnal business plans. 
Strongly 10 20 30 40 50 Strongly 
agree disagree 
; uccessful small business managers know the strengths and weaknesses of 
thew competitors. 
Strongly 10 20 30 40 50 Strongly 
agree disagree 
13. Even poorly organised firms often prosper. 
Strongly 10 20 30 40 50 Strongly 
agree disapree 
---I(1 11 ( 
A significant number of small businesses fail because management lack 
tmancial competence. 
Strongly 10 20 30 40 50 Strongly 
agree disagree 
uccess in small business is largely a case of being in the right place at the 
riýht time. 
Strongly 10 20 30 40 50 Strongly 
agree disagree 
17. Businesses with clear financial control systems are more likely to survive. 
Strongly 10 20 30 40 50 Strongly 
agree disagree 
Good management is good management; no matter what sector the 
company is m. 
Strongly 10 20 30 40 50 Strongly 
agree disagree 
Setting goals, planning and evaluating progress is the hallmark of a well- 
managed firm. 
Strongly 10 20 30 40 50 Strongly 
agree disagree 
Agreement between the firms' objectives and its operations indicate good 
management. 




22. Success depends more upon the sector that the firm is in; rather than the 
quality of the management. 
Strongly 10 20 30 40 50 Strongly 
agree disagree 
23. Finance is more readily available for well-managed firms. 
Strongly 10 20 30 40 50 Strongly 
agree disagre 
It is unnecessary to innovate to be successful as a small firm unless the firm 
is in ahigh tech sector. 
Strongly 10 20 30 40 50 Strongly 
agree disagree 
25. Successful companies appear well organised and tidy. 
Strongly 10 20 30 40 50 Strongly 
agree disagree 
26. You can tell a lot about a firin by just walking round. 
Strongly 10 20 30 40 50 Strongly 
agree dis ee 
Its all down to luck. 
Strongly 10 20 30 40 50 Strongly 
agree d týs aff ele 
j 
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Causes of Business Failure 
28. From the list of factors below and your experiences please indicate to what extent they are 
important causes of business failure. 
Very Unlikely Unlikely to neither likely Likely to cause Very likely to 
to cause failure cause failure nor unlikely failure cause failure 
Lack of 10 20 30 40 50 
demand 
Poor debtor 10 20 30 40 50 
control/bad 
debts 
Lack of 10 20 30 40 50 
management 
capability 
Low profit 10 20 30 40 50 
margins 
Poor 10 20 30 40 50 
management 
accounting 
Inadequate 10 20 30 40 50 
working capital 
Unexpected 10 20 30 40 50 
changes in 
demand 
Changes in 10 20 30 40 50 
technolo9v 
Poor cost 10 20 30 40 50 
control 
Over-trading 10 20 30 40 50 
Supply chain 10 20 30 40 50 
d'squeezes" 
Staying too 10 20 30 40 50 
long in mature 
markets 
Lack of 10 20 30 40 50 
innovation 
Lack of 10 20 30 40 50 
managerial 
skills 
Inadequate 10 20 30 40 50 
market 
rese 




Factors for Business Growth 
29. From the list of factors below and your experiences please indicate to what extent they are 
important causes of business Prowth. 
Very unlikely Unlikely to neither , ely Likely to Very likely to 
to produce produce nor unlik ly produce produce 
growth wth growth growth 
Increase in 10 20 30 40 50 
customer 
demand for 
the product or 
services 
Ability to 10 20 30 40 50 
develop new 
markets 
Good debtor 10 20 30 40 50 
control 
Iligh profit 10 20 30 40 50 
margins 
Good market 10 20 30 40 50 
research 
Adequate 10 20 311 40 50 
workine capital 
Ability to bring 10 20 30 40 50 
new products 
to market 
Ability to spot 10 20 30 40 50 
new 
opportunities 





Good 10 20 30 40 50 
management 
skills 
Good 10 20 30 40 50 
knowledge of 
cost structures 
Ability to 10 20 30 40 50 
absorb cost 
increases 
Ability to 10 20 30 40 50 
manage the 
margin 
Ability to 10 20 30 40 50 
improve 
productivity 
Long-term 10 20 30 40 so 
business 
planning 
Ocar business 10 20 30 40 50 
objectives I I I I I 
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Your views about management functions 
, Management tasks tend to be associated with different functions in the 
management of a business. In small businesses, the same person may undertake 
these activities. Please map the following activities to the three functions. 
30. Please tick the area to which you think the following management activities 
apply. 
Activity Function 
leadership strategy control 
managing stock levels 0 0 0 
co-ordinating 0 0 0 
directing purpose 0 0 0 
researching the market D 0 0 
managing cash 0 D 0 
raising finance 0 D 
developing vision D D 
setting clear targets 0 0 0 
setting prices 0 0 0 
knowledge of competition 0 0 D 
changing business direction 0 D 0 
chasing debts 0 0 0 
motivating staff 0 0 D 
producing management accounts D 0 D 
'Ibank you for your help with this research. Please return the questionnaire in 
the envelope provided. Further comments and discussion are welcome. Write 
to Kevin Mole, Management Research Centre, University of Wolverhampton, 
Shropshire Campus, Priorslee, Telford TF2 9NT. (E-mail: EXI 166@wlv. ac. uk) 
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